Robbins SCE Research
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BOOK II Glen Robbins Sept. sub to SCC Re: LPA (BC), Royal Assent May 2012, unlawful conduct conspiracy, Bakonyi, Cambridge, Ellis, BMO, Fenlon J., Hinkson CJ, Gov BC, Right of Audience v LPA
  Dec 20, 2014

Commentary
118. From paragraph [34] of “YAL” “The definition of “practising lawyer” is found is in section 1 and is as follows: “practising lawyer” means a member in good standing who holds or is entitled to hold a practising certification.'” It is a fact that in order to practice law a person must be a member in good standing with the Law Society of British Columbia, and must hold a certificate to practise law and to receive payment for so doing. A non lawyer appears to be able practice law (pre May 2012) so long as they don't charge a fee or expect a gain or benefit. (Ed: In fact at the time of the decision the practice of law under the enactment of the Legal Profession Act (BC) would include a practicing lawyer not expecting a fee, gain or benefit, otherwise why would the legislation have included the exemption/exception or alternatively why was the legislation amended to remove this. Given that section 15 (1) encumbers the liberties of persons who are not members of the Law Society to the authority of that same organization shouldn't these untrained people confronted with the high fees of the middle class as discussed by the Chief Justice of the SCC at the Empire Ballroom luncheon at least be accorded the clarity of some clarity, or is that just the point... there is more control in confusion than clarity)”
119. From paragraph [35] of “YAL” “member” means a member of the society, and “society” means the Law Society of British Columbia.”
120. From paragraph [38] of “YAL” “The definition of “practice of law” includes the following activities, among others: “(a) appearing as counsel or advocate, (b) drawing, revising or settling (ii) a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial.”
121. From paragraph [37] of “YAL” “However, the activities which comprise the “practice of law” (which in my view also include acts described in s. 15 (5)) are exempt from the definition of “practice of law” (gpr-ed), “(h)....if not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed.”
122. From paragraph [38] of “YAL” “Mr. Cram prepared the originating documents in the last four of the five proceedings, and has appeared (with leave of the court) as counsel for the plaintiffs/petitioners at two previous interlocutory hearings. He has given legal advice, and has prepared notice of motions and affidavits for use in all five proceedings. It appears that Mr. Cram has performed this work without fee, gain or reward and without expectation of a fee, gain or reward. Accordingly, what he has done, does not fall within the “practice of law”. (Ed- it appears these actions of Mr. Cram are with leave of the court )- (Ed: I disagree with His Honour's assessment of Mr. Cram on this account as he is not practicing law if he has done so without fee, gain or reward and Halfyard J. does not explain the distinction well as between para 37 and 38)
123. From paragraph [39] of “YAL” “Mr. Cram has applied for leave to represent the plaintiffs/petitioners pending his reinstatement by the Law Society. The plaintiffs/petitioners say (though Mr. Cram and through several other persons who spoke at the hearing) that they want to continue the prosecution of the proceedings, and they want Mr. Cram to represent them in doing so. Part way through the hearing of that application, I (Halfyard) adjourned it and it has not yet been completed.”
124. From paragraph [40] “I accept that Mr. Cram has had lengthy experience as counsel and was a competent member of the bar for many years before he ceased to practice in 1994. I also accept that, although he apparently did not resume working on litigation matters until about the fall of 2003, he possesses the skill of a barrister.” “Mr. Cram is a lawyer, and it would be wrong to refer to him as a lay person.” (Ed: Here, Halfyard J is taking a person who has an apparent good history as a member of the Law Society for some period of time, but not at the time he appears before him, but at the point in time of YAL has no more authority under the Act than any other non lawyer other than to practice law without any expectation of a fee, gain or benefit. Halfyard J.'s assessment that Mr. Cram “possesses the skill of a barrister” would reflect His Honour's likely inclination to give Mr. Cram a right of audience. [At this point the matter of section 15 has not been dispensed with]. It is important to note here that the application for leave is unrelated to the right of audience but on the basis of representing the members of the band. I would taken the events on the subject in a very different way than Halfyard J., and rather than skate around the poorly written “inelegant” “redundant” legislation, I would indicated to Mr. Cram that I believed by granting him an order to represent these persons, given that they are aboriginal and the matters have causal connection to claims and other monetary matters that by representing them without being a member in good standing with the Law Society of BC he was in fact in the midst of the potentiality of future benefit and supplying his good will talents with that motivation in mind, in breach of the practice of law exemption).
125. From paragraph [41] “But Mr. Cram is not a “practising lawyer”, and I do not agree with his contention that he court should treat him as if he was. He is a former member who is seeking restitution by the Law Society. That being so, for the purposes of s. 15 of the Act, Mr. Cram is not “an individual party” and he is not a “practising lawyer”. (Ed: This position reflects Halfyard J.'s position that section 15 (5) may be intended to have overriding authority to the exception to the practice of law available to non lawyers at the time of the hearing of “YAL” since made clear by the amended legislation (May 2012), yet the provisions provided as they were prior to the amendments made by way of Royal Assent provide no avenue of distinction as between the exemption of subsection 15 (1) (h) 'the exemption to practice of law' and the prohibitions contained in section 15 (5), particularly no distinction by notice or other provision and certainly not by the Interpretation Act.)
126. From paragraph [42] “As I interpret Mr. Jane's argument, he submits that the last four proceedings were commenced in violation of s. 15 (5) of the Act, and that all steps previously taken and current attempts being made by the plaintiffs/petitioners to further prosecute all five proceedings are in violation of the same statute. That complaint does not include the proceedings taken in action no. 12437 (by Gordon Sebastian solicitor) up to December 10, 2002.” (Ed: At this point we can see that Mister Justice Halfyard aligns with the Reasons of Mister Justice Grauer on the 'meat' of what section 15 (5) may be intended to mean, but exists as only a contradiction to subsection 15 (1) (h). Person A cannot sign an originating document on behalf of Person B even if Person A is a party to the action. An originating document should be signed by the party to the action. However, 15 (5) required interpretation and even with this could not be conclusively identified as to object in light of the contradictory language of section 15 (1) regarding the practice of law – for free. The trouble with this goes beyond the contradictions offered by the original 15 (1) (h) and 15 (5) as is evidenced in the Grauer J. matter concerning Glen Robbins. That is, if Glen Robbins has commenced an action on behalf of another person, namely Ita Robbins and Frana Matich (in another persons name), aren't Ita Robbins and Frana Matich also guilty of commencing an action in another person's name, that of Glen Robbins? Ita Robbins and Frana Matich cannot be guilty of breaching section 15 (1) on the basis that they are the individual parties (“whatever that means”). Yet Glen Robbins is not found by Grauer J to be in breach of the practice of law, quite to the contrary, Grauer J addresses the distinction with subsection 15 (1) and goes no further on it).
127. (Argument) The point to consider at this juncture of facts (evidence) is who is responsible for this confusion? The non lawyer or the Law Society of BC, and the drafters of the legislation? Do the commoners have control over the drafting of legislation? No they do not. They only have control – sort of – over the people they elect. The persons they elect are alleged to be responsible for drafting competently worded legislation and they failed in terms of section 15 and most specifically 15 (1) and 15 (5) until the recent amendments approved by Royal Assent May 2012. Aren't these amendments to 15 (1) and 15 (5) linked historically to the Robbins case, and aren't they an admission of faulty legislative drafting if a quorum of smart justices cannot definitively figure this out over a number of decades, or at least many years? Didn't the Law Society simply plan this and shouldn't Glen Robbins be getting an apology and compensation? Shouldn't Ita Robbins and Frana Matich be getting an apology and compensation? Should Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis be permitted to practice law ... in the interests of the public (as it were). Was Justice Fenlon really deluded during the hearing – or was she planted at the hearing as revenge for her former boss Elizabeth Lyall and the horrible job she and Michael Kleisinger before Mister Justice Grauer at hearing September 8, 2011?
128. From paragraph [43] “It appears that this is a case of first impression. Counsel did not refer me to any case in which a representative action was commenced or prosecuted by one or more lay litigants on behalf of themselves and numerous other plaintiffs or petitioners. However, it has been established that actions based on aboriginal rights are properly brought by way of representative proceedings: see: Oregon Jack Creek Indian Band et al v CNR (1989) 34 B.C. L. R. 2D 344 (C.A.) at 350 and 355.”
129. (Back to Halfyard J.) -From paragraph [44] “In determining the meaning of a statute, the primary role of construction is this: “In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless there be something in the content, or in the object of the statute in which they occur, or in the circumstances with reference to which they are used, to show that they are used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.” “This statement of the fundamental principle was made by Lord Atkinson in Victoria (City) v. Bishop of Vancouver Island [1921] A.C. 384 at 387. It was accepted as correct by our court of appeal in Harden Nation v. B.C. (Minister of Forests) (1997) 45 B.C.L.R. 3D 80 per Esson, J.A at 86. At page 91, Esson J.A said” “....in the absence of a reason to reject the 'ordinary' or 'plain meaning' of the words, the meaning is binding.” (Ed: Prior to the amendments to section 15 (1) (h) the practice of law entitlement for persons not members of the Law Society, and 15 (5) the actions of the solicitor (and not right of audience) were confusing, this is the central component of Grauer J.'s Reasons that no one wants to talk about. The distraction(s) on May 9, 2013 before Fenlon J., were not just 'perjured' submissions by Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis, and obviously highly incompetent and bias conclusion in regard to 15 (5) by Fenlon J., but worse. They are worse because if neither of these members of the Law Society or Constitutionally appointed Justice were not aware of significant amendments to that subsection as is evidence from the transcript, but affected this behaviour in order to keep Glen Robbins deluded as to the constitution of these subsection relevant to his ongoing court of appeal matters not yet formally completed at Supreme Court of Canada then we must conclude that this fraud was perpetrated with malice aforethought and reflects a large chunk of the proof of unlawful conduct conspiracy. Making the situation of the language worse was the fact that the confusing language is not abstracted to the order of Justice Grauer alone, but exacerbated by the confusing and contradictory relationship between 15 (5) and 15 (1) (h).
130. Didn't Grauer J. reject the ordinary and plain meaning sufficiently to create an outcome of his decisions that bound the court to what is really an abuse of the administration of justice. At Page 6 paragraph [21] Grauer J., writes: “Previous decisions of this Court are not consistent, and the Court of Appeal has yet to resolve the inconsistency. The problem arises from what I consider to be rather clumsy legislative drafting. Given that the legislation in question is the Legal Profession Act, this observation is not without irony.” At Page 7 paragraph [25] Grauer J., writes: “It is not immediately obvious why subsection 15 (1) (a) permits a person who is an “individual party” (whatever that means) to a proceeding who is acting without counsel on his or her own behalf to engage in the practice of law, when by definition, the practice of law would appear not to include that activity. One must assume, I suppose, that since the definition is not exhaustive, the practice of law may be taken to include other activities not covered by the definition, even when no fee is charged.” “It is also unclear why subsection 15 (5) includes the redundant words “in the persons own name”. Given the provisions of subsection 15 (1), and the definition of the “practice of law”, those words would appear to be superfluous, and detract from the clarity of the subsection.”
131. From paragraph [45] “There is a legislative rule for interpreting statutes, in section 8 of the Interpretation Act which says: “8. Every enactment must be construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensure the attainment of its objects.” (remedial: intended as a remedy or cure). On October 3, 2011 (respectfully), how did the enactment (Legal Professions Act cure anything – other than provide the Law Society with some type of confused control and how does this advance the object and duty of these professionals? It doesn't – it just gives them a vulgar type of control over courts processes through the ambush of the untrained, making the legal profession more rudimentary in the law than the great unwashed they propose to regulate. (Physician heal thyself – first).
132. (Position argument) The amendments made though Royal Assent May 2012 made have finally provided the cure, but it left Glen Robbins a virus and apparently a number of its members and Justice Fenlon among other justices without sufficient knowledge of the cure. If the justices don't know the enactment that governs the regulation of law and the courts we have some very serious problems. Perhaps it is time to do like Quebec has done and combine the Law Society with the Bar and demand at least that is membership know the enactment that governs it.
133. From paragraph [46] “YAL” “I think the object of s. 15 of the Legal Profession Act is to the prevent the practise of law by persons other than lawyers who are authorized to practice law by the Law Society, with certain exceptions. One of the exceptions is....”an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf.”
134. From paragraph [47] “In my opinion, the plain and ordinary meaning of s. 15 (1) (a) is that an individual party to a proceeding “is permitted to engage in the practice of law,” insofar as that is necessary to act himself or herself in the proceeding (i.e. without counsel)” However to Grauer J., this does not appear to be the case. At page 7 paragraph [25] he writes: “It is not immediately obvious why subsection 15 (1)(a) permits a person who is an “individual party” (whatever that means) to a proceeding.” “It is also unclear why subsection 15 (5) includes the redundant words, “in the person's own name”. (Ed: By extension of logic is must also be construed --- particularly to lay people trapped in this web of verbosity and confusion which the Law Societies own members don't appear to understand, which justices don't appear to understand-- that in “another persons name” the second part of that redundancy of section 15 (5) as it was then – is not also unclear when considered in light of the exceptions to section 15 (1) as it was prior to the May 2012 Amendments. If this wasn't the case why would have they removed the words relating to the 3rd party (not the individual party)?
135. From paragraph [48] “In my view, it is plain meaning of s. 15 (5) that an individual party who is acting for himself for herself in a proceeding can commence, prosecute or defend that proceeding, on his or her own behalf, but cannot do any of those things on behalf of any other party to the same proceeding, I would add the words “a person” in s. 15 (5) include both parties and non-parties to litigation” (Ed: though I think I understand what Halfyard J is hoping to accomplish here – I believe his reason is insufficient not only to the YAL matter but particularly to the Glen Robbins and Law Society matter where he stipulates: “I would the words “a person” in s. 15 (5) include both parties and non-parties to litigation”. Based on Halfyard J. attempt at resolving the language riddle he gives support to the argument later inferred by Grauer J. that Ita Robbins and Frana Matich are as guilty as Glen Robbins is in terms of breaching subsection 15 (5), Glen Robbins meets the criteria suggested as non party, whilst It Robbins and Frana Matich fit the criteria as the party to the action).
136. From paragraph [49] “The next question is whether there is anything in the context (i.e. “the immediate context of the subsection and the general context of the Act”: Haida Nation supra, at p. 88) which could sustain an interpretation contrary to the plain meaning I have set out. I would frame the question this way: In a proceeding where multiple plaintiffs are all acting without counsel, could one of them, with the consent of the rest (or could a non party, with the consent of all the plaintiffs) act on behalf of all of them.” At this juncture Halfyard J., is describing two situations which he believes breach section 15 (5) as it was prior to the May 2012 Amendments. That is if there are three parties to an action, let's say they are plaintiffs, a person who is not a party cannot sign their court filings on their behalf with their consent or not. Also, a person who is a party may not, again with consent from others, sign the documents on their behalf. The parties to the action must all sign their name to the document being filed, this is elephant in the room everyone is dancing (prancing nearly) around.
137. From paragraph [50] “I see nothing in the context which tends to contradict the plain meanings of s. 15 (1) (a) and s. 15 (5) which I have described. I do not detect an apparent ambiguity in the meaning of the words “practice of law” in s. 15 (1), with inference to the exception in s. 15 (1) (a). The definition of “practice of law” in s. 1 includes a series of activities, but then says, in effect, that, if a person is not a paid for such activities (or if a person is paid, but is working as a public officer, notary public or insurance adjuster), then a person is not engaging in the practice of law. Under this definition, it seems to me that a party litigant who acts in person would not and could not be practicing law in this sense, because it would be nonsense to suggest that he or she would be paying himself or herself for the work in self representation.” (Ed: At this juncture Halfyard J is opening the door for Grauer J to step through vis a vis the Grauer J comments about “individual party” It isn't pretty. The applicant(s) point is that it is intended to not be pretty. (One can only hope this is the reason).
138. (Ed: Justice Halfyard gives a brave effort in attempting to make clear that which is not clear. It isn't clear to Justice Grauer, it wasn't clear to other justices making determinations, it isn't (wasn't) clear to Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins or Frana Matich. However His Honour is a very smart person. He is well trained in the law. We are dealing with people who by definition are included in section 15 who we know aren't trained in law. The very essence of the language of the injunction offered by he Law Society from the enactment demand that until these non lawyers become members in good standing with the Law Society. This would presume that legal education and training has occurred (and not the voluntary sort that the Bar demands of Law Society members across the country). What is essential to consider from s 15 (1) (a) is the fact that Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins, Frana Matich and about 25,000,000 other middle class Canadians who are subject to the imposition on their general liberties from in this case a provincial law society which is not a registered society at all, self governing with the Attorney General as its designated Bencher in perpetuity, making the law society a de facto legal arm of the Government of British Columbia, in control of everyone's liberties as this concerns the use of provincial court forms for filing in provincial court registries and who cannot with any degree of clarity, in fact no clarity at all, have no idea what the rules are which govern their access to justice. Apparently based on H130330, S111171, and 106413 neither doe the lawyers and justices...in Graurian terms “this is not without irony”).
139. From paragraph [51] “YAL” “But such a self-represented individual party would be doing acts that fall within paragraphs (a) to (g) of the definition of “practice of law”. Is such a party exempted because he or she fits into the s. 15 (1) (a) exception, or because he or she is not being paid and is therefore is not practicing law at all”?
140. From paragraph [52] “I see no need to further pursue this apparent anomaly, because regardless of the answer, the fact remains that any “an individual party acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf” is exempted from the prohibition. A self represented plaintiff who wanted to act for one or more individual plaintiffs (even without this consent) would appear to be precluded from doing so by s. 15 (5).” (Ed: I respectfully do not agree with His Honour's position on this given the pre May 2012 amendments which permitted the practice of law so long as there was no expectation of a fee, gain or benefit.” From the Reasons of Grauer J. Page 6 paragraph 22: “Section 1 of the Act defines the “practice of law”. The definition is non-exhaustive. It includes such matters s “appearing as counsel or advocate”, “drawing, revising or settling....a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial”, and doing an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages”. “It specifically does not include, however, “any of those acts if not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed.” “So by definition, the “practice of law” does not include, for instance, appearing as counsel or advocate if one does charge a fee for doing so.”
141. (Ed: Grauer J advances the Halfyard J. analysis to go through what does and what does not constitute the “practice of law”. It is important to micro manage the language as it pertains to the practice of law which itself is unclear. Appearing as counsel might give one the impression of attendance before the court but we know it is not as that judicial discretion falls to the “right of audience” a wholly different section of the process journey. The word “appearance” as it used in this context can be linked to the requirement in the old manner of document filing which remains in some appeal matters at least at BC Court of Appeal of filing an “appearance” as Ronald Bakonyi did on behalf of Cambridge Mortgage in the appeal of the chambers orders given by Arnold Bailey J nearly the end of May 2014 and prior to the further ex parte orders made Her Honour while her first orders remained before the BC Court of Appeal. Mr. Bakonyi's “Apperance” entitled to him the protection of the rules which demand further service of documents under a file that he otherwise would not be entitled to if he did not file said “Appearance.” The applicants take the position that Mr. Bakonyi and BC Superior Court Justice Arnold Bailey J. committed unlawful conduct conspiracy by proceeding with hearing when the stipulations made by order for that hearing were before the BC Court of Appeal and where an Appearance had been filed. Mr. Bakonyi cannot expect the safety and protection for his client of the BC Court of Rules on one hand and then deliberately undermine and abuse this process on one hand, and then slip back into the lower court from whence the appeal first came to ambush an order from the court. Justice Arnold Bailey strode to the bench in that ex parte hearing with the file (one can only anticipate) which at the top of it (we checked) had the Requisition and BC Court of Appeal appeal documents with affidavit evidence attached thereto).
142. (Ed: Grauer J. affirms that the exempted acts include drawing, revising or settling....a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial. Can we not all agree that a Notice of Claim would fall under this document description? This is what Glen Robbins did and he did not do so “for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect from the person for whom the acts are performed” The only indirect benefit Glen Robbins might have received from his wife Ita Robbins was the blessing of her wonderful cooking, her extraordinary love and care of his two daughters and her unwavering commitment to him as his wife. The elder Trudeau might have had something to say about any other benefits possibly enjoyed by Glen Robbins in representing his wife).
143. From paragraph [53] “YAL” “The third issue is whether the plain meaning of the statute is inconsistent with the object of the Act. If I am right, than the combined effect of s. 15 (1)(a) and s. 15 (5) is to enable individuals who are parties to proceedings to act on their own behalf, but to prevent them from acting on behalf of any other co-party to the proceeding. It is reasonable to infer that this effect is also one of the purposes of the legislation. If so, then there is no conflict between the object of the statute and the plain meaning of the words in question.” (Ed: Once again, like a spouse or family member enabling the excessive drinking of a spouse – His Honour compares section 15 (1) (a) to section 15 (5) when it is section 15 (1) (h) {as it was prior to May 2012 amendments} WHICH OUGHT TO BE COMPARED).
144. From paragraph [54] “Finally, are there any circumstances which militate against the prohibition that would result from acceptance of the plain meaning? In my opinion, there is on such important circumstance.”
145. From paragraph [55] “An individual who is a party to a proceeding may not wish to act on his or her own behalf, but may be able to pay fees to retain a practising lawyer. If such party wants a non-lawyer to act for him or her, then the non lawyer may apply to ask for leave (and the court has power to grant leave) to act on behalf of the party. In granting this discretion, the court will also grant such leave if it is “in the interests of justice” to do so. It has also been said that this discretion “should be exercised rarely and with caution”, See Vernrose Holdings Ltd. v. Pacific Press Ltd (1978) 88 D.L.R. 3D 523 (B.C.C.A.) per McIntyre J.A., at 529. Yet the discretion was held to exist, even though it was not expressly permitted by the statute, and or a literal reading of it, was arguably precluded” (Ed” This might be a fine suggestion but doesn't deal with the tending toward a solution which Grauer J., does and mostly in his exposure of the rather hobbled language in the Act).
146. (Ed: What Halfyard J. fails to do here - is to properly articulate how leave is obtained in context of NOT breaching the provisions in question given that the breach of 15 (5) can only occur in documents filed at the provincial court registry. How would self litigants wishing to appoint an lawyer who isn't a lawyer commence the circumstance under which a justice, or other decision maker with authority to make decisions that possess inherent jurisdiction make that decision to grant leave.? Have the persons who want to commence an action already filed their claim prior to applying for leave, or is the application for leave a separate undertaking prior to the action being commenced? If it is the latter than how was the claim commenced, by Requisition? Our choices are notice of claim, petition and requisition. Did the person the parties wanted to act on their behalf [who was not a member of the Law Society] sign the originating documents, the notice of claim, or petition on 'other person's behalf ' and then seek leave for judicial authority to do what had already been done, or would a requisition be filed to determine leave, or does the non lawyer, or more accurately the regular person not a member in good standing of the Law Society (pre May 2012), acting as a practicing lawyer with no expectation of fee, gain or benefit sign her or her name to the originating documents and wait to see if the court approves? In Halfyard J.'s thinking the court with it inherent jurisdiction should be reaching out to the provincial court registry through the provision of the BC Civil Rules (somehow) to exercise its inherent jurisdiction with specificity to self litigants prior to the judge making a decision. The Law Society application based on provincial court Rule 8 of the BC Civil Rules under S111171 initiated an action for the Law Society under a file which subject matter was related to this very subject. The object of this particular application under section 18 of the BC Supreme Court Act for vexatious proceeding (litigant) includes numerous cases as evidence which include Ita Robbins and Frana Matich as the sole parties or Glen Robbins as one of the parties along with them. Each party has signed their own name to the action, many are dismissed ahead of the hearing and some are settled through the normal course of events. How it is that Glen Robbins is once again segregated as the vexatious one and Ita Robbins and Frana Matich though equal in action and status to whom are not? Why is it that Ronald Bakonyi seeks the same order from the same persons namely Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich using the exact same evidence of cases put before Hinkson CJ one month after the order of Hinkson CJ? Wasn't Hinkson CJ and his legal associates at the Law Society of BC actually revealing their preference to the Grauer J. Reasons over the Halfyard J Reasons?
147. From paragraph [56] “YAL” “The continual existence of the discretion was affirmed by..court of appeal in R. v. Dick [2002] B.C.J. No 59; 2002 B.C.C.A. 27, at para. 6 and 7.”
148. From paragraph [57] “When Vernrose Holdings Ltd. was decided, the relevant section of the Legal Profession Act was s. 72 and it then read (in relevant part) as follows: “72. No corporation and no person other than a member of the Society in good standing shall engage in the practice of law, except that (a) a person may act on his own behalf in a proceeding to which he is a party.”
149. From paragraph [58] “It is apparent that s. 5 (1) (a) is similar in substance to its predecessor, s. 72 (a). But there is no provision in the earlier Act that was similar to s. 15 (5) (which came into force on December 31, 1998). It was not suggested by the court in R v. Dick, nor was it argued by counsel in the present case, that the enactment of s. 15 (5) had any effect on the court's discretion to permit a non lawyer to act for a litigant in court. I conclude that the legislation to extinguish the court's discretion by enacting s. 15 (5).” (Ed: This positioning of Halfyard J. becomes interesting. Although Halfyard J. 'concludes' that s. 15 (5) is the legislation that extinguishes the court's discretion (I presume he means the court with inherent jurisdiction and not the provincial court registry) he does so in context to predecessor provisions of s. 5(1) and s 72 (a) which assert: “no corporation and no person (covering off both types of legal persons), other than a member of the Society in good standing shall engage in the practice of law, except that (a) a person may act on his own behalf in a proceeding to which he is party.” (Ed: doesn't it appear that s. 72 or s 5 (1) was better than section 15 (5)? Further we are spinning our wheels here because we are still left with 15 (1) (h) the exception to the practice of law).
150. From paragraph [59] “This discretion has its source in the power of the Courts to control their own processes. In Vernrose Holdings Ltd. (p 529), Mr. Justice McIntyre described the source and the scope of the power in this way: “...the Courts, as master of their proceedings must retain a discretion whether to hear from time ti time on the cause of the dispatch of their business such persons other than barristers as they may consider should be heard in the interest of justice. The Court in its own discretion may grant a privilege of audience to such person in any case where it deems it necessary or proper and deny it in other cases. This, no doubt, is a power which should be exercised rarely and with caution, and is one the Courts will be zealous to preserve.”
151. From paragraph [60] “As far as I can tell, the court's discretion has only been judicially considered in cases where a non-lawyer has sought leave to act as counsel for one party to a proceeding, and when that party was the only plaintiff or accused person in the proceeding. There does not appear to be any reported case in which a person who was not a practicing lawyer made application for leave as counsel for numerous plaintiffs or petitioners.”
152. From paragraph [61] “It seems to me that, if there is discretion to permit a person who is not a practising lawyer to act as counsel for an individual plaintiff, then the discretion should extend to cases having multiple plaintiffs. In my opinion, a group of plaintiffs could agree that they wanted to have a non-lawyer act as counsel for all of them, and than the non-lawyer could apply to the court for leave to do so. Moreover, I see no logical reason why the non-lawyer put foreward by the group of plaintiffs as their counsel of choice, could not be on of the plaintiffs.” (Ed: Once again, the use of the term “practise law “ once again is unclear because s. 15 (1) (h). What is most important is the spirit of Halfyard J's contemplation being that it should be possible to have a person who is not a member of the Law Society in good standing act on behalf of other parties so long as the presiding operator of the inherent jurisdiction triggered by the sitting of the justice at the bench (and not at the registry) which suggest an opening for self litigants who don't have the money for a lawyer or simply don't trust the profession. A person can be relieved of counsel when they say they have lost confidence in the member of the Law Society representing them. What is the entire group of persons seeking access to the courts don't trust lawyers)? This is the elephant in the room going forward – should the Law Society of British Columbia – or any other law society in Canada have authority over self litigants. The Halfyard J. reasons would suggest so, the Grauer J. reasons only suggest whatever that authority might be it is poorly advanced in 'clumsy legislative drafting').
153. From paragraph [62] “The issue of whether the court's discretion should be exercised in favour of granting leave, is of course an entirely separate question. The nature and complexity of the proceedings, the suitability of the applicant, the financial means of the plaintiffs and other relevant matters would have to be considered.” McIntyre J.A. , in 1978 makes reference to some of the considerations where a non lawyer who is not a member of the Law Society in good standing. The nature and complexity of the proceedings, 'financial circumstances and capacity of the person wanting to speak on behalf of other person(s) (sic).' (Ed: Under BCSC 106413 the issue under consideration follows the federal Bank Act and lack of notice proven not to have been given prior to a foreclosure petition (Lis Pendens) being filed. The court determines that this lack of notice under the Bank Act is res judicata the foreclosure proceeding itself. How can this be? The act of the lack of notice occurred and was admitted to prior to any commencement of court proceeding on the subject. The applicants believe that this action properly belongs in the Federal Court of Canada. Ita Robbins is a disabled person under Canada Pension Plan disability, she has lost her pension for Reynaud's Syndrome which has been under appeal for some 5 years now, Frana Matich is a widow and Glen Robbins is injured in a workplace accident requiring a right knee replacement. There are assets but cash flow is scarce. BMO Bank has clearly cheated them and not done their homework as required by the Foreclosure Checklist provided by the Law Society. BMO has placed the family home on a national security watchlist “Key Facts” for empty homes. Key Facts informs Glen Robbins they have no idea why this was done, but believe that because many homes were empty the bank simply included their without checking. The applicants believe that the chartered banks facing a $100 billion guarantee fund were looking to double dip and apply for benefits under the federal aid as well foreclose on unwanted clients. This period of time January 2009 was also the time that the Bank of Canada began to drop the Bank Rate and mortgage brokers and other lenders without administrative facility (to actually satisfy section 6 of the Interest Act) began to get in the 'mortgage business' that in fact was not a mortgage business at all but a loan enterprise disguised as a mortgage).
154. (Ed: If Glen Robbins is considered the applicant in BCSC 106413 to represent Ita Robbins and Frana Matich (the plaintiffs) we already know that he has had success in a previous case involving CIBC where applications were directed by the Court for hearing by Trial Scheduling and the action commenced against the persons he was defending abandoned by legal counsel in their capacity as members in good standing with the Law Society of BC. We know from the cases cited herein that the court will direct any matter to trial if there is a hint of the chance of success. This would apply in the matter under H130330 involving Ita Robbins, Frana Matich, Ronald Bakonyi, Robert Elllis, Justice Fenlon and Glen Robbins. Clearly Justice Fenlon says right on Transcript that Ita Robbins and Frana Matich “have a case”. Adair J., is made aware of Glen Robbins previous history in the 1990's. He remained inactive until the BMO actions but was awakened to the injustice of the banks actions and realized they needed a response for their impropriety and infidelity. His publishing business had been with them for many years at Commercial banking headquarters. They had pledged nearly three quarters of a million dollars in unemcumbered real estate. What was the problem here? So, in terms of Halfyard J.'s criteria for leave Glen Robbins was a good candidate. Adair J. thought so too. Her stipulation was that Ita Robbins and Frana Matich either or (joint tenants) show up to court. No problem says Glen Robbins. When Glen Robbins talks to his wife and mother in law they instruct him to settle with other defendants who have offered settlement with no costs. Only BMO refuses. The night before hearing Frana becomes seriously ill with cancer symptoms and is booked for surgery. The court is informed and adjournment sought. There would have been no need for any hearing had BMO just sucked it up and settled the matter. They cheated the Robbins family by not providing notice and thereafter went to no lengths to resolve the matter catipulting the family into the land of the sub prime and the predations offered there.)
155. (Argument) Clearly, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich filed an appeal of the order nisi to the BC Court of Appeal following the May 9, 2013 hearing and included a constitutional provision in that conventional appeal. The amount of fee paid for the appeal was $200. In what democratic country is an appeal filed within 30 days of the order not heard because it was not filed as a leave application.? The first appeal under constitutional question is a right and the second is an application for the right to appeal. Can there be any question that these awkward and untoward events and circumstances were part of the nefarious calculations of the members in good standing with the Law Society under H130330 (and likely a number of justices with alleged constitutional independence) in conjunction with cooperating justices to deny a constitutional hearing and protect the secret of the illegal loan agreements disguised as mortgages? Ita Robbins and Frana Matich have not their appeal heard and have a constitutional right to a proper appeal which justices of what the common person would consider 'good behaviour' would expect. Although the secret is in the vault on the order nisi (SCC 35772) we have not had opportunity to address the irregularity in Cambridge filing a petition for mortgage when their contract was for a loan. We have not had an opportunity to appeal the notice of hearing document. We have not had an opportunity to appeal the affidavit evidence not disclosing triable issues. We have not had an appeal based on the fact that the petition was not filed in the proper registry. We have not had an appeal of the perjured submissions of Mssrs Bakonyi and Ellis to Fenlon J.. We have not an appeal of the apprehension of bias of Fenlon J or worse conduct. We have not had an appeal of the fact that lawyers Ellis and Bakonyi filed an Order After Application with their signatures on their clients featuring orders of the court, when in fact no Application was ever made, does not occur anywhere on the docket and never received any such order. Justices and Judges don't like the word fraud – This was and remains fraud. This was and remains an unlawful conspiracy.
156. From paragraph [65] “YAL”“In the meantime, the first ground of the present application is dismissed. I will reserve my decision on grounds 2 and 3, pending completion of Mr. Cram's application for leave to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs/petitioners.” In the more recent “YAL” instance, Mr. Cram, a former lawyer of good standing with the Law Society of BC, and at the time of hearing before Mister Justice Halfyard not in good standing but hoping to have that standing reinstated, is not considered to be any different in terms of his standing with the Law Society of BC then Glen Robbins. The justice in this case considered by peers to be an excellent justice reserves judgment until an application can be made for leave. Isn't this what ought to have fairly occurred in the BCSC 106413 matter involving BMO Bank of Montreal and under H130330 with triable issues known to Justice Fenlon in the original case given that by Fenlon J deciding to direct the matter to Trial Scheduling at the first hearing in January 2011 and knowing of the complaints regarding Glen Robbins status from the Law Society?
157. From paragraph [68] “YAL” “In view of Rules 8 (8) and 8 (18), it appears that Ron Jackson was not permitted to sign the originating documents in Action Nos. 13305 and 13306. Since no plaintiff or petitioner signed either document, I think this would be a separate ground for staying these two proceedings. It may also be necessary for all of the plaintiffs and petitioners to sign the last four of the originating documents (on a separate document) in order to realize the proceedings. But I would like to hear further argument before deciding the issue.” Given the history of these cases involving sections 15 (1), 15 (4) and 15 (5) and the plentiful reasons provided though without emphatic determination about these particular provisions – isn't it obvious that the courts have taken care to not rush to judgments that might send the administration of justice into tailspin. In this instance no signatures equal a stay. At page 4 paragraph [15] of the Grauer decision he writes in reference to 106413: “An application for dismissal brought the Bank of Montreal......came on for hearing before Madame Justice Adair on January 19, 2011. At that time, as I understand it, Adair J. Refused Mr. Robbins a right of audience. In the circumstances, Adair J., adjourned the hearing so that the plaintiffs could attend in person or retain counsel.” (Ed: In context of the BC Court of Appeal actions of Saunders J., at BC Court of Appeal given the fact that Cambridge filed a writ of possession while the order nisi appeal at the Supreme Court of Canada had yet to be heard, in fact an order given July 10, 2014 by a provincial deputy registrar with no legal training pre empting the decision of the Reconsideration matter not yet heard at the countries top court likely the first matter in a line up of a thousand applications to be stayed?
158. (Facts and arguments) Justice Adair seized herself of the matter under 106413 on January 19, 2011. Her Honour did so in conjunction with directing the matter to Trial Scheduling. The legal inference of this is that there was enough evidence in the “rambling and incoherent” pleadings of the plaintiffs. How can the justice reconcile her defamatory comment about these pleadings (apparently unread by Grauer J.) on one hand and send the poor plaintiffs off to trial for her now seized of the matter to adjudicate over the matter. In so doing doesn't Justice Adair reflect an apprehension of bias in the case against the plaintiffs and signal to the defendants ahead of time that they are going to win? Glen Robbins and other legal counsel attend to Trial Scheduling as directed to by Justice Adair. Glen Robbins agrees to a Trial date on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich along with the other members in good standing with the Law Society of British Columbia. Did legal counsel for defendants have the authority to make such a deal with Glen Robbins over a trial date given the directives made by Adair J., just minutes before? Did Trial Scheduling with order in hand have the right to set a Trial date or did legal counsel involved in making this arrangement with Glen Robbins for settling of trial date and Trial Scheduling in effect, breach of the order of Justice Adair?
159. (Facts and Arguments) Glen Robbins made preliminary agreements for settlement with parties whilst a Trial Date was being determined to settle the matter given the circumstances of knowledge of Frana's cancer that was known at this time but did not explode as illness requiring immediate surgery until the night prior to the February 24, 2011 Summary Trial hearing. The basis in part was in relation to the illness at the time and the requirement for Frana Matich not to endure any further stress. Daniel Webster QC representing BMO at the time was aware of this and the overtures of settlement. These settlements followed including settlements of actions against Ellis Roadburg (in its legal capacity under the Bank Act as an “insider' of the Bank) and an employee with the firm (now permitted to be treated as a lawyer with supervision). All settlements were made following the January 19, 2011 save for BMO who wanted a hearing on the merits, and did not serve a response to civil claim and did not produce an affidavit of service.
160. (Facts and Argument) Given Grauer J's rendition of the January 19, 2011 events before Justice Adair, and the transcript of the record, why did Justice Adair grant Glen Robbins a right of audience with respect to costs thereafter made against Ita Robbins and Frana Matich contrary to her first order that he not be given a right of audience? Wasn't this decision by Justice Adair in light of all the precedent decisions available to her to not rush matters in the interest of justice - to provide a right of audience to Glen Robbins just, it would seem to find money for BMO in the award of costs, particularly in light of Frana's illness, the desire of the plaintiffs to abandon their claims, the subsequent settlement with all parties save for BMO, a sign of cruel and unusual punishment? Or was this merely a harbinger in changing court attitudes towards self litigants whether they could afford counsel or not, or part of a larger scheme by the courts working with the provincial government now providing additional benefits to work in concert to protect the go it alone commercial loan business and enterprise groomed in the province under the Memorandum of Understanding between the Attorney General of BC (Justice Minister), the Chief Justices of the Court and the BC Government Employees Union?
161. From Oregon Jack Creek Indian Band et al v CNR SCC Case Numbers: 21420, 21452. Appeal from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (1989), 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 344, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 404, setting aside a judgment of Meredith J., dismissing respondent's application to amend their statement of claim. Appeal dismissed. MCLACHLIN J. For the Court: “The issue on appeal is whether the plaintiffs (respondents) should be permitted to make certain amendments to their pleadings. The plaintiffs claim is for declarations, an injunction, and for damages based upon aboriginal rights and more specific rights from the application of the Indian Act. Thirty-six Indian Chiefs commenced an action against the C.N.R. Alleging that the construction proposed by the C.N.R. in connection with a second track would involve rock fill encroaching on several acres of the Thompson River bed and the dumping of rocks and gravel....Each chief commenced an action on behalf of himself and all other members of the Band. The application to the chambers judge was for leave to amend the style of cause and statement of claim to advance a claim, not only on behalf of the members of the..Band but also on behalf of the members of three Indian Nations.” “The action is framed as a personal one. The defendants (appellants) sought particulars as to the authority of the chiefs to bring claims on behalf of the nations. The plaintiffs responded that the actions were personal in nature and no authority was required. The appellants maintain that the proposed amended pleading are communal in nature, and that the proposed personal action as members of the Nation cannot be maintained. In our opinion, the issue of authority to bring the claims, like the issue of personal entitlement, if any, of the members of the Band or Nations is a question of fact or mixed fact and law which is best determined by the trial judge. For these reasons, we are of the view that the Court of Appeal was correct in permitting the pleadings to be amended.” (Ed: In this case each chief is responding to the Legal Professions bar to accessing the courts by commencing the action on behalf of him or herself and other members of the Band – on the basis that the case is personal and communal in nature. Obviously the defendant corporations is attempting to have the court compel the chiefs and band members to secure legal counsel at least in the first stage of litigation. The applicants would similarly take the position that their home of 23 years, family safety and security, particularly given the onset of problems from BMO Bank of Montreal is personal and communal in nature).
162. (Argument) One can see from the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Oregon Jack that the defendant carried forward its position from the lower courts that the chiefs could not being claims on behalf of nation members, and chiefs responded saying their actions were both personal and such authority isn't required. The Court determined that the issue of authority to bring claims is best determined by the trial judge......the Court of Appeal ignored the issue of chiefs representing members. (the solicitor work) and took possession of their inherent jurisdiction in a manner similar to Halfyard J. in “YAL”. (Ed: First of all, this decision comes from the BC Court of Appeal not distressed at the commencement level and more interested in making judgment on the 'commencement and prosecution' aspects of the case within their inherent jurisdiction. The applicants feel that this decision in Oregan Creek Indian Band recognizes what Grauer J., failed to do in Law Society v Glen P. Robbins, that is, although the BC Court of Appeal did not “resolve” the particulars of the matters relating to the Legal Profession Act from “YAL” they did not in fact provide guidance at that time inferred as a response by way of judicial comity, that being that inherent jurisdiction of the judiciary takes primacy over the requirements of the provincial government legislation inherent in the Legal Profession Act and the Law Society of British Columbia mandate – object and duties to protect the public. This case history presents the judiciary in 1989 reflecting the best interests of the public to be held ultimately by the independent court.
163. (Argument – theory) On this, the question must be asked why did Justice Adair permit a matter that involved pleadings Her Ladyship determined to be “rambling, incoherent, and almost incomprehensible” to be directed by herself 'an individual independent justice to Trial? Glen Robbins asserts that the notice of claim is anything but rambling or incoherent, or almost incomprehensible (whatever almost incomprehensible is?). Pleadings in this state should have been ordered amended or struck before hearing under Rule 9 of the BC Civil Court Rules. Knowing the law societies concerns and its representative attendance at initial hearing in January 2011 could it not be said that Adair J. was signaling an option to dismiss the case by settlement, actions undertaken by the plaintiffs and all defendants with the exception of BMO Bank?
164. (Argument) Pleadings as described could have been easily struck out by application under Rule 9-5. Glen Robbins believes it is a fact that the notice of claim was good and was sufficient to go to trial. Justice Fenlon satisfied the trial part of the equation and then struck out the claim against BMO on the merits without arguments on the merits of the application to dismiss (ex parte) but with arguments for costs with 'partial' right of audience to Glen Robbins. How can one NOT be permitted to speak on the merits of an application or application response yet be permitted to speak to costs on behalf of another person(s)? It is the 'little bit pregnant' argument staring at us in the face. Had Justice Adair been truly concerned about the breaches of the Legal Profession Act, considering her awareness of the conditions she demanded that those same defendants be in the court that day she could have just as easily for all her efforts directed that the notice of claim be amended to compel Ita Robbins and Frana Matich to either sign the document themselves 'on their own behalf' or have as she indicated – have a solicitor or member of the Law Society sign it.
165. (Argument) If aboriginal chiefs can argue their ability to represent members of their respective bands WITHOUT reference to specific sections of the Legal Profession Act and no reference to the Court Agent Act, can we assume that the aboriginal groups are not subject to the Legal Profession Act (BC)? Does the Legal Profession Act even deal with representatives. If aboriginal chiefs can do this on behalf of their member 'families' why can't Glen Robbins act for his family particularly when the subject matter is his family home? This is intended as no sleight or any comment on aboriginal rights including those to represent themselves. It is intended as a common sense liberty for families to manage their affairs as they see fit. How many families were devastated by divorce litigation costs eating up family assets? Why was mediation put in place and why is it a growth industry today? Why do we have Powers of Attorney including Powers of Attorney? In other cases like Bryfogle and Targosz we have evidence of third parties providing Powers of Attorney to persons under court application for breach of the confusing sections 15 (1) and 15 (5)? One can see how these matters in the midst of payments or benefits being expected being made to persons not members in good standing with the Law Society of BC could cause significant problems if not put in check. But the matter of dealing with legal matters for a spouse are somewhat different. So long as the court is aware that a spouse is desirous of the other spouse performing legal work on their behalf isn't that their freedom of choice in an open and democratic society that really does not threaten the administration of justice? Doesn't the fact that an Enduring Power of Attorney includes provisions for persons acting from authority of a donor in matters of interest in land so long as they don't have a direct relationship or interest to that land infer a legal arms length relationship.? Isn't it contrary to democratic principals to assume that because a person has not attended law school that they are therefore unable to properly address matters of justice in court's of law? Bear in mind the Legal Profession Act applies in matters of small claims court (the Inferior Court) in British Columbia where lawyers are able to ply their trade as well? On its face doesn't the justice system appear to be more about the protection of industry than the protection of legal rights?
166. From Vernrose Holdings Ltd v Pacific Press Ltd., 1977 397 (BCSC) @ para [1]: “30th August 1977 MEREDITH J. “The defendant moves to strike out the plaintiff's proceedings I understand the grounds to be firstly that the Supreme Court Rules do not contemplate that a writ of summons can be signed in the name of a corporate body but only a solicitor on its behalf, who is not a member of the bar, has no right of audience before the court on behalf of the company, as a natural person would have acting on his or her own behalf. (Ed: Actually the writ was signed simply by “Fred A. Stephenson”, no representative capacity is indicated. However, Mr. Stephenson is the chief officer and principal shareholder of the plaintiff. His credentials to bring the action in the name of the company are not in question).
167. From paragraph [2] “Vernrose” “On the first branch of his argument for the applicant , counsel cites Western Producers Mutual...Ins. Co v Stewart (sic), reflex, [1928] 1 W.W.R. 320, a decision of Buckles D.C.J., of the District Court of Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. In upholding the objective that a company cannot issue a writ by anyone but a solicitor, the learned judge cited English texts and American law as it appeared in Corpus Juris.(“body of law”) (sic).”
168. From paragraph [3] “Vernrose” “The English authorities on the point held that O. 4, R. 2, of the Supreme Court Rules then in force could, not be construed so as to permit a company to issue a writ “in person” and thus a company could only proceed through a solicitor. Those authorities are Re London County Council and London Tramways Co. (1897), 13 T.L.R. 254; Scriven v Jescot (Leeds Ltd.) (1908), 53 Sol. Jo. 101; and Frinton and Walton Urban District Council v Walton and District Sand and Mineral Co. Ltd., [1938] 1 All E.R. 649.” (Ed: Vernrose is 1977 pre the 1998 wholesale changes to the Legal Profession Act – citing the 1928 provisions in Western Products).
169. From paragraph [4] “Vernrose” Order 4, R.2 above referred to read: “2 (1) A plaintiff suing in person shall endorse upon the writ of summons his place of residence and his occupation “(a) If his residence is within the jurisdiction it shall be an address for service, and, if his place of residence is not within the jurisdiction, or if has no place of residence, the plaintiff shall include on the writ of summons a proper place within the jurisdiction which shall be an address for service where notices, pleadings, orders, summones, warrants and other documents, proceedings, and written communications, if not required to be served personally, may be left for him.” (Ed: we can see in Vernrose the importance of identification on the commencement document of that time – the writ of summons and more particular the residence within the jurisdiction of the correct court. Vancouver courthouse Smithe St., is not the correct courthouse).
170. From paragraph [5] “Vernrose” “McGillivray J.A., in Rex v Cook, [1931] 3 W.W.R. 707 at 713, [1932], D.L.R. 88 (Alta. C.A.) why a company cannot do anything required to be done, “in person.” “The corporation although a legal entity included in the definition of 'person' is none the less not a visible person if it without physical existence; it has neither body parts nor passions' and so in my view is quite incapable of doing anything required to be done 'in person'.
171. From paragraph [6] “Vernrose” “Under the present English rules which came into force 1st January 1964 a company is expressly excluded from commencing or from defending proceedings save by solicitor O.5, R. 6 (1) O.12 R. 1 (2).” (Ed: the Interpretation of 'in person' is significant – we are told in Vernrose that a corporation though a legal entity cannot be a human person – also (potentially) a legal person. When Adair J. directs the matter v BMO to trial is she doing so because Ita Robbins and Frana Matich are 'In Person” when the Law Society of B.C is writing Glen Robbins telling them they are not in person because he signed the notice of claim. Who then is “In Person” under judicial comity of Vernrose as applied to Robbins et al v BMO).
172. From paragraph [7] “Vernrose” “The question is whether the new rules of practice now in force in this province should be construed as was the English rule. The present rules were drafted with an eye to the English rules now if force; indeed, some language is borrowed for the English rules. It is therefore of no little significance that the draftsman of our rules did not think fit to incorporate the express prohibition...in the English rules.”
173. From paragraph [8] “Vernrose” “Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules govern the form and commencement of proceedings. Subrules (6), (8), and (10) are apropos to the present discussion. (6) “A writ of summons shall state the address of the plaintiff and the office address of his solicitor, if he has a solicitor.....and shall state an address for delivery which, unless is the office address of the solicitor shall be within 10 miles of the Registry.” “(8) A writ of summons should be signed by the plaintiff or by (sic) his solicitor and may be issued out of any Registry of the Court...” “(10) The plaintiff or his solicitor, on presenting a writ of summons for sealing, shall leave with the Registrar a copy of the writ signed by or for the solicitor, or by one of the plaintiffs himself if he sues in person.” (Ed: Once again – though Vernrose is Alberta the recognition of the importance of the distance of the registry to the self litigants (10 miles or about 16 kilometres). Ita Robbins and Glen Robbins live in Coquitlam their court registry is New Westminster courthouse, Frana Matich resides in Burnaby a similar distance to both registries. When she sues BMO as plaintiff under BCSC 106413 she is seeking damages in tort based on her address in Burnaby. When Cambridge Mortgage files its petition under H130330 it is commencing the action on the subject matter relating to 1355 Honeysuckle Lane in Coquitlam, which Frana Matich co-owns and the petition ought to have been filed in New Westminster courthouse which legally accommodated both respondents Ita Robbins and Frana Matich).
174. From paragraph [9] “Vernrose” “The only rule that would militate against a company signing a writ on the reasoning of McGillivray J.A., above, would be the words “or by the plaintiff himself if he sues in person.” (Ed: McGillivray J.A. Is saying that if individual party is including in the style of cause possibly on the basis of being the sole shareholder of the corporation or as proprietor than he or she could include their own name, the implication for fiduciary responsibility if other shareholders and a requisite Board are involved this might be another legal question altogether).
175. From paragraph [10] “Vernrose” “The conclusion that a company is to be treated for purposes of commencement and defense of proceedings as a natural person is strongly reinforced in that under O. 6(4) the draftsman, borrowing from the present English O. 80 (2), requires a guardian ad litem to act by solicitor. In the absence of an express prohibition, can it be said that the draftsman intended that a company is under the same disability? I think not, and I conclude that although a company is under the same disability? I think not, and I conclude that although a company is without physical existence, it nevertheless is competent to sign the writ.”(Ed: this brings mind to the matter described herein under S111171 and evidence adduced by the Law Society of BC in Kellie Robbins v BMO Bank of Montreal wherein an action was brought by Glen Robbins as guardian ad litem for Kellie Robbins in her previous capacity as an Infant under the Infact Act BC, and wherein BMO filed application and received at settlement conference order to amend the notice of claim to reflect that Kellie Robbins in her present state as adult be the plaintiff. Not only did this case not proceed through the provisions of the Small Claims Act to pre conference hearing or trial – it was unilaterally stopped by the court by Hinkson CJ and used as evidence in the section 18 application against Glen Robbins).
176. From paragraph [11] “Vernrose” “I come now to the second question as to audience before the courts counsel suggests that Mr. Stephenson is really appearing as counsel for the company and this is unlawfully engaging in the practice of law. Section 72 [a.m. 1969, C.15, s.17; 1974, c. 49, S 5A 1975, c. 35, S. 16] of the Legal Professions Act, R.S.B.C 1960, c. 214 “the corporation although a legal entity included in the definition of 'personal' is none the less not a visible person) it is without physical existence; it 'has neither body parts nor passions' and so in my view is quite incapable of doing anything required to be done 'in person'.” “72. No corporation, and no person other than a member of the Society in good standing shall, subject to the Inferior Courts Practioners Act, engage in the practice of law, except that “(a) a person may act on his own behalf in a proceeding to which he is a party.” “Practice of law” includes “(a) appearing as counsel or advocate...”but it does not include any such act if not done for in the expectation of any fee, gain, or reward, direct or indirect, from any other person.” (Ed: at Vernrose from the late 1970's we begin to see the confusion beginning to emerge in terms of what the practice of law is or isn't. It is clear that a person is not practicing law if no expectation of any fee, gain or reward direct or indirect in available to the person. This is the same condition 34 years later in the Grauer J. decision).
177. From paragraph [12] “Vernrose” “Mr. Stephenson is not here appearing for the company is expectation of any reward and thus cannot be said to be engaging in the practice of law.” (Ed: this is the lynchpin of the argument which ought to wipe clean any of the alleged sins and unwarranted consequences fro, BCSC 106413, S111171 (35302 SCC), H130330 (SCC 35772) in terms of judicial comity. There is not case law which refutes this 'silver bullett').
178. From paragraph [13] “Vernrose” “The second suggestion is that because the company has no material substance it cannot appear in court. This point of view is advanced in Re Canron Ltd. and Can. Workers Union (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 765, 70 D.L.R. (3d) 198. This passage appears for the judgment of Weatherston J., at p. 199: “I am told that the only Canadian case directly dealing with the subject was a decision of Mr. Justice Morrow in Northern Homes Ltd. v Steel Industries Ltd. reflex, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 115, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 309 (N.W.T.), in which he points out that counsel was not always available in the Yukon Territories (sic) and concludes that some of the older cases are no longer applicable and then says (at p 315).
179. From paragraph [15] “Vernrose” “The disadvantages faced by a litigant not represented by counsel are manifest. In this case they are evident in the conduct of the motion and in the text of the statement of claim. However, I must say that I am not persuaded by the logic in the proposition that a natural person should have a right of audience that corporations do not. It seems to me a company may be said to speak through the moth of a competent officer. I cannot see why the company should be denied a right of audience simply because of Lord Justice Swinfen Eady put it, the company is no “visible person”.
180. From paragraph [16] “Vernrose” “In the result I hold that the company is competent to sign the writ as a party. I would grant leave to the plaintiff to amend so that the writ be signed in the name of the company. Further, I hold that the plaintiff has a right of audience before the court through its competent officer speaks as the company. If I am wrong in the latter conclusion, I then have a discretion in the matter and I would exercise that discretion in favour of the plaintiff in this case.”
180. From paragraph [16] “Vernrose” “In the result I hold that the company is competent to sign the writ as a party. I would grant leave to the plaintiff to amend so that the writ be signed in the name of the company. Further, I hold that the plaintiff has a right of audience before the court through its competent officer speaks as the company. If I am wrong in the latter conclusion, I then have a discretion in the matter and I would exercise that discretion in favour of the plaintiff in this case.”
182. Vernrose as well as CIBC v Tannis (Glen Robbins right of audience for Tannis), Coast Paper v Tannis & Sunsphere (Glen Robbins right of audience for Sunsphere) reveals that a person 'qualified' may represent a corporation, a legal person. What can't Glen Robbins also represent his wife? After all he was successful in both the CIBC and Sunsphere cases.
183. From Citation: Law Society of B.C. v., Bryfogle 2006 BCSC 1092 – Mister Justice Groberman, beginning paragraph [1] “THE COURT: The Law Society of British Columbia comes before the court by petition, seeking various orders to restrain the respondent from engaging in activities that constitute the practice of law, and to prevent him from acting on his own behalf or on behalf of others in litigation without leave of the court.”
184. From paragraph [3] Bryfogle: “While the petitioner (LSBC-ed) and respondent characterize Mr. Bryfogle's history in the courts differently, there is little dispute with respect to the most important factual issues. The evidence establishes and Mr. Bryfogle does not dispute, that he has, since approximately 2003, been involved in a number of proceedings before the courts, representing other persons and representing himself. At times he has remunerated for the legal work he has done for others. Mr. Bryfogle does not have training as a lawyer and is not a member of the legal profession.”
185. From paragraph [4] “The argument of the Law Society is that Mr. Bryfogle has engaged in the practice of law contrary to s. 15 (1) and 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act, S.B.C. 1998, c.9.”
186. From paragraph [5] “The practice of law is defined broadly in the Legal Profession Act. The definition in s. 1 of the Act state as relevant: 'practice of law' includes....(a) to (g) but does not include (h) any of those acts if not performed for in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, for the person for whom the acts are performed.”
187. From paragraph [6] “The Law Society also seeks an order under s. 18 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.B.C C. 443. That section provides as follows: “18. If, on application by any person, the court is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court against the same or different persons, the court may after hearing that person or giving him or her opportunity to be heard, order that a legal proceeding must not, without leave of the court, be instituted by that person in any court.” In the Bryfogle case the Law Society of BC sought an order under section 18 of the Supreme Court Act (B.C.). No such action was taken against Glen Robbins under S111171 under original petition dated February 24, 2011. In Bryfogle the section 18 order falls under the same petition as other orders sought. In the Robbins matter (S111171) it is not brought under the originating petition. Instead the vexatious litigant order is brought 3 years later by way of Rule 8 application while the original petition matter is still before the Supreme Court of Canada. Evidence is brought by the Law Society at the section 18 application including BCSC 106413 the BMO matter. Other superior court actions related include BCSC 149328 commenced February 2013. The plaintiffs involved in 149238 are Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich. Each of these persons signs the notice of claim. They are commencing litigation pursuant to their right to do so under section 15 (1) of the Legal Professions Act. This claim is intended to counter the petition of Cambridge Mortgage Investment petition for foreclosure and to put in place what is legally tantamount to a counter claim to the statement of claim that would have rightly followed a justice directing triable issues to Trial Scheduling. It also included BMO as defendant. Why didn't BMO seek the section 18 order?
188. (Argument) A vexatious proceeding often follows successive lawsuits being brought against the same party over the same subject matter. Is the Law Society the de facto law firm for BMO Bank? Isn't the reintroduction of the BCSC 106413 matter res judicata the Adair J., matter? How can Glen Robbins, one of three parties be the only party selected to be respondent under the section 8 application of the Law Society. How can this application stand when the appeal process at Supreme Court of Canada 35302 did not conclude until July 2015 a year and one half later? The same logic applies to BCSC 150621 a petition for foreclosure filed by Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich at New Westminster courthouse on April 15, 2013 the same day the fraudulent notice of hearing is filed by Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corp under H130330. Robbins, Robbins et al filed BCSC 150621 in order to establish the proper jurisdiction under the BC Civil Rules for hearing of matters involving self litigants. Again, why did the new Chief Justice Chris Hinkson need to rush the Trial so quickly when all that really occurred by his actions was the further worsening of the interests of justice. Here, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich were parties to 150621 yet they were not included in the section 18 application. The only other superior court action involved in the Law Society evidence train is BCSC 136991 referred to in Grauer J.'s reasons (MIC Investments). It was concluded in early 2012 and BMO claimed costs illegally from the financing with its partners Cambridge. The claim was dismissed. How can it form part of the evidence package? The other matters include PCBC 13721, PCBC 11987, 12033 and a couple more. All of these claims were no longer opened or concluded by judgment? How could they be seriously considered in the evidence under the Law Society of BC application heard March 21, 2014? All of these small claims also include Ita Robbins and Frana Matich as parties to the action. How was it that Glen Robbins was singled out from the group?
189. (Argument Theory) Isn't the real reason that the Law Society of BC entered into the decision to abuse the process of and interests of justice as well as the charter rights of Glen Robbins by engaging the court under S111171 because they came to the conclusion following Ita Robbins affidavit of January 6, 2014 declaring that Glen Robbins commenced all of these claims on her behalf, knowing they had failed to disclose the Legislative amendments to subsections 15 (1) and 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act during the appeal process to BC Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada (35302), would have exposed their duplicity, the duplicity of their 'partners' in crime members Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis who they failed to investigate in an effort to 'bury' Glen Robbins with the aid of a Chief Justice with a long history of association who was their 'friend'.
190. From paragraph [7] “Finally, to the extent necessary to grant the relief that it seeks, the petitioner relies on the inherent jurisdiction of the court.”
191. From paragraph [8] “I indicated in the course of argument that I was not disposed to make an order prohibiting Mr. Bryfogle from acting solely on his own behalf in litigation in which he himself is an individual party.” The only litigation that has been referred to in which Mr. Bryfogle represents himself as an individual party is the School Board litigation. There is a pending motion by the defendant in that litigation to have the matter struck as being frivolous and vexatious.”
192. From paragraph [26] “Justice Groberman asserts, the matter, in my view, is not a matter of res judicata or issue estoppel. The Law Society has not been party to previous proceedings and would not, therefore, normally be governed by the doctrine of res judicata in respect of earlier rulings. More importantly, however, I do not understand any of the previous rulings to have decided that Mr. Bryfogle was in compliance with the Legal Profession Act in purporting to represent parties before the courts. That fact that the court has allowed Mr. Bryfogle to appear and argue cases in the past does not establish that he was in compliance with the Legal Profession Act in doing so. No previous decision of this court decided that Mr. Bryfogle was entitled to engage in the practice of law in this province.” Where I disagree with Groberman on this account is that although the Law Society of BC “has not been party” what of circumstances where they are aware of perceived breaches to the Legal Profession Act but do not file application to be included as a party to such a claim as Groberman J. describes? (Ed: It is interesting that the BC Court of Appeal characterizes service of documents to fundamentally be based on “awareness” that is why person service must be proved to be, in fact, personal. When is the Law Society Party to a proceeding? In BCSC 106413 the Law Society of BC attended to the courts, was recognized by the courts, and other members of that society representing defendants that day in January 2011. A number of procedural considerations were undertaken by the court at request of legal counsel, why didn't the Law Society ask to be added as a Third Party. Given that the prohibitions and injunctions have quasi criminal type legal inferences (contempt etc.) isn't this a type of entrapment?)
193. In the BMO matter before Justice Adair the Law Society of BC had legal counsel sitting in the courtroom on January 19, 2011. They had heard the issues and judicial directives dealt with on that day Grauer J.'s statement that Glen Robbins was denied a right of audience so that plaintiffs could attend in person or retain counsel does not include any place for Glen Robbins. The comment made by Adair J., is that the plaintiffs must retain counsel in order to be heard. The term retain would presume to mean a “fee, benefit or gain” distinguishing the practice of law by members in good standing with the Law Society of British Columbia from the practice of law (as it was then) by persons who were not such members. Again, retained counsel did not make arguments in relations to costs under BCSC 106413. The Law Society then tried to extract concessions by Consent Order from Glen Robbins far more onerous than any reasonable person would ever think to sign. The Law Society was using the circumstances to take more benefit than they were fairly and legally entitled to take at that time. Glen Robbins was always reasonable. Wasn't it he that provided two consent orders which Grauer J. failed to read though in the file offering the Law Society blanket consent orders far beyond those prohibitions and injunctions related to section 15 (1) and 15 (5)?
194. The proof of this failure by Grauer J. in determination of costs is evident at Page 14 paragraph [51] where he states: “The Law Society, on the other hand, gave Mr. Robbins every opportunity to give undertakings or consent to the orders it has now obtained and thereby avoid costs. He chose not to do so.” This is simply not a true statement. Glen Robbins provides consent orders to the petition of the Law Society under S111171 and to the amended petition under S111171.
195. From (Citation) The Law Society of British Columbia v Targosz, 2010 BCSC 969 “INTRODUCTION” (before Dardi J.) at paragraph [1] “The Law Society of British Columbia (the “Law Society”) seeks an order pursuant to s. 85(5) of the Legal Professions Act, S.B.C. 1998, c.9 that the respondent, Ms. Barbera Targosz, be enjoined from contravening s. 15 (1), (4), and (5) of the Legal Professions Act.”
196. From paragraph [2] “The Society of Notaries Public of British Columbia (the “Notaries Society”) seeks an order enjoining the respondent from contravening the Notaries Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, C-334, by representing or holding herself out as a notary public or as a member of the Notaries Society.”
197. From paragraph [3] ... “ The respondent opposes the relief, she contends that the court should not exercise its jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. The essence of her submission is that, because she only charges fees for translating and mediation services, she is not engaged and not engaged in any unlawful conduct and the injunction sought is not necessary.”
198. From paragraph [13] “Pursuant to the Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 124, the Attorney General has appointed the respondent as a commissioner for taking affidavits in British Columbia. The commissioner.....has “'effect only in the course of discharge of [“the respondents”] duties as a member of the Polish Congress, Board of Directors.” Further, she “may not administer oaths and take affidavits, declarations and affirmation....before any court in the province.”
199. “ISSUES” From paragraph [34] “The issues on this application may be summarized as follows: i. “Has the Law Society established that there is reason to believe that the respondent has or will contravene ss. 15(1), (4) and (5) of the Legal Profession Act or Law Society Rules? Has the Notaries Society made out a case for an injunction restraining the respondent from acting or holding herself out as authorized to act as a notary public?” It is important for consideration of this application to closely consider the language which supports the object of attaining a prohibition. The language seeks to identify if the 'respondent' 'has or will' contravene the Act. In what instance and what activity would the Law Society of BC be able to prove that someone would breach the act in the future if they had not already done so? This makes no sense. Truly, the protection of the public can only occur when the Law Society responds to someone who has already breached the Act. In circumstances where fees benefits or gains are obtained from 3rd parties by persons without proper training, or more importantly who under the auspices of regulation (in the event of malpractice and protection of insurance) this is desirable public policy as is evidenced in the Bryfogle,Targosz and Dawson matters. But even in this most glaring circumstance, how much of the problem lays at the feet of the Law Society who the Chief Justice of the country suggests is charging average fees of $350 per hour? Doesn't this admission by the countries top jurist suggest the likelihood that persons would then seek to lessen legal costs by using a lawyer without professional credentials? How about in the Robbins circumstances where attempts are made to hire lawyers and those lawyers failing them? The Robbins don't have confidence in lawyers or the legal system, beyond the matters put before the court at this time do they have cause for this position?
200. When Ita Robbins is seriously injured with massive head injuries and other injuries in an motor vehicle accident in 1985 what was experience like? Her first lawyer suggests she settle for $40,000 when her income loss is already double this. Her second lawyer suggest $100,000 when her income losses are nearly equal to this. Though both lawyers 1 and 2 had contingency fee agreements of high percentage they still had provision in these agreements for an hourly fee if fired. Both were well paid for their erstwhile efforts. Lawyer 3 did a better job attending to trial and doing a good job. But he overcharged by tens of thousands of dollars and when the court registry fouled up the date for hearing the costs the Attorney General was forced to pay out nearly $20,000 in damages which the lawyer kept in his pocket.
201. (Argument lack of confidence of in lawyers history of abuse) In this case, Glen Robbins and another person as well as legal counsel witness two lawyers from law firm Bull, Housser and Tupper in an elevator in BC courthouse at Smithe Street making explicit sexual gestures to Ita Robbins including wiggling their hips and grabbing themselves. A complaint was made to legal counsel for Ita Robbins and to the Law Society of British Columbia.
202. When Ita Robbins was injured in another motor vehicle accident nearly a decade later she hired well known lawyer Tom Berger. Mr. Berger promised that this was his “last case as he was retiring”. His daughter Erin took over the case (without consultation) and proceeded to advise that Ita should not call any of her family to attend to court or for Glen Robbins to attend to court. During her isolation with Ms. Berger Ita is advised that she should leave her husband Glen who did not drink, smoke and owned a very successful publishing business. Why would any lawyer put a client who she knew suffered from many medical issues including Reynauds Syndrome and Fibromyalgia be put through this by any person let alone their own lawyer?
203. (Glen Robbins loses multi million dollar publishing business) When Glen Robbins hired John Motiuk to defend against allegations made by the 23 year old daughter Jennifer Tannis of an ex business partner Mitchell Tannis found guilty of check kiting and refused bank accounts anywhere in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, along with a number of her friends all accusing Glen Robbins of staring at them each and every day for a year and one half (along with an associate of Glen Robbins, Murray Cameron charges dropped after he was determined to be legally blind), and it was discovered that the complainants had changed their stories/testimony from point of then BC Human Rights Commission to BC Human Rights Tribunal, including testifying that they worked with 15 feet of the owner of the company Mitch Tannis each and every day and then mysteriously decided to say he didn't work there at all, his lawyer John Motiuk made application for separate hearings of all women. The lawyers for the girls (employed with Heenan Blaikie law offices) then sought an adjournment of the hearing “joinder” or in Glen Robbins to separate the women on the basis that at no time in history had complaints of staring (harassment) been made by five persons (usually a one on one he said she said type of circumstance). During the adjourn period (spring 1999) John Motiuk's certificate to practice law was taken away, but he never told Glen Robbins about this fact until until nearly a year later and continued to give Glen Robbins the impression that he was dealing with matters at the BC Human Rights Tribunal. At the beginning of January 2000 with the application to separate the women dismissed because of no response from John Motiuk, Motiuk was officially disbarred by the Law Society. Still, Glen Robbins was not informed by John Motiuk of the events until just weeks before the hearing of the charges at BCHRT. How much confidence would any reasonable person have in lawyers or the law society after this?
204. Incidentally former BC New Democrat leader Tom Berger did not retire from law, in fact he became co counsel in a huge government case against Tobacco companies along with Bull, Housser and Tupper law firm.
205. What reasonable rationale person against this historical backdrop would want to hire legal counsel at $350 per hour? Who would put their family through this? High cost for optional misery the applicants would say.
206. From paragraph [35] “The Law Society is....charged with the “object and duty...to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice”?
207. From paragraph [36] “Section 15 (1) of the Legal Profession Act provides that, with certain exceptions, no person other than a practicing lawyer is permitted to engage in the practice of law. The term “practicing lawyer”, by virtue of the definition in s. 1(1), means a member in good standing of the Law Society, who hold or is entitled to hold a practicing certificate.”
208. From paragraph [37] “The definition of “practice of law” in s. 1(1) includes any of the following activities if performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, for the person for whom the acts are performed.”: (a) appearing as counsel or advocate, (b) drawing, revising or settling (1) a petition, memorandum, notice of articles or articles and the Business Corporations Act, or an application, statement, affidavit, minute, resolution, bylaw or other document relating to the incorporation, registration, organization, reorganization, dissolution or winding up for a corporate body, (ii) a document for use in a proceeding, judicial, or extrajudicial, (iii) a will, deed of summons, trust deed, power of attorney or a document, relating to a probate or letters of administration or the estate of decease person, (iv) a document relating in any way to a proceeding under a statute of Canada or British Columbia, or (v) an instrument relating to real or personal estate that is intended, permitted or required to be registered, recorded or file in a registry or other public office, (c) doing an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages, (d) agreeing to place at the disposal of another person the services of a lawyer, (e) giving legal advice, (f) making an offer to do anything referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e), and (g) making a representation by a person that he or she is qualified or entitled to do anything referred to in paragraph (a) to (e) [.].*****[Dardi J., similar to Grauer J., sees fit NOT to include this part of section 15 (1): “The definition of “practice of law” does not include: (h) any of those acts if performed by a person who is not a lawyer and not for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed, (i) the drawing, revising or settling of an instrument by a public officer in the course of the officer's duty, (k) the usual business or by an insurance adjuster who is licensed under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Financial Institutions Act, or (1) agreeing to do something referred to in paragraph (d), if the agreement is made under the prepaid legal services plan or other ..liability insurance program.”
209. From paragraph [38] “Section 15 (4) of the Legal Profession Act prohibits any person from falsely representing himself or herself as being a lawyer, articled student or practitioner of foreign law. Section 15 (5) then provides that except as permitted by s. 15 (1), “a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court, in the person's own name or in the name of another person.”
210. From paragraph [39] “Section 85 (5) of the Legal Profession Act gives the Law Society authority to apply for an injunction restraining a person from contravening the Act. Section 85 (6) states: (6) The court may grant an injunction sought under subsection (5) if satisfied that there is reason to believe that there has been or will be a contravention of this Act or the rules.”
211. From “ANALYSIS – the test for relief” and specifically from paragraph [40] “With respect to the relief sought by the Law Society, the statutory test is prescribed by s. 85 (6) of the Legal Profession Act. In Law Society of British Columbia v. Grim wood (24 February 2005), Vancouver LO32736 (S.C.) at para. 9, Stewart J., after citing that section, observed: “Note how little the Law Society need establish to obtain an injunction ordering someone not to do that which they are not permitted to do as a matter of law, in any event.” (Ed:could be interpreted to mean that Law Society is reaching into areas it should not be in considering that no one regulates the Law Society).
213. From paragraph [42] “The threshold for making out a case for an injunction is..a low one. As the Court observed in Grimwood: the injunction merely operates to prohibit breaches of the statute which is permissible conduct in any event. Regarding the latter, s. 3 of the Legal Profession Act stipulates that the Law Society's paramount object and duty is to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice and, in so doing, to regulate the “practice of law”.
214. From paragraph [43] “The form of consideration required to constitute the “practice of law” according to the Legal Profession Act, has been broadly interpreted by the courts as the receipt of fees or another type of benefit “such as promise of future business, gifts or favours”. The Law Society of British Columbia v. McLaughlin, 1992 1061 (BCSC), [1992] 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) (S.C.) {McLaughlin].” (Ed: once again we see affirm the 1992 Interpretation of the Practice of Law consistent with the Interpretation made by Glen Robbins under BCSC 106413).
215. From paragraph [44] “At the hearing, the respondent abandoned her challenge to the Legal Profession Act on the basis of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. In any case, she would not be entitled to seek a constitutional remedy as she did not comply with the notice requirements of the Constitutional Questions Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 68.” (Ed: It is important to remember that when Ita Robbins and Frana Matich appeal the May 9, 2013 order nisi to the BC Court of Appeal they smartly do so by conventional method of appeal and not leave to appeal normally required in the circumstance. They tick the 'new' box available on the BC Court of Appeal form (See SCC 35772) and include the court provisions (there are NO Reasons). This is important to remember in context of the ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION of Ronald Bakonyi (Cambridge Mortgage) and Robert Ellis (BMO Bank of Montreal) discussed herein, filed May 31, 2013 three weeks following the hearing – but no served upon Glen Robbins at all, and not provided to Ita Robbins or Frana Matich until months after the hearing of May 9, 2013 not in time for inclusion in the BC Court of Appeal matter. Had it been provided in timely fashion with respect to the rights of Robbins and Matich to appeal their decision then the conventional appeal would have had ground to proceed given that the ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION was not limited appeal order and in chronology of any actions which might loosely be connected to it (in terms of the right of audience denied Glen Robbins) preceded in succession the substantive submissions on the order nisi order which followed).
216. “1. Constitutional Question Act [RSBC1996] CHAPTER 68 150 Lieutenant Governor in Council to refer matters to court 1 The Lieutenant Governor in Council may refer any matter to the Court of Appeal or to the Supreme Court for hearing and consideration, and the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court must then hear and consider it. Court to certify opinion 2 (1) The Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court must give to the Lieutenant Governor in Council its opinion on the matter referred, with reasons, in the manner of a judgment in an ordinary action.(2) A justice of the Court of Appeal who differs from the opinion of the majority may give to the Lieutenant Governor in Council the justice's opinion, with reasons. Notice to Attorney General of Canada 3 In case the matter referred relates to the constitutional validity of all or part of an Act, the Attorney General of Canada must be notified of the hearing, and must be heard if the Attorney General of Canada sees fit. Notice of reference 4 On a reference by the Lieutenant Governor in Council under the agreement made between the government of British Columbia and the government of Canada under the Federal Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act (Canada), the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of any province of Canada that has, after December1, 1961, entered into a similar agreement must be notified of the hearing, and may appear and be heard as a party. Notice to persons interested 5 The Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court may direct that a person interested, or, if there is a class of persons interested, any one or more persons as representatives of that class, must be notified of the hearing, and those persons are entitled to be heard. Appeal 6 The opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court is a judgment of the Court of Appeal or of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, and an appeal lies from it in the manner of a judgment in an ordinary action. Publication in Gazette 7 The reasons given by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court under this Act must, as soon as practicable, be published in the Gazette. Notice of questions of validity or applicability 8 (1) In this section:"constitutional remedy" means a remedy under section 24 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedomsother than a remedy consisting of the exclusion of evidence or consequential on such exclusion; "law" includes an enactment and an enactment within the meaning of the Interpretation Act (Canada). (2) If in a cause, matter or other proceeding (a) the constitutional validity or constitutional applicability of any law is challenged, or (b) an application is made for a constitutional remedy, the law must not be held to be invalid or inapplicable and the remedy must not be granted until after notice of the challenge or application has been served on the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of British Columbia in accordance with this section.(3) If in a cause, matter or other proceeding the validity or applicability of a regulation is challenged on grounds other than the grounds referred to in subsection (2) (a), the regulation must not be held to be invalid or inapplicable until after notice of the challenge has been served on the Attorney General of British Columbia in accordance with this section.(4) The notice must(a) be headed in the cause, matter or other proceeding,(b) state(i) the law in question, or(ii) the right or freedom alleged to be infringed or denied, (c) state the day on which the challenge or application under subsection (2) or (3) is to be argued, and (d) give particulars necessary to show the point to be argued.(5) The notice must be served at least 14days before the day of argument unless the court authorizes a shorter notice.(6) If in a cause, matter or other proceeding to which this section applies the Attorney General of British Columbia appears, the Attorney General is a party and, for the purpose of an appeal from an adjudication respecting the validity or applicability of a law, or respecting entitlement to a constitutional remedy, has the same rights as any other party.(7) If in a cause, matter or other proceeding to which this section applies the Attorney General of Canada appears, the Attorney General of Canada is a party and, for the purpose of an appeal from an adjudication respecting the validity or applicability of a law, or respecting entitlement to a constitutional remedy, has the same rights as any other party. Action for declaration of validity of Act 9 (1) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain an action at the instance of either the Attorney General of Canada or the Attorney General of British Columbia for a declaration as to the validity of an Act of the Legislature, though no further relief is sought.(2) The action is sufficiently constituted if the 2 Attorneys General are parties.(3) An appeal lies from the judgment in the manner of a judgment in an ordinary action.
217. ORDER in Vancouver Registry file No.: LO32736 - “In the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Law Society of British Columbia (Petitioner) v Mark Edward Grimwood (Respondent) – Before the Honourable Mr. Justice Stewart – Thursday, the 24th Day of February, 2005 -- “The Petition of the Petitioner, the Law Society of British Columbia, coming on for hearing at Vancouver, British Columbia, on the 23rd day of February, 2005 and a reading of the Petition and Affidavits filed herein, and on hearing Carmel Wiseman, Counsel for the Petitioner, and Mark Edward Grimwood, appearing on his own behalf, and judgment being reserved to this date; THIS COURT ORDERS that the Respondent, Mark Edward Grimwood, until such time as he becomes a member in good standing of the Law Society of British Columbia, be permanently prohibited and enjoined from (a) appearing as counsel or advocate; (b) drawing, revising or settling a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extra-judicial; (c) drawing, revising or settling a will, deed of settlement, trust deed, power of attorney or a document relating to a porbate or letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person, (d ) drawing, revising or settling an instrument relating to real or personal estate that is intended, permitted or required to be registered, recorded or filed in a registry or other public office; (e) drawing, revising or settling a document related in any way to proceedings under a statute of Canada or British Columbia; (f) doing any act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages; (g) giving legal advice, and (h) making a representation that he is qualified or entitled to provide to a person the legal services set out in (a) through (g) above; for the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person.. from who the acts are performed.”

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