Robbins SCE Research
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Volume III Glen Robbins criminal complaint subs to Justice Minister Wilson Raybould Liberal Party of Canada - Re: Ron Bakonyi, Robert Ellis (BMO), Michael Kleisinger (Law Society BC) (lawyers), Lauri Fenlon, Chris Hinkson (BC Justices)
  May 27, 2016

Commentary
189. That I verily believe (with emphasis) that April 23rd, 2014 precedes April 30th, 2014 in the calendar for that year, and that the order made April 23rd, 2014 conflicts and is ultra vires to the Order Made April 7th, 2014 as an Order cannot be made by a BC Supreme Court Justice which conflicts with a previous Order made by a Justice of equivalent authority, (although it would not surprise me if a cadre of BC lawyers and some of its justices might offer a different explanation of how calendar dates follow in BC Courts).
190. That I verily believe that the matter of the appeal of the conduct of sale order of Master Tokarek made December 9th, 2013 - (heard (during stay period) April 24th, 2014) with both the December 9th, 2013 and April 24th, 2014 hearings inclusive of the ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION, or consequential to the notice of hearing document, which evidence I further believe contravened the Criminal Code of Canada as a document filed by “officers of the Court” with the expressed intention of misleading the Court, and to take advantage of myself, my wife and her mother, with prejudicial knowledge of the court registry and the constitutional Courts complete lack of oversight in the making of order by legal counsel.
191. I verily believe that this lack of oversight laid open the opportunity for unscrupulous and dishonest legal counsel Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis to manufacture false evidence like the Order Made After Application of May 31st, 2013 and/or the contamination (corruption) of court proceedings and the proper lawful administration of justice, in order to obtain orders themselves originally and consequentially 'corrupted', and further believe that this corruption of the proper administration of justice by nefarious means was initiated with a view to corrupt proceedings foreseen to occur down the line under H130330 including most specifically the Conduct of Sale Order and the Vacant Possession order.
192. That I verily believe in two instances where Ita Robbins, Frana Matich or myself actually hired lawyers to defend us against predatory lenders, that these lawyers did not do their job and withdrew with cause, justification or justifiable explanation in response to demands made upon them to not help us, including profession law firms Lawson Lundell and James Davidson. That in fact during the time when Frana Matich and I attended to Lawson Lundell and they accepted our retainer for $3,000 they performed no work over the course of crucial period of 30 days prior to hearing date and then expected to be paid for giving the opposing side what it wanted.
193. That over the course of this 30 day period involving Lawson Lundell a senior lawyer and friend of the BC Liberal government was coincidentally granted a Queens Counsel designation (a political attribute permitting lawyers to charge higher hourly fees).
194. That I believe the fact that we were not able to hire competent counsel was based on the fact that unknown to us persons associated with the Law Society of BC had contacted these law firms senior partners or them personally and told them not to help us.
195. That I was personally present in Ross Davidson's legal office when he contacted Ronald Bakonyi and made settlement to have our appeal filed as conventional appeal heard as leave to appeal. By the time we attended to hearing in October 2013 before Justice Tysoe this settlement agreement has 'evaporated'.
196. That in January 2014 Madame Justice Saunders of BC Court of Appeal made order to dismiss application to extend time for filing leave to appeal (an appeal had been filed and $200 paid). It is this order only from which leave was filed to Supreme Court of Canada under SCC docket 35772.
197. (The Motive for the Crime(s)): That I verily believe that both Mr. Bakonyi and Mr. Ellis went to the lengths they did on behalf of and under the instruction of their clients “CMIC” & “PCFS” (as well as BMO Bank of Montreal), as a consequence of their fear that if a summary trial were ordered, predicated on the 'de minimus' threshold for dealing with trial issues, their unconscionable and fraudulent activities as against myself, Ita Robbins & Frana Matich would be discovered, and this discovery would well lead to an honest Justice to make inquiry and order rescinding the original financing agreement with Peet & Cowan Financial Services, which would have forced the deregistering of mortgage of sister company Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation at BC Land Title Office, and exposing the other fraudulent activity that occurred, including (a) false information on notice of hearing document filed April 15, 2013 (H130330); (b) false statements made by Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis at May 9, 2013 hearing; (c) inquiry into actions of Justice Fenlon and contemptuous dealings with Reasons and order of Justice Grauer (S111171) which would have raised the profile as to the other offensives occurring in breach of BC Consumer Protection Act, which the Directors of that institution, all political appointments of the Government of British Columbia also knew was ongoing including thousands of other illegal loan agreements filed against other unsuspecting and otherwise duped British Columbians.
198. On page 11 of the Original Leave To Appeal Application of April 30th, 2015 is the Order Made After Application, the 9th day of May, 2013 (stipulating): THIS COURT ORDERS that: (1) “Glen Robbins has no standing and is prohibited from making submissions in this matter on behalf of the respondents Ita Robbins and Frana Matich.”
199. That the legal definition of standing (locus standi) relates to a party's capacity to show connection to a particular case, as in being a named party to that action. It generally is ground in a number of 'causes'. 1. The 'something to lose doctrine' where a party perceives an adverse inference as a consequence of the action; 2. A party not directly affected but seeks relief because of the 'chilling effect' it may have on others.
200. That both Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis were aware that I had guaranteed repayment of mortgage monies owed on 1355 Honeysuckle Lane to Ita Robbins & Frana Matich in consideration of other matters.
201. That the Supreme Court of Canada developed the concept of public interest standing in three constitutional cases commonly referred to as “the Standing Trilogy”: Thomson v Canada (Attorney General), Nova Scotia Board of Census v McNeill, and Minister of Justice v Barowski summarized as follows in Canada Council of Churches v Canada (Canadian Council of Churches v Canada) (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236
202. That this Order Made After Application dated time stamped filed May 31st, 2013 and filed under BCSC file No.: H130330 is featured in Application for Leave to Appeal stamped in Supreme Court of Canada Registry “SEP 28, 2015” is featured under submissions affidavit at pages 13-23. To summarize the affidavit evidence in that application documents at paragraph 1, I assert that the Order “is untrue and in breach in numerous provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada.”; at para. 2 declaring that “no such Application was ever made before Madame Justice Fenlon or any other other in the Superior Courts in British Columbia; including false statement “coming on for hearing at Vancouver on Thursday, May 9, 2013 and on hearing Ronald A. Bakonyi, Counsel for the Petitioner, Robert Ellis, counsel for the Bank of Montreal, Glen Robbins and no one appearing on behalf of the Petition Respondents although duly served”.; at paragraph 3: “That this false/forged/fraudulent document denoted at the bottom by both lawyer “officer of the court” describing their signatures as “Signature of Ronald A. Bakonyi, Lawyer for the Petitioner, Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation” and “Signature of Robert Ellis, Lawyer for the Respondent, Bank of Montreal features the following statement made on behalf of Madame Justice Fenlon s. 98 Constitutionally Appointed Justice for the Province of British Columbia: “THIS COURT ORDERS that: “(1) Glen Robbins has no standing and is prohibited from making submissions in this matter on behalf of the Respondents, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich” when this statement is entirely false.”; at paragraph 4: “That I verily believe that it would be impossible for a person about whom (sic) an application is made to not have standing as standing is required to be party to an action”; the remainder of the affidavit .
203. That I note in Google v Equustek currently ordered to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, November 2016 that Justice Fenlon made the lower court decision of injunction against Google who was not party to the action on the basis of connection between the case and Google. That notwithstanding the correctness or legal stability of this order, a formal application was made to the court which was served on Google who filed a response to application under the rules.
204. That no Application by way of petition or Rule 8 (BC Civil Rules) application (no final orders allowed under Rule 8) was made to determine “standing”, & no evidence adduced in order that a justice could make such a determination in the matter involving myself and my wife under H130330.
205. That the original application for petition for foreclosure did not include me as party and if it had, I would have had (generally speaking) an automatic right of audience under section 15 (1) of the Legal Profession Act, unless the presiding justice refused said right, which reaffirms the overarching discretionary authority of a constitutional justice as this relates to matters of right of audience.
206. That the submissions of Ronald Bakonyi on behalf of the petitioner Cambridge Mortgage and Robert Ellis for BMO included in Transcript from hearing of May 9, 2013 under H130330 Vancouver courthouse, reveal arguments being made as to my right of audience which was not within their authority to argue given the nature of constitutional discretion on the basis that I had no standing, which fact both Mr. Bakonyi and Mr. Ellis attested to in the forged order they signed May 31, 2013.
207. The legal concepts of standing and right of audience are not mutually inclusive.
208. That I believe the evidence of the the actual petition for foreclosure which did not include me as party, the arguments made about me at hearing with respect to right of audience which were not within Mr. Bakonyi's or Mr. Ellis' authority to make, and that were only within the jurisdiction of the sitting justice to determine, the Order Made After Application of May 31, 2013 and the specific language of said forged order is proof enough of an irregularity in the administration of justice as a person who is not party must of their own action seek orders for standing, and when a person is not a party they automatically do not have standing until they seek said standing, Mr. Bakonyi and Mr. Ellis cannot ask the court to deny me something that I already do not have.
209. That it is fundamentally irrational to accept the premise that because I have no standing that I must also therefore not be able to seek leave to right of audience.
210. That in Google v Equustek Google Inc. did not have a natural standing as they were not party to action, but only achieved standing predicated on an actual application for injunction which can be made against a non party in pursuit of orders which would if obtained would thus presume standing upon that party.
211. Thus, Justice Fenlon is presumed by the order forged May 31, 2013 (and signed nearly a year later) to have heard an application which did not happen, she dealt with a preliminary issue. A preliminary issue cannot be considered a substantive issue until the correct documents are filed with the court igniting the transfer from preliminary issue.
212. That Michael Kleisinger employed a different variation of this play on the administration of justice in full cooperation with Chief Justice Chris Hinkson filing an interlocutory application in a case which required an original petition application (S111171) in a case which had been closed by virtue of dismissal order at Supreme Court of Canada (35302).
213. In both cases involving me at (H130330) and (S111171) we have inappropriate abuses of court process producing orders made after application, both of which are illegitimate yet obtained with judicial approval. The first has no application whatsoever (H130330), the second has no originating application to support it, with the only originating application (petition) related to a case history with trial before Justice Grauer and Reasons for Judgment made October 3, 2011 involving orders under the Legal Profession Act.
214. The vexatious proceeding order comes from section 18 of the Supreme Court Act (BC) which is different subject matter than sections 15 (4) & 15 (5) of the Legal Profession Act which Mister Justice Grauer dealt with at trial in September 2011. Vexatious proceeding deals with multiple litigation outcomes involving similar subject matter under different court docket numbers. Sections 15 (4) and 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act deal with declaring oneself to be a lawyer when are not, and commencing, defending and prosecuting claims (which involves filing documents at registry.
215. That under BCSC S11171 Justice Grauer definitively stipulated in Reasons that I only breached section 15 (5) on one occasion under BCSC 106413 (Robbins v BMO Bank). As a consequence it would be impossible for me to a vexatious personality (proceeding or litigant however the lawyers are using the linguistic spin from one day to the next) which presumes multiple cases.
216. That I am aware that on March 20, 2015 Chief Justice Hinkson ordered the New Westminster BC Supreme Court courthouse to refuse a Requisition filed myself, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich to adjourn our application to that court to be heard on or about March 26, 2015, with affidavit attached out of concern that respondents who had been served might have filed response material and served it to 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, an address for service we no long controlled.
217. That in this document order made in Chris Hinkson's name but without his signature he includes Ita Robbins and Frana Matich under BCSC action number S111171 a case in which they are not parties, and of the three of us only I am a party.
218. That while we were attempting to adjourn the matter under BCSC 149328 out of abundance of caution to fair process, Chris Hinkson was enabling an application for dismissal orders sought by Ronald Bakonyi on behalf of Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation and Peet and Cowan Financial Services which was never served upon us.
219. That Chief Justice Hinkson was again purposefully using his office to help persons committing fraud.
220. That after discovery his (sloppy and duplicitous effort) in relation to his order of March 20, 2015, Chris Hinkson thereafter directed registry staff at New Westminster courthouse to backdate a new order for March 24, 2015, again not signed by him and this time under action No. 149328 stipulating that application filed in August 2014 under this action number be deemed a nullity, despite the fact that this application had already been adjourned by Requisition filed by use on March 19, 2015. That this order of March 24, 2015 was not located at BC Court Services online in the middle of April 2015.
221. That because we had not received any responses to application under 149328 (owing I verily believe to the address issues at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, and Canada Post taking changing the locks on the mailbox (located down the street from the actual property), and again, our concerns for procedural fairness, and the fact that we had not received any responses to application, we applied Rule 8 in our thinking to file the Requisition for (unilateral) adjournment based on the provisions that permit adjournment without consent.
222. That Chris Hinkson appears to have used his office to throw around invalid and errant court orders like a teenager might throw their dirty laundry about their bedroom.
223. That I believe both the March 20, 2015 order made under S111171 and then the back dated order for March 24, 2015 under BCSC 149328 are further examples of Chris Hinkson's personal assault on our family and abuse of his office of chief justice, making any excuse he might choose to employ that Michael Kleisinger took advantage of his new position in that office, to be unbelievable, and instead I believe proves our case that he was in 'cahoots' with the corrupt conspiracy and abuse of process.
224. That on January 2nd, 2014, I made application with regard to 'standing' (to be added as party under BCSC H130330), and was denied access to have this application heard, but 'sudden applications' by Mr. Bakonyi 'going on holidays' (for which an ex parte actual court order was granted), (and an abuse of court process application made by Michael Kleisinger aided and abetted by Chief Justice Hinkson) for hearing of application under file No.: S111171, (despite that file number being before the Supreme Court of Canada until August 2015) (a new petition should have been filed and no final order should have been provided under a Rule 8 application. (see later malfeasance accusations against Michael Kleisinger and Chief Justice Chris Hinkson).
225. That it is a fact that the only prohibition made against me at any time was made October 3, 2011 by Justice Grauer in relation to an order under subsection 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act “commence, defend and prosecuting claims” which has limited interpretation in a jurisdictional sense as it pertains only to a provincial statute (the LPA) and document filing at court registry and has no bearing on matters relating to right of audience.
226. That it is not lawfully possible for the stipulations made in ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION to occur as one judicial decision maker cannot apply a prohibition against a right to speak at bar to any further occasion involving another different judicial decision maker, nor could a judicial decision maker make an order in relation to the “standing” of any person without adducing evidence to make such a decision.
227. That this May 31st, 2013 ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION contaminates the entire administration of justice under BCSC file No.: H130330 with collateral contamination of S111171 as I contend to colluded between Michael Kleisinger and a more than willing chief justice in Chris Hinkson.
228. That it will be shown in this affidavit evidence that this 'phony' forged/fraudulent Order Made After Application date May 31, 2013 under BCSC H130330 conceived & produced' signed & filed by Ronald Bakonyi for “CMIC” and Robert Ellis for BMO Bank, and afterward maliciously promoted by Michael Kleisinger, including using that Order in contempt of the actual Reasons for Judgment of Mister Justice Grauer later used to fraudulently obtain orders of conduct of sale and vacant possession order as well as to obtain an ex parte order dismissing my application relating to standing (to be added as party) under BCSC file No.: H130330, which orders (vacant possession [WRIT OF POSSESSION], & conduct of sale orders.
229. That primary respondents in the two Supreme Court of Canada submissions (referenced) (the 2 Volumes of April-May, 2015 & 1 Vol of September 2015) Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corp, Peet and Cowan Financial Services, British Columbia Attorney General (Justice Ministry), BMO Bank of Montreal, BC Court Services, selective Justices of the BC Superior Courts, & Law Society of BC, have been served with all three Leave Applications including both Volumes from April 30th, 2015 and September 28th, 2015 (received by S.C.C.) from application dated September 20, 2015, so they are well aware or ought to be well aware of the criminal actions which have occurred.
229. That primary respondents in the two Supreme Court of Canada submissions (referenced) (the 2 Volumes of April-May, 2015 & 1 Vol of September 2015) Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corp, Peet and Cowan Financial Services, British Columbia Attorney General (Justice Ministry), BMO Bank of Montreal, BC Court Services, selective Justices of the BC Superior Courts, & Law Society of BC, have been served with all three Leave Applications including both Volumes from April 30th, 2015 and September 28th, 2015 (received by S.C.C.) from application dated September 20, 2015, so they are well aware or ought to be well aware of the criminal actions which have occurred.
230. That the Supreme Court of Canada and other senior courts in the country have made determinations affecting a general consensus that where punitive damages occur there must be evidence of an effort to mitigate damage to lessen penalties in matters criminal, and further, these senior court determinations and the Criminal Code of Canada direct that standing in the community will have no bearing on determinations in criminal court.
231. That with respect to the ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION filed May 31, 2013 under H130330 referred to often herein, I (again) point out that there is only one original application (petition for foreclosure), and only one response to petition, as well as only one binder in relation to the petition under H130330. It would not be possible to have an Order for foreclosure and Order Made After Application in a matter pertaining to right of audience result from one filing.
232. There is no “Application” seeking a prohibition against Glen Robbins from speaking on behalf of Ita Robbins or Frana Matich under H130330. Accordingly, there was no opportunity for any of Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins or Frana Matich to file a Response Application to such an order directly affecting them. There is also no binder for any such Application. There is no evidence supporting any application. There is no lawful due process in seeking the Order, with no evidence makes it impossible for an Order to exist, without that Order being made with lawful authority.
233. Had an application in relation to Glen Robbins “standing” been made, or one seeking to prevent him speaking on behalf of his wife, with original subject matter unrelated for foreclosure matters under new petition (to be heard prior to the foreclosure matter as it ought to have been), then I verily believe that my wife and I would have had opportunity to secure Enduring Powers of Attorney and register them at Land Titles Office as was presented to Justice Fenlon on May 9th, 2013 hearing at Transcript page 20 line 43 “The advice I've gotten was to ask, because we need to hear on the merits, and so far we haven't....and I (sic) ask for a continuance, extension in order to file and in order to procure two powers of attorney and register them at Land Titles, and on that basis, specifically dealing with this property, we would be able to hear the case on its merits. If we're not able to hear it on its merits, then it's highly prejudicial.....”I'm saying if we're given this opportunity to get the two powers of attorney and register them at the Land Titles office, then we would be in a position here to come back before My Lady and at least be able to make our cases and not be handcuffed by sort of the moving the goal posts of the judicial system about what meets a standard, what doesn't meet a standard from one room to another or one place to another.”
234. That (I already possessed two powers of attorney from the respondents evidence in the Grauer J Reasons for Judgment and published in the Vancouver Sun article as relevant evidence in defence of the section 15 (5) petition pleadings made against me but were available evidence not introduced on May 9, 2013 because of concerns about the actual trustworthiness of Fenlon J. when the false statements were being made about the Grauer J.'s order and its meaning in context of the preliminary issue).
235. That lawyer Ross Davidson asked me in October 2013 whilst he was preparing and filing mutual Enduring Powers of Attorney between my wife and I, why, when the Cambridge petition was served on March 24, 2013 my wife and I were surprised about the hearing when the binder was personally served, to which I explained, the notice of hearing was not included in the Petition and was not served (only ordinary service was required). (This was the same 'trick' used by Robert Ellis for BMO Bank under BCSC 106413). We did not find out about the hearing until the Court Index was served a few days prior to the hearing date... “we were ambushed on hearing”, and the foreclosure petition was not filed in the correct court.
236. That Ross Davidson provided legal advice that the primae facie numbers on the agreement did not add up, that the interest rates were not lawful, and asked us if we wanted to “get out from under the mortgage as a result”, and provided additional legal advice that at the least “a new hearing should be given”
237. That I verily believe (and have established in submissions provided), that it is not possible to make an application under the BC Civil Rules in relation to matters pertaining to the Constitution Act, 1867, (UK) 30 & 31 Victoria, B.C. when the objective of that application seeks a prohibition against a person from speaking on matters before court, which involve other adjudicators, jurists, judges and justices, who are presumed under law to possess their own capacity to determine a right of audience.
238. That the BC Civil Rules in relation to process and procedure are alluded to in relevant context to this affidavit evidence, and are compared and contrasted to matters pertaining to “right of audience” “inherent jurisdiction” of Constitutionally appointed justices can be properly understood through arguments in the S.C.C. Leave application time stamped S.C.C. September 20, 2015 beginning at or about page 35 of that document.
239. Under the Court Rules Act – Supreme Court Rules under “Petition and applications” “(4) If an enactment authorizes an application to the court or to a judge, the application must be (a) a petition under 16-1 or requisition under Rule 17-1, or (b) if the application is for an order other than a final order, by application under Part 8 whether or not the application provides for the mode of application.” “(5) “Enactment of Canada” - “Subrule (4) does not apply if a particular mode of application is required by an enactment of Canada.”
240. Under the Constitution of Canada VII, “Judicature” section 96. “The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Section 99. (1) Subject to subsection two of this section, the Judges of the Superior Courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the Governor General or Address of the Senate and House of Commons.”
241. That I understand that “good behaviour” is not to be literally interpreted (as it would seem to be literally understood by any reasonable person), and that it simply means until age 75.
242. The legal inference from this “good behavour” is not intended for literal interpretation, what it actually means its that once appointed it is difficult to get rid of a sitting justice.
243. That I verily believe that Justices Fenlon and Chief Justice Chris Hinkson undertook the actions and conduct they did in File Nos: H130330 and S111171 on the basis that there was nothing anyone could (or would) do about it. That they were in essence, 'above the law' and could do as they pleased.
244. That I verily believe in the evidence provided and in context of the Order Made After Application document filed May 31st, 2013 at Vancouver courthouse under file No.: H130330, and its relationship to actions and conduct of certain Law Society of BC members, including Ronald Bakonyi, Robert Ellis, prior to its filing, and afterward, as well to actions and conduct of Justices Lauri Anne Fenlon in relation to Order(s) of that day, as well to actions involving others Orders made by her including Order for Sale (December 6, 2014) also under file No.: H130330, and to actions and conduct of other “officers of the court” including Michael Kleisinger “compliance officer” with Law Society of BC with regard to that Order Made (May 31st, 2013) and to other conjunctive orders, including contempt by these persons of the Order(s) made by Justice Grauer October 3, 2011 (see pgs 140-153 of S.C.C. Legal filing time stamped at that court May 7, 2015 Vol II), and to the action and conduct of Michael Kleisinger in connection to his Rule 8 application for final order and Orders provided on that basis by Chief Justice Christopher Hinkson equal in sum total a plan by persons trained with specific know how to conspire to act in bad faith and in criminal concert to cause particular harm to Glen Robbins as well as to Ita Robbins and Frana Matich. (with emphasis).
245. That I believe, with respect to the actions and conduct of Madame Justice Fenlon and Chief Justice Hinkson, that notwithstanding whether or not there is sufficient evidence for criminal charges, that sufficient grounds exist for the Governor General of Canada on Address of the Senate and House of Commons to impeach their ability to properly represent the Judiciary and the Constitution of Canada.
246. That the only evidence filed in support of the petition relates to the foreclosure matter. The notice of hearing document filed April 15th, 2013 by Mr. Bakonyi for “CMIC” (also including false statements) includes his stipulation that the foreclosure application should be heard by a Master and only “5 minutes is required”. This suggests that in the mindset of Mr. Bakonyi and his 'friend' Robert Ellis (for nominal respondent BMO Bank of Montreal (seeking $1,000)), both of whom signed the notice of hearing document, that this was a simple straight forward application for foreclosure as is later reiterated in this my affidavit in relation to transcript evidence filed at the S.C.C., unrelated to matters of Glen Robbins 'speaking' on behalf of others.
247. Nothing in the foreclosure application, notice of hearing or binder filed included any evidence in relation to Glen Robbins who was not party to the action. No evidence was included which is held out by these two “officers of the court” to be a truthful document filed in the court, namely, that they both made an application to the court with evidence, then served this application upon me (or Ita Robbins & Frana Matich), an application which would necessitate a petition filing for final ORDER, and provided me the requisite time for filing a response to that application and a required binder for the hearing of that separate application. The court grid from BCSC H130330 through the relevant time period as well as the “Proceedings in Chambers of May 9th, 2013”, specifically pages 155-180 of Vol II “Law Branch” document S.C.C. Support this evidence.
248. The Application referenced in the ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION would, under the BC Civil Rules have to been made by way of petition and was not. The ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION has no application filed, nor evidence of service of that application, no evidence of a response to application or any other evidence of an application being made.
249. That when this 'phony application' and 'phony order' referred to as Order Made After Application of May 31, 2013 (BCSC H130330) is presented to new decision makers following order nisi, including at application for conduct of sale, application for vacant possession dated April 7, 2014 (adjourned with stay provisions attached), my application on April 23rd, 2014 to be added as party (under April 7, 2014 stay order) (and where no response to application was served pursuant to additional orders made April 7, 2014), application of appeal by Ita Robbins et al for April 24, 2014 hearing (under April 7, 2014 stay order) (and where no defence was served by pursuant to the Rules), it has the appearance of due process and has the possible affect of inducing them to error as was the case with Master Tokarek who clearly stipulates in court clerk notes that “his hands are tied” by the phony order, particularly when he sees the phony order is made in the name of a Justice which has more authority than he.
250. That Master Tokarek had to know that such an order was impossible to have occurred and had jurisdiction (requisite on some element of courage) to stay the period for redemption to investigate.
251. At page 2 line 2 (pg 157 of S.C.C. filing) Mr. Bakonyi for the Petition addresses the Court: “My Lady, this is usually a usual sort of application in foreclosure materials.”
252. At page 2 line 47 (again at 157) through to page 3 line 1 (page 158) “its' a foreclosure proceeding”, to which the Court at page 3 line 2 answers “Yes”.
253. Commencing at page 4 (page 159) line 11 Mr. Bakonyi speaks to the Court in reference to Glen Robbins attendance: “So normally there are times when people attempt to speak on behalf of others and sometimes it happens, but in this case it presents a whole host of problems because the first element is I'm objecting to it because Mr. Robbins has no standing because he's not a party. Number 2, I need to go through a little bit of the history of this and that's why we had put this, said half an hour, is because Mr. Robbins has had a long, long history of litigation matters with other lenders, other lawyers, he has sued lawyers, lenders, I am advised judges and other parties, and what Mr. Robbins did in this case was – well, I'm going to start by just giving you a copy of that order that he has referred to dated October the 3rd, 2011. It was an action between the Law Society and Mr. Robbins directly and if I can just hand you up a copy. He has a copy of it. He was aware of it and he mentioned it. That order is in an action in Vancouver court, Supreme Court, and it's an order filed January 11, 2012 and in paragraph 1, it was an action between the Law Society, who has had many dealings with Mr. Robbins also, and the order says: 'The respondent, Glen P. Robbins, be permanently enjoined from commencing, prosecuting, or defending a proceeding in any court on his own name or in the name of another person except as permitted under section 15(1) of the Legal Profession Act....Which deals with you have to be a lawyer to be able to practice law.” “So what Mr. Robbins has done since receipt of this petition and application is first of all this clearly shows (now at page 5-160) that he's clearly behind all of these matters and that he has done, in the envelope that he had sent me there was a letter in which Mr. Robbins had noted himself as the sender and it was his return address......(at line 11, page 5 (160) “The envelope that was delivered to my office on May the 2nd included in two cover letters and in the envelope, the envelope that is came in, which I have, had Mr. Robbins as the sender of the letter, of the materials.”
254. {That I leave it to the reader to make assumption about the cerebral constitution of Mr. Bakonyi as a lawyer relative to the Act that governs his livelihood, from the aforementioned paragraph, and ask the reader to consider what the likelihood that Mr. Bakonyi schemed this out on his own.}
255. At line 16 page 5 (page 160 of submissions) from Justice Fenlon “So this is in furtherance of your submission that what he's doing here is contrary to the order of Mr. Justice Grauer.”
256. At line 19 page 5 (page 160) Mr. Bakonyi responds to Madame Justice Fenlon “Exactly, and that he has no standing and that the order, he is contravening with that court order and he has no right to be speaking today and he has no standing to be speaking today.”
257. That I verily believe this short exchange between Mr. Bakonyi and Madame Justice Fenlon elucidates no evidence nor an introduction for evidence of the sort necessary for an ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION to be heard, notwithstanding the conspicuous procedural difficulties already point out. Mr. Bakonyi is producing without proper foundation for so doing, an Order of Justice Grauer from Reasons published October 3, 2011 which he admits to obtaining from the Internet (while waiting for Respondents Robert Ellis for BMO).
258. That I verily believe that Mr. Bakonyi's submissions pertain only to a willful misinterpretation of the Grauer J. Reasons for Judgment and Order of October 3, 2011 and clear evidence that he has no idea what he is actually talking about.
259. That I believe the events occurring on May 9, 2013 were the original brainchild of Robert Ellis legal counsel for BMO Bank of Montreal given the nearly incoherent ramblings of Mr. Bakonyi. Mr. Ellis had attended to other court proceedings involving Ita Robbins and Frana Matich including an application to set aside an order at Vancouver Provincial Court case number 1030114 on November 24, 2011 which ran a one day trial. That I attended to hearing to speak on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich, and although the application by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich was dismissed no costs were awarded to BMO Bank of Montreal, and Mr. Ellis made no complaint about my attendance at that time.
260. That Mr. Ellis was furious that no costs were awarded and informed me after hearing that “he would get them one way or another”.
261. That in the loan agreement between Ita Robbins and Frana Matich, agent for the lender Peet and Cowan Financial Services demanded an '11th hour' addition of new charges of payment to BMO Bank of Montreal, in an amount of about $11,500 which were not legally justifiable.
262. That when the additional new unjustifiable charges demanded by BMO Bank were added to financing amounts under threat by Peet and Cowan of denying financing altogether, they were agreed to on the basis that BMO Bank of Montreal had a hearing two weeks hence for conduct of sale of a previous foreclosure matter, and on that basis was leveraging money it was not lawfully entitled to. This conduct of sale was linked to petition for payment of outstanding amount of around $10,000 from the the referenced provincial court matter.
263. That I contacted Cobbett and Cotton lawyers in Burnaby, British Columbia informing them of the circumstances of the threats and demand by BMO under threat of using court processes as threat to enter into original (unconscionable) agreement with Peet & Cowan Financial Services (the predecessor and 'sister' company to Cambridge Mortgage), and owing to duress of the 'new deal' signed the agreement with Peet and Cowan in the name of my wife and mother in law who were not available to sign. That I obtained my wife's permission to sign her name but could not reach my mother in law to obtain permission but had her consent to sign her name from time to time.
264. That my wife and her mother were joint tenants on title of the property in question located at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane in Coquitlam, BC., our family residence of more than two decades.
265. That I on behalf of my wife Ita Robbins provided lawyer Michael Rathbone of Cobbett and Cotton with the loan agreement of Peet and Cowan Financial Services.
266. That I understand when my wife Ita Robbins attended to Cobbett and Cotton to sign mortgage documents with Peet and Cowan Financial Services she was confronted with a registration of an entirely new company - Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation, which neither she nor her mother were expecting. Peet and Cowan Financial (the original agreement) did not compel independent legal advice which they should have done, and had this been a stipulation of the loan, than the Criminal Code breach would have been discovered, an extension of time of payment of the $10,000 provincial court order might have been obtained.
267. That what Peet and Cowan Financial Services did was transfer the unconscionable and criminal loan agreement (98.7%) with Ita Robbins and Frana Matich to another company Jonathan Cowan and Francis Peet jointly owned namely, Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation, with a lawful rate which itself was fraudulent in nature as it it did not properly recognize the annual percentage rate of the loan or the fact that the loan was not made in advance as required by section 6 of the Interest Act (Canada) as required to be constituted as a proper mortgage. (What this was – was an unconscionable agreement with inflated principle)
268. That under section 2 (1) of the Business Corporations Act (SBC 2002) Chapter 57: “For the purposes of this Act, one corporation is affiliated with another corporation if (c) each of them is controlled by the same person.”
269. That Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation and Peet and Cowan Financial Services are both owned and controlled by the same two persons namely Francis Peet and Jonathan Cowan. That the original accounting and financing arrangement was made between Ita Robbins and Frana Matich with Annual Percentage Rate at nearly 98% a criminal rate, which agreement was then laundered without amendment to any original accounting through the second company they own at BC Land Title and Survey Office in New Westminster BC.
270. That the Cambridge Mortgage registered mortgage featured two different rates of interests, both of them fraudulent rates, which should have set off alarms at BC Land Title Office anyhow. Like money laundering this criminal agreement from Peet and Cowan Financial Services to Ita Robbins and Frana Matich, later rinsed through Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation did not require the financial details to submitted at filing to BC Land Title Office.
271. That I am aware that Michael Rathbone of Cobbett & Cotton would not authorize his signature to represent independent legal advice and signed the document as to signature only.
272. That on numerous occasions before the courts in relation to these matters Mr. Bakonyi has misrepresented the actual circumstances of independent legal advice.
273. (Back to May 9, 2013 hearing):That my position is affirmed by transcript evidence at line 47, page 8 (page 163 of submissions) from the Court: “All right”. “So you are saying on behalf of your client (“CMIC”) that this is a standard application for an order for foreclosure?”, to which Mr. Bakonyi responds at line 3 page 9 (page 164) “Yes”. At line 4 the Court asks: “And the preliminary issue is whether the court should be hearing from Mr. Robbins?” to which Mr. Bakonyi responds at line 6 page 9 (page 164) “Right”.
274. That this evidence clearly affirms Mr. Bakonyi lying to the court that this is a standard mortgage agreement, supporting his client Jonathan Cowan\s false affidavit and failure to properly declare or disclose any friable issues as required by law in the Province of British Columbia.
275. At line 29 page 11 (page 166 of Submissions) the Court says (to Robert Ellis for BMO) “All right. And what do you say is the effect of the order of Mr. Justice Grauer?” to which Mr. Ellis responds “I support my friend's position on this that Mr. Robbins here is clearly the driving force behind all of the responses that are being filed and submitted to the court in this matter. He is clearly defending a proceeding in the name of another person and he is clearly not a member of the Law Society.”
276. That I know for fact that Mr. Ellis never disputed on some 4 or 5 occasions and court hearings involving my wife Ita Robbins and mother in law Frana Matich as parties to the action, my attendance to speak on their behalf as directed by the Reasons of Grauer J dated October 2, 2011.
277. That in order for me to be in breach of defending a proceeding, my name would have to be in the place of one of the parties, either my wife or mother in law for signing on the document. In all documents involving Ita Robbins & Frana Matich (under H130330) they sign all of the requisite documents necessary to defend the case, with one exception, where I apply to be added as party which document I sign, and which application Ita Robbins & Frana Matich consent to.
278. That Justice Grauer clearly described (later Fisher J. does the same in “LSBC v Parsons” 2015 BCSC 742) section 15 (5) of the LPA as it was prior to amendment by Royal Assent of the BC Legislature as relating to the filing of documents “as a solicitor is wont to do” (Page 10 para [38] The Law Society of BC v Robbins) unrelated to matters pertaining to right of audience.
279. That in fact as a longstanding participant in Law Society matters including numerous unsuccessful runs for office with that public body Mr. Ellis knew or ought to have known that 'defending a proceeding in the name of another person' according to Grauer J and other justices referenced here under, would require me to sign a defending document (response to application- response to notice of claim etc.) in the place where another person, such as my wife Ita or mother-in-law Frana ought to be signing, and nothing more or less than that.
280. That I believe Madame Justice Fenlon at line 3 page 15 of transcript (page 170 of submissions) purposefully and with targeted active malice commences to ignore the obvious circumstance of right of audience and to further apply what she obvious knows is ultra rives her authority by (a) admitting that the Grauer J order of October 3, 2011 is binding upon her; (b) purposefully misinterpreting it to mean something it could never mean; (c) failing to bother to read the short 14 page double spaced Reasons of Grauer J., and thereafter making order that no justice could make binding on any other justice or adjudicator. “...or what answer can you give me to this order of Mr. Justice Grauer which very clearly says you are not supposed to speak on anyone's behalf.”
281. That I verily believe this question from Fenlon J. to me is a request to adduce evidence based on a false judicial assumption regarding an order of a fellow justice (Grauer J.) which this hearing and subsequent actions by Fenlon J. would, I believe, lead and reasonable person armed with the facts to come to the conclusion that Fenlon J. was knowingly and with malice assisting Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis in their fraudulent scheme to deprive Ita Robbins and Frana Matich of all of their property and to steal it for themselves and their clients.
282. That I realize that Fenlon J. is 'trending down the path of partiality' and at line 23 page 15 (transcript) (page 170 submissions) and commence to 'lock her down' on her bias in terms of her former relationship as associate legal counsel at Fasten Martineau law firm working under senior partner Elizabeth Lyall, who was opposing counsel to me under file No.: S111171 before Grauer J. Mr. Robbins: “Yeah. The full findings actually were, and this is the two things, this is what Justice Grauer his position was, so long as – his question was to Ms. Lyall of Fasken Martineau and the Law Society, did you serve the document on the parties....Its' up the person hearing it.”
283. That I believe at this point in the hearing Fenlon J. (whose professional history I had investigated while we were waiting for her Honour and Mr. Ellis (please note page 155 of submissions the “Proceedings in Chambers” Index stipulation “No exhibits entered” and the fact that “Proceedings Commenced at 12:00 Noon”), -- ought to have properly recused herself and failed to do so.
284. That in support of my position of my accusation that Justice Fenlon was willfully bias, and further that she was purposefully (and not randomly) selected to sit on the hearing (which I verily believe was arranged by Robert Ellis and BC Court Services while we waited two hours for him to attend to court in order to protect his client BMO's $1,000 interest in the foreclosure petition), I cite Gun son v Sekhon BCSC Docket M116504, Vancouver Registry: Date: 20151218 (December 12th, 2015) hearing before (ironically) Justice Grauer, who replaced Bellavance J. as the justice hearing the matter, on the basis that Bellavance J. had a cousin on the witness list.
285. That I verily believe acting as justice in a case involving Reasons for Judgment and orders made involving your former boss and senior partner at the law firm you once worked at, as associate counsel in a contentious matter which relates to judicial independence, & judicial comity, is a greater reason for recusing oneself than recusing oneself because a witness in a trial is your cousin. The higher standard of care would rest I believe in a situation involving two former co workers from the same firm involving both of these professional persons, one of them a constitutional justice, the other a senior partner who was opposite me in the original case from the order is made, than in a case involving a constitutional judicial appointment and a cousin.
286. That it is interesting to note that in the Gunson matter, that Bellavance J. actually reviewed the file sufficiently to ascertain the conflict from which she recused herself, while Fenlon J didn't even bother to read the Reasons for Judgment of Grauer J during the recess period of one hour, or maybe she did, which would make her response post recess even more suspicious.
287. That I verily believe that Fenlon J., her former boss Elizabeth Lyall of Fasken Martineau professional law firm of Vancouver BC, were angry and humiliated at the Reasons for Judgment of Grauer J of October 3, 2011, including: (1) his Honour's reference to Glen Robbins being “ingenious” in terms of applying the donor aspect of power of attorneys as more than just a principle and agent relationship; (2) to the fact that so many orders sought by Elizabeth Lyall were not obtained; (3) that Justice Grauer clearly determined that subsection 15(5) was unrelated to a right of audience (the right to 'speak' on another's behalf); (4) that Justice Grauer tore the legislation of the Legal Professions Act to shreds causing it to be amended by Royal Assent of the BC Legislature (both BC Liberal and BC NDP members); and (5) most importantly to the fact that Grauer J definitively defined and distinguished the different relationship between the solicitor and barrister and made clear that the actions in the Legal Profession Act under section 15 (5) related only to the filing of documents “as a solicitor is wont to do” and (5) that Justice Grauer waived off many argument of Elizabeth Lyall at hearing, and that Ian Mulgrew of the Vancouver Sun wrote an article about the case in the Vancouver Sun, sufficient to cause Fasken Martineau, and the Law Society of BC through their nominee to the bench Fenlon J., and through their members Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis to willfully hatch a collective scheme among them to use the facilities of the Court to deprive Justice Grauer of fair interpretation of his Reasons and his status as a constitutional justice, and Glen Robbins his right to benefit of those Reasons.

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