Robbins SCE Research
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Vol V - G. Robbins criminal complaint to Jus Min Wilson Raybould, BC Prosecution Services, R Bakonyi (Cambridge-Peet & Cowan), R. Ellis (BMO Bank), M. Kleisinger (LSBC), Justice(s) Fenlon and Hinkson
  May 31, 2016

Commentary
387. That I verily believe the notice of hearing document filed by Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis under BCSC H130330 is a criminal act in that it contains false statements endorsed by both Mr. Bakonyi and Mr. Ellis, those statement in obtaining the May 9, 2013 hearing date before Master for 5 minutes bearing false statement that a response to petition had in fact been filed on April 15, 2013, when it had not been, and that the respondents had been consulted. The response to petition was filed on April 19, 2013 as the court grid of BC Supreme Court clearly outlines.
388. That this fraudulent filing can be identified at BC Court Services online which the courthouse and senior counsel have access to at H130330 or can be reviewed in substantial evidence provided by these submissions and two volumes initially sent to Supreme Court of Canada.
389. At page 7 line 23 (pg 162 of submissions) Mr. Bakonyi makes submissions unrelated to the matters before the court involving document filings, and various criticism of myself in matters unrelated to (1) foreclosure; and (2) right of audience/misapprehension of Grauer J. order to which Justice Fenlon responds (eventually) at page 8 line 17: “Now, that's not something I can take into account, it's not in the materials.” Justice Fenlon then asks at line 20 page 8: “There is no vexatious litigant order?” Mr. Bakonyi responds to the Court: “That's the – Law Society is looking at that --”
390. That there is no such legal animal as a vexatious litigant, there are only orders for vexatious proceedings, and further believe that the term vexatious litigant is defamation.
391. At page 11 line 9 (page 166 of submissions) in response to submissions from Mr. Ellis speaks to the Court: “Your Honour really? Its' character assassination. Please”, to which Justice Fenlon responds at line 11 of page 11 “All right”.
392. That I verily believe the statements with regard to para 75 acknowledging Mr. Bakonyi's confessed communication with the Law Society of BC regarding a vexatious litigant order (which is not related in any way to right of audience) marks in time (May 9th, 2013) the first time this matter comes up, and established a linkage between this hearing and events which follow later between Michael Kleisinger of the Law Society of B.C. and Chief Justice Hinkson under BCSC S111171 – connecting that matter (to be addressed in this affidavit evidence) with the events of May 9, 2013, where false statement are made to the Court (and accepted by the Court) concerning a planned purposeful misinterpretation of subsection 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act which obviously has nothing to do with matters pertaining to right of audience.
393. That I verily believe on May 9th, 2013 under BCSC H130330 – Officers of the Court Ronald Bakonyi, Robert Ellis and Constitutionally appointed Justice Fenlon purposefully and with malice colluded to offend the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Grauer because they were dissatisfied with his Reasons, and colluded through the process of H130330, to ensure that the facts available in the response petition which properly considered would lead any competent jurist to put the matter over to trial hearing.
394. That on November 24, 2011, 50 days following the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Grauer, and 20 days following the 30 day period for filing an appeal to the Grauer J. matter (BCSC S111171) of October 3, 2011, I had filed my appeal of the costs order, while the Law Society had not filed any. That as a consequence of this, and the Law Society's action taken to amend the unclear provisions of Section 15 of the Legal Profession Act (B.C.), and as a consequence, I assume they had accepted Justice Grauer's Reasons beyond my appeal of the Costs which order was maintained owing to discretion of the court.
395. That I verily believe none of the following persons Ronald Bakonyi, Robert Ellis, Michael Kleisinger, Lauri Fenlon, Chris Hinkson or Bobby Bauman give two wits about the Supreme Court of Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or due process unless it involves a case where paying parties are represented by lawyers being paid, and that these cases are clear evidence of this attitude.
396. That I appeared alone on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich at Vancouver registry Provincial Court under file No.: 1030114 v BMO Bank of Montreal and its legal counsel Robert Ellis, for a one day trial without either Ita Robbins or Frana Matich in attendance. That I appeared in North Vancouver on behalf of a 3rd party Sandy Lauzon and successfully obtained an order for her 'without receiving or expectation of a fee or benefit', and made successful application on her behalf.
397. That an argument might be made that on May 9th, 2013 under BCSC H130330, Fenlon J. might have simply misapprehended the evidence in light of the false statements knowingly (and maliciously) made by Ronald Bakonyi (“CMIC”) and Robert Ellis (“BMO Bank of Montreal) to her that morning, admittedly while she was unexpectedly brought in to hear a matter she otherwise was not expected to hear. However this argument falls flat when we consider that there is evidence of her (eventually) signing the ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION, and then providing order for sale of property under file No,: H130330 for hundreds of thousands of dollars under even a discounted accounted, whilst the offending order in her name was in the very file at their fingertips when she made the order, and later her making order for the sale of the house at a fraction of its value.
398. That the case law on misapprehension of bias in light of the substantive events occurring on May 9th, 2013 and thereafter would not tend to support this condition as any more than an etoliated excuse.
399. In R v Alboukhari – 2013 ONCA 581 (from “D. Styler” analysis) “the trial judge had found that the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was not available to the defendant- now the appellant – and, in turn, convicted him of sexual assault. On appeal, it was necessary to the court to determine whether this finding was the result of a misapprehension of evidence on the part of the trial judge.”
400. “There were two issues on appeal: 1. Did the trial judge misapprehend or fail to consider material evidence; 2. If so, did this result in a miscarriage of justice as a legal error.”
401. “As stated by Epstein JA @ para 42: [W]hile reasonable steps are assessed from an objective point of view, this assessment is informed by the circumstances subjectively known to the accused. The accused is not under a positive obligation to determine all of the relevant circumstances subjectively known to the accused.”
402. Misapprehension of Evidence: “The Ontario Court of Appeal stated that a misapprehension of evidence includes “a failure to consider evidence relevant to a material issue, a mistake as to the substance of the evidence, or a failure to give proper effect to evidence.” In order to result in a miscarriage of justice, the misapprehension must be central to the trial judge's finding...(of guilt).”
403. As per the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v Lohren, 2004 SCC 80 at para [2]: “The misapprehension of evidence must go to the substance rather than the detail. It must be material rather than peripheral to the reasoning of the trial judge. Once these hurdles are surmounted, there is the further hurdle (the test is expressed as conjunctive rather than disjunctive) that the errors thus identified must play an essential part not just in the narrative of the judgment but “in the reasoning process”..... and from Alboukhari @ para 30 “There will be no miscarriage of justice if the trial judge would have arrived at the same conclusion without the misapprehended evidence”.... “The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had misapprehended the evidence in relation to five issues, which coloured his assessment of the appellant's credibility.” (Ed: ““Conjunctive” is a grammatical term for particles which serve for joining or connecting together. Thus, the conjunctive “and” is called a “conjunctive” and “or” “disjunctive”----conjunction”).
404. That I am aware that “In 2001, the Alberta court (sic), under the penmanship of Chief Justice McLachlin wrote: “Judicial notice disposes with the need for proof of facts that are clearly uncontroversial or beyond reasonable dispute” That I verily believe and understand the issue of the order of Justice Grauer made October 3, 2011 and its introduction to the Court on May 9th, 2013 under H130330 cannot be characterized or considered under Judicial Notice of evidence.
404. That I am aware that “In 2001, the Alberta court (sic), under the penmanship of Chief Justice McLachlin wrote: “Judicial notice disposes with the need for proof of facts that are clearly uncontroversial or beyond reasonable dispute” That I verily believe and understand the issue of the order of Justice Grauer made October 3, 2011 and its introduction to the Court on May 9th, 2013 under H130330 cannot be characterized or considered under Judicial Notice of evidence. 405. That, again, I reassert that the Order of Justice Grauer in relation to section 15(5) of the Legal Professions Act, as it applies to its introduction at hearing on May 9, 2013, did not occur in any of the text or any part of the originating foreclosure petition, or the affidavit in support of that petition or in any binder filed with the court. That the matter of the Orders introduction is initiated by Ronald Bakonyi lawyer who produced the petition and the affidavit in support of foreclosure orders for his client “CMIC” and which follows this path: (a) On Page 2 commencing at line 40 of the transcript “Yes, My Lady. The first thing I', here to – the reason we're in this courtroom today is because I'm, my position is that Mr. Robbins has no standing to be here today/and to speak on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich and there's two elements to that,.....” (b)And, then at Page 4 line commencing at line 11 “So normally there are times when people attempt to speak on behalf of others and sometimes it happens, but in this case it presents a whole host of problems because the first element is I'm objecting to it because Mr. Robbins has no standing because he's not a party...” (to line 23) “well, I'm going to start by just giving you a copy of that order that he has referred to dated October 3, 2011” (By “he” Mr. Bakonyi is referring to me and my assertion in submissions at Page 1 line 29 “I'm not appearing as agent, I'm appearing for my wife and mother-in-law, which I have done, pursuant to the order of Justice Grauer of October 3, 2011..”) (c) And, then continuing under Mr. Bakonyi's submissions at Page 4 line 36 Mr. Bakonyi reads in the order of Justice Grauer: “The respondent, Glen P. Robbins, be permanently prohibited and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting, or defending a proceeding in any court on (sic) his own name or in the name of another person except as permitted under section 15(1) of the Legal Profession Act” (N.B. The language 'in his own name or in the name of another person' is amended out of the subsection May 2012 by Royal Assent (mentioned earlier in this Affidavit) in relation to Justice Grauer's assertion that the language is confusing). (d) At Page 4 line 44 Mr. Bakonyi sums up his rendition of the Grauer J. order after clearly identifying it to the court as relating to the Legal Professions Act, which one would presume the presiding Justice and the two lawyers would be familiar with given that it does (or has) applied to them, and they have paid fees in relation to a membership in public body The Law Society of B.C. which is mandated to enforce this provincial statute: “Which (the order of Justice Grauer) deals with you have to a lawyer to be able to practice law.” (e) At Page 5 line 16 the Court responds to Mr. Bakonyi (despite his apparent lack of understanding of the implications or interpretation of the Grauer J. order): “So this is in furtherance of your submission that what he's doing is contrary to the order of Mr. Justice Grauer?” (N.B. I note that just after Mr. Bakonyi moves from the subject matter of the foreclosure petition to the issue of whether or not I am able to attain a right of audience Justice Fenlon has purported to be busy making notes from these less than stellar submissions “Just a moment. I'm behind you a moment, I was making a note.”) (f) At Page 5 line 23 Mr. Bakonyi asserts in furtherance of his apparent view of the contravention of the Grauer J order: “The envelope that he had delivered (N.B. Service documents of response to petition under H130330) included an unfiled response and numerous and lengthy other documents prepared by Mr. Robbins including the two letters that I mentioned, and those were copied to the Chief Justice, (N.B. At this point in time the C.J was Robert Bauman) to the Trial Lawyers Association, to the RCMP, to the Liberal Party, the NDP Party, the Supreme Court of Canada, the Canadian Press, the office of the prime minister, and it goes on and on.” (N.B. Mr. Bakonyi is providing collaboration of my notice of fear that a robbery is being planned and is in progress) (g) At Page 5 line 32 Justice Fenlon asks “Is that material in the ---” (NB. I submit that the Court is asking if the material Mr. Bakonyi is referring to is in the filed material in relation to the petition for foreclosure). (h) At Page 5 line 33 Mr. Bakonyi responds “That's not in the material.” (i) (That by the end of Page 5 we can conclude that neither the Order of Justice Grauer provided to the court or any submissions in support of a contravention of that Order are in the materials filed under the petition for foreclosure that day). (j) (From the top of Page 6 (submissions page 161) and line 1 to line 31 Mr. Bakonyi occupies time speaking about matter unrelated to petition foreclosure or to the right of audience matter) (k) (At Page 6 line 32 Justice Fenlon now fully aware that the submissions Mr. Bakonyi is making are unrelated in any way to the foreclosure matter or in reality to the Order of Justice Grauer or relevant to the issue at bar {presumably right of audience – but who knows?} makes a response which would, in context suggest a misapprehension of evidence....which I suggest is in fact Her Honour taking the opportunity to pretend to be deluded by Mr. Bakonyi's mesmerizing eloquence) she asks Mr. Bakonyi: “Is that against the same parties” (N.B. A response which would suggest that her mind has turned to consideration of vexatious procedures {a different concept than section 15 (5) and Orders of Justice Grauer consider}) Mr. Bakonyi (thinking he is onto something) responds: “And some others”. (l) Commencing on Page 7 line 18 Mr. Bakonyi asserts to the Court: “We filed our notice of application on April 15th, 2013” {This is the notice of hearing containing false statements}. The Court responds “On April?” to which Mr. Bakonyi replies “15th” to which the Court further responds “15th”....and then Mr. Bakonyi admits at line 24 his admission of guilt in filing a notice of hearing document in a superior court registry containing false statement signed by him when he states: “I remind you that there was no response filed that we had received by that point”. {Mr. Bakonyi's notice of hearing file on April 15th, 2015 through the Government of British Columbia 'efiling' mechanism contained false statements that in fact a response to petition had been filed and that the respondents had been consulted over time}.
406. That the subjective nature of Fenlon J. at hearing under BCSC file No.: H130330 must be turned from that capacity (what is in her mind as guilty party) to objective based on her training, the presumptions one would make about the qualifications of a competent constitutional justice, is that she is mindful of the constitutional right of audience authority she has, and knowingly subverts her own authority (and along with it the authority of every justice operating in the province in unity), to the provisions of the Legal Profession Act rejecting a more fulsome consideration of the Grauer J. Reasons which would have easily enlightened her in the five minutes it might have taken to read her brother justice's Reasons of October 3, 2011
407. That these actions, responses and determinations however arrived at, cannot be characterized as a misapprehension of bias. It was deliberate and Fenlon J. used the court to affect it showing no regard for myself, and a disgraceful disregard for the interest or justice for my wife or my mother in law who were defenceless.
408. That Mr. Bakonyi further admits his participation in making false statement in an official document (notice of hearing) on Page 7 line 28...{in reference to the response to petition} “So it's 21 days now after delivery of the notice of hearing which is in front of us today. So I just want to now go back to where we were...” (and at line 38) “...it's irrelevant because there was no filed response served and delivered pursuant to the rules. Rule 16-1 (4) requires him {actually not me, but Ita Robbins and Frana Matich} to file a response and serve the filed response to me. He never did that. I don't even have one to this day (this day being May 9th, 2013).”
409. That at Page 7 line 44 Mr. Bakonyi, who at this juncture of transcript evidence pertaining to filed documents has already admitted twice in submissions to Justice Fenlon, in relation to filed evidence before her, to which she has invested upwards of a quarter of an hour, that he has achieved a hearing date before the Court through the filing of a document featuring false statements, and to add icing to the cake then admits at Page 7 line 44: “Now this matter has been reported to the Law Society.....”
410. That at Page 8 line 17 following an estimated 103 transcript lines of erroneous 'gibberish' from Mr. Bakonyi unrelated to either the foreclosure matter for hearing that day, or to the right of audience, but directly relating to the admission on two occasions of actus and mens rea filing of document in a court registry bearing two false statements.
411. That, again the sequencing of this stage of evidence I reiterate that at Page 8 line 17 Justice Fenlon on behalf of the Court with full awareness of the documents and evidence in her binder including the notice of hearing responds to Mr. Bakonyi by asking “There is no vexatious litigant order” to which Mr. Bakonyi submits “That's the Law Society is looking at that--”.
412. That at this juncture – Page 8 line 20 the matter of myself and right of hearing have not been addressed, Justice Fenlon has by inference of her questions to Mr. Bakonyi in response to his submissions to this point that her “state of mind” interpreted these submissions as being closer to grounds for vexatious litigant status, although the submissions made to her at this point on that account are unfounded on the evidence notwithstanding Mr. Bakonyi's conspicuous lack of eloquence or clarity on any of the subjects considered.
413. From Page 8 and line 24 until line 46 (a total of 127 transcript lines) Mr. Bakonyi intermingles the Grauer J. order at line line 27 “The only reason it's in front of you that I have, and I just happened to come across that when I looked at his name on the internet” (Again, unrelated to the matter of the petition for foreclosure).
414. Again, after this, Justice Fenlon finally takes back control of the Court at Page 8 and line 47 “All right. So you are saying on behalf of your client that this is a standard application for an order foreclosure?”, to which Mr. Bakonyi answers “Yes”, and then to which Justice Fenlon asks at Page 9 and line 4 “And the preliminary issue is whether the court should be hearing from Mr. Robbins.”
415. That at Page 9 line 11, Mr. Bakonyi makes false statement to the court with respect to the matter of the so called mortgage between his client “CMIC” and Ita Robbins and Frana Matich where he he states that each woman received independent legal advice from Michael Rathbone and Jeff Kuhl.
416. That in fact Michael Rathbone, who had been made aware of the problems with the originating criminal agreement made between “CMIC's” sister company Peet and Cowan Financial Services (“PCFS”) at 98.7% A.P.R., placed his signature next to Ita Robbins on the mortgage registration with “CMIC” (the 2nd company used for laundering the criminal-unconscionable agreement) denoted “As to Signature Only”, while Frana Matich has sworn an affidavit that she did not understand what her lawyer was saying seen at page 203 of Volume II of the April 2015 submissions to the S.C.C. Sworn 24th, April 2015 in Burnaby, B.C.
417. That Exhibit “B” of Frana Matich's affidavit (page 204 Vol II) reflects a Commitment Letter between Peet and Cowan Financial Services outlining an “entire agreement” as between Peet and Cowan Financial Services (and not Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation “CMIC”. The agreement acknowledges a $500 “Lender Fee & Application” made payable to Peet and Cowan Financial Services Inc. In Trust to RBC:003-04000-1073378; (rec'd)”, with “Proposed Security”: 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC.”
418. “That under the agreement under Borrower's Acceptance it states that “This offer is open for acceptance until 5 pm 1 business days after the date of issue. If this document is not signed and received, it shall be rendered null and void, Acceptance indicates consent to the collection and disclosure of personal information necessary to process and manage this loan.”
419. That the loan agreement made between Ita Robbins and Frana Matich is signed on the 23rd day of December 2011, however the loan offer expires at 5 pm on December 22, 2011.
420. That I aware that my wife Ita Robbins attended to lawyers in early January 2012 to sign documents with Peet and Cowan Financial Services, unawares at the time of the 98.7% A.P.R., and when she arrived at law offices was confronted with a mortgage agreement devoid of financial details, in the name of another company owned by Peet and Cowan, the petitioner Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation “CMIC”.
421. That I do not believe the loan agreement Ita made with Peet and Cowan Financial Services to be a valid enforceable legal contract, and further believe that it was null and void.
422. That I verily believe that if the original loan from Peet & Cowan Financial Services is deemed to be valid, then it has not been revoked, and if it is not revoked then it is not possible to introduce the new mortgage registration with Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation without the proper consent of Ita Robbins or Frana Matich through a proper appraisal of the accounting and with proper independent legal advice for the new agreement.
423. That I verily believe a had proper approval of change of agreement been given or in the circumstances if it considered valid to swap names from originating agreement to new party without any changes then the mortgage ought to have been registered at BC Land Title and Survey in the actual Annual Percentage Rate occurring of 98.7%, the proper A.P.R. Associated with the financing, and not 8.9% or 9.2% which was the first mortgage amount filed, which amount was erroneous and a constructive fraud.
424. That Ita Robbins lawyer Michael Rathbone of Cobbett and Cotton Burnaby do not sign their names as witness to Ita Robbins under the CMIC mortgage document and registration, but rather, stipulate as noted above “As To Signature Only”
425. That in the Transcript Evidence of May 9, 2013, Mr. Bakonyi has admitted to the felony charge of filing a document in a Superior Court registry containing false statements which Justice Fenlon has right in front of her, and acknowledged, and now has misrepresented the nature of legal advice or action between Ita Robbins and her legal counsel Michael Rathbone, information which is in the filed documents before Justice Fenlon.
426. That at Page 9 line 25 of Court Transcript for May 9, 2013 under BCSC H130330 Mr. Ellis is asked to deal with the matter of right of audience characterized by her Honour as the “preliminary issue” intended to mean the matter preceding the actual substantive matter before the court, the foreclosure petition. Mr. Ellis is a nominal respondent. Between Page 9 at line 34 (of 47) and page 10 to line 22 Mr. Ellis carries on talking about unrelated matters court cases, already canvassed by Mr. Bakonyi...which Justice Fenlon facilitates by asking questions such as “When did this occur?” In fact Mr. Ellis is mainly talking about matters pertaining to BCSC 106413 the original action from which the Grauer J. Reasons were made under BCSC S111171 that produced what Fenlon J refers to as “the binding order”, binding on herself as well.
427. That I believe Fenlon J. was purposefully permitting Robert Ellis to re litigate matters already decided by the court in Reasons for Judgment of Mister Justice Grauer under file No.: S111171 made October 3, 2011.
428. That during proceedings May 31, 2013, Mr. Ellis continues on advancing the case of a nominal respondent in submissions of BMO matters already dispensed with another Justice....but Justice Fenlon permits him to “Ramble On”...which she knew full well was unrelated to the matter at hand.
429. Finally at Page 11 and line 29 (again) I reiterate in context of evidence as the complicity of Justice Fenlon she asks Robert Ellis who was not party to the Law Society of BC matter v Glen Robbins “All right. And what do you say is the effect of the order of Mr. Grauer?”
430. That the court had no business asking Mr. Ellis about the effect of the order of Mr. Grauer. He was not party to the trial before him, he did not file intervenor status at either the BC Court of Appeal or Supreme Court of Canada, and obviously doesn't fully understand the matter, or is simply being dishonest and manipulative, which the history of filings including the notice of hearing document of April 15, 2013 and Order Made After Application of May 31, 20133 would attest to.
431. That I verily believe Justice Fenlon is permitting Mr. Ellis as she has Mr. Bakonyi before him, to re interpret the Order of Mister Justice Grauer, a constitutionally appointed justice, (as she is), which has already been clearly interpreted by his Reasons, which, at the time of the May 9, 2013 hearing under H130330, had included amendments having been made to section 15 by Royal Assent of the BC Legislature, and when, Her Honour knew full well, the matter of right of audience in matters of hearing before her are under her constitutional discretion 100%, and that no other justice can have effect on her authority, and that beyond this – Fenlon J. had no right to seek submissions of interpretation of the Grauer J order when she knew full well his Reasons provided his final determination inclusive of clear and unequivocal interpretation.
432. That these two lawyers and justice had no idea that the language in the order of Justice Grauer had been amended by virtue of Royal Assent of the BC Legislature May 2012.
433. That I am aware from phone calls of anonymous persons involved in legal cases in BC superior courts that Michael Kleisinger attended to a court hearing in Nanaimo, B.C. before Master McNaughton where he applied to deny a right of audience based on the legal profession act.
434. That I verily believe at Page 11 (page 166) Justice Fenlon is consciously abusing her power by re-litigating Reasons already determined by a fellow justice by persons not related to that litigation, the order from which she refers to as “binding” upon her.
435. That during my submissions on Page 12 beginning at Page 38 I assert “Where's the evidence here? I don't have the documents. This is very simple. Justice Grauer asserted section 98 of the constitution in essence saying judges are independent, they are federally appointed. They differ from masters who are appointed by the provincial government. Justice Grauer, because when he steps into the courtroom he is an independent person, and he said what difference does it make to me whether he represents his family” (appearing at bar)....(at line 47) The technicality, the Law Society – and I must say that the core of that decision, 14 pages of Justice Grauer, the core of it, 10 pages deal with BMO, Mr. Ellis, who has been riding shotgun for lawyers ever since keeping an eye on his client, that's the core of it....at Page 13 line 36 “Today's matter, that's why I asked for a transcript, all of the transcripts of everything that has ever been done on that property (1355 Honeysuckle) are being sent to the Supreme Court of Canada....and my issue here with standing, standing is an excuse. We can't beat this guy, right, so let's just get up here and talk to somebody else, and hope that our fellow friend bites...”
436. That I verily believe I had Fenlon J. pegged right from beginning of H130330 at hearing May 9, 2013. That dishonesty and predictability therein is not a comforting state of affairs in any so called independent court.
437. That I verily believe that at this juncture in the Transcript evidence that I have communicated a understanding and awareness of the complicity of the Courts with the two fellow friends (lawyers) and former business associates in her capacity of associate legal counsel with Fasken Martineau professional law firm in what her former boss Elizabeth Lyall refers to as the Law Society (“corporation”) (not an actual society). How can Justice Grauer's order be “binding” upon her and his Reasons for Judgment not be “binding” as well?
438. That, at this juncture, I have realized to my own belief Fenlon J.'s partiality. She started out reasonably (ending at or about page 1) and then (too) easily permits a nearly incoherent Mr. Bakonyi to ramble on too long on the “preliminary issue”, with matters unrelated to the task at hand being the “preliminary issue” and not the substantive matter before her, the petition for foreclosure.
439. That my first comment to the Court questions the evidence in the index binder. I reiterate not having documents (notice of hearing), something which Fenlon J. acknowledged at the beginning of the hearing, I don't have the notice of hearing document. Then I clearly distinguish between the authority of a constitutionally appointed justice, Fenlon J.'s role at hearing, and that of a provincial employee...the Master (who normally hears simple straightforward foreclosure matters), the inference being that the matter before Fenlon J is in context falls under the former authority, and this is what should be guiding her.
440. That the hearing of the matter of right of audience in Chambers before Fenlon J. requires the proper consideration of bona fide evidence, if it is going to be characterized as an application, and the evidence before her that day includes the petition for foreclosure (the commencement), (the notice of hearing with false statements (the prosecution) and the response to petition (signed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich in compliance with the Grauer J. order is all before her) only., and as such constitutes a summary trial wherein the pleadings of the response to petition filed by Ita Robbins & Frana Matich in their own names as provided for by section 15(1) of the Legal Profession Act (B.C.) which should be considered a final order from trial and dealt with as such by BC Court of Appeal.
441. That in no matter of circumstance or interpretation did anything occur on May 9, 2013 under BCSC H130330 which would constitute a basis of a separate application for order. Had one existed then the question would have been a substantive one not a preliminary issue.
442. That the evidence handed up to Fenlon J. (the order of Justice Grauer made October 3, 2014) (filed with the court January 2012 at or about the same time that BC Legislative lawyers were amending the wording of subsection 15(5)), recognized by her as “binding” upon her was not properly marked and introduced to the Court, was not contained in any of the court filings of the petitioner, but was acknowledged by her.
443. An order relating to a provision of law which has since been amended would require a proper analysis of the reinterpretation of the order particularly as it relates to filing documents at courthouse registry (“commence, defend, prosecute”), as the former provisions conflicted with the previous provisions under section 15 (1) (h) (oft ignored by previous justices) that permitted any person to practice law so long as there was no expectation of a fee. During the Royal Assent process ending May 2012 section 15 (1) (h) was removed and section 15 (5) (the Grauer provision in question) was amended.
444. That I provided Fenlon J. with submissions about the res judicata styled efforts of Robert Ellis characterized as riding 'shotgun'... in context of the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Grauer, and then take a veiled swipe at the Justice for the record “so let's just get up here and talk to 'somebody else',” (in reference to the inference that the Grauer J. outcome was not satisfactory to the Law Society of BC which they failed to address on appeal, regretted it and were not trying to change the interpretation of the Grauer J order..... “and hope my friend bites” was intended to suggest that Fenlon J was acting as a lawyer helping other lawyers, the Law Society of BC, her former boss Elizabeth Lyall, embarrassed by the Grauer J. outcome, and not as constitutionally appointed justice.
445. That I further place on the record in terms of submissions: “I even have in the affidavit there, and this is important, and we'll get back to this, that I spoke with the CO (sic) of the Mortgage Brokers Association. What do you do with mortgage brokers interest she says. Well, Samantha Gale says it must be included in the APR, the annual percentage rate, and on that I've already one case in B.C. Supreme Court on the Interest Act Canada, a federal statute. Samantha Gale says it (A.P.R) with mortgage brokers fees and such, it's got to be included in that.”
446. That this comment on the record regarding the APR is in reference to the original loan agreement made between Peet and Cowan Financial Services and Ita Robbins and Frana Matich (likely not a binding agreement in any event), with self regulated disclosure of a criminal interest rate at 98.7%. This criminal loan agreement is implemented in part using letterhead of the Government of British Columbia giving weight and authority to the criminal activity making the Government a complicit partner with the nefarious actions of the mortgage brokers, who they also permitted to become self regulating.
447. That I am not aware that the Province of British Columbia is permitted to sanction criminal activity at any time, as I believed that this would not be in the public interest.
448. At Page 14 line 45 Justice Fenlon asserts: “Just let me – so I have two questions that I need you to address on this preliminary question. One is what evidence do I have that I want Mr. Robbins to represent me and he is speaking on my behalf, and two, what evidence, or what answer can you give me to this order of Mr. Justice Grauer which very clearly says you are not supposed to speak on anyone's behalf.”
449. That I verily believe that at this juncture armed with the facts, and evidence Fenlon J. makes a deliberate and conscious decision to avoid what she knows or ought to know is the truth and to purposefully and with active malice misinterpret or to reinterpret for the benefit of the petitioner and BMO the order of a fellow justice and complicity with a criminal act admitted to her (notice of hearing). She had no (apparent) original intention of questioning my speaking on my wife's behalf (there are no questions), then the 'evidence' from the online Grauer J. order is provided without his Reasons being provided with them irregular procedure, now she is indicating that she has “two questions” one of them the “binding” order of Grauer J. which she says “very clearly says you are (not) supposed to speak on anyone's behalf”.
450. I ask the reader what reasonable person armed with the facts gives Lauri Fenlon one shred of credibility in this matter?
451. At Page 15 line 17 of the Transcript (page 170 of S.C.C. Submissions) Fenlon J. for the Court says to me: “I cannot ignore an order that has already been made, so I'm constrained by that order.”
452. That the order Fenlon J. refers is found on Page 13 para [48] of his Reasons for Judgment which states: “Mr. Robbins is hereby permanently and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding in any court, in his own name or in the name of another person, except as permitted by section 15(1) of the Legal Profession Act”. The 'evidence' handed up to Fenlon J. says: “The respondent, Glen P. Robbins, be permanently prohibited and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting, or defending a proceeding in any court in his own name or in the name of another person except as permitted under section 15 (1) of the Legal Profession Act.”
453. That the order in Justice Grauer's October 3, 2011 Reasons for Judgment and the Order referenced at hearing May 9, 2013 are one and the same.
454. That on May 9, 2013 at the time of the foreclosure hearing H130330, the law pertaining to Section 15 and specifically subsection 15(5) had been amended by Royal Assent to read as follows: 15(5) “Except as permitted in subsection (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding any court.”. What is clear is that the amendment to subsection 15(5) amends out the words “in his own name or in the name of another person...”, this following Grauer J.'s comments at Page 7 of his Reasons for Judgment at para [26] wherein he states: It is also unclear why subsection 15 (5) includes the redundant words “in the person own name”.
455. That the September 2015 S.C.C. Submissions under docket 35772 go to some lengths to clarify further what Justice Grauer's Reasons had taken the greatest distance in Law Society of BC v Robbins in terms of why signing my name in the place of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich as their lawyer when he was not a lawyer (whether for fee or not) was THE breach of subsection 15(5) and it is this Order of Justice Grauer relating to subsection 15 (5) that was binding upon Justice Fenlon unrelated to her individual discretion as a constitutionally appointed justice to determined a right of audience.
456. That I verily believe that although there was a lack of clarity to subsection 15 (5) there was no lack of clarity at any time, following amendments to it by Royal Assent, or on May 9, 2013, that Section 15(5) formed part of BC provincial legislation, and had no bearing on Justice Fenlon's constitutional discretion on right of audience, as the former is inferior legislation in respect of the higher power and authority of the constitutional appointment, and capacity, resplendent with full discretion of conduct of all persons in any courtroom including the parties intending a right of audience & including (particularly) members of the Law Society of BC appearing therein.
457. That I verily believe the Law Society of BC consciously attempted a 'neo' coup d'etat of the Constitution Act of Canada and the overriding discretion of constitutionally appointed justices of the BC Supreme Court on May 9, 2013, with the assistance of two justices of the court, namely Justice Lauri Anne Fenlon, and Chief Justice Chris Hinkson, and further believe these actions to be tantamount to sedition.
458. That on May 9, 2013 I did not attend to the BC Court for hearing under H130330 while in breach of subsection 15(5) in any regard of the October 3, 2011 or May 12, 2012 versions, as my name is not in place of either of the Respondents Ita Robbins and Frana Matich in the response to petition documents, a stipulated requirement of said breach according to the “binding order” of Justice Grauer.
459. That at Page 16 line 9 I say to Justice Fenlon: “That isn't the order, that isn't the order” (the order isn't denying me a right to speak), to which Justice Fenlon replies: “Well, that's what this order says.” At Page 16 line 39 “Well, the order is what's here and unless you have another order, this is the order that is in the court and it's binding.”
460. That I verily believe that no reasonable person would deny that at the hearing of May 9th, 2013, officers of the court and a constitutional justice Ronald Bakonyi, Robert Ellis, and Lauri Anne Fenlon purposefully and with malice aforethought, with ability and full capacity to understand the probable and foreseeable consequences of their actions, committed abuse of their power and office as against me, my wife Ita Robbins, and mother in law Frana Matich causing significant economic and emotional harm including loss of property and other damages.
461. That in the circumstances of their training and their status (colour of law) I verily believe no independent rationale or reasonable person equipped with the facts would diagnose these experience and events as anything other than a criminal act making myself, my wife and mother in law victims of crime.
462. That I verily believe the legal concepts of misfeasance “the wrong exercise of lawful authority”, malfeasance “wrongful conduct by a public officer”, and nonfeasance “A failure to act under an obligation to do so” applied to a number of individuals who were fully aware of these circumstances in relation most particularly to BCSC H130330 & BCSC S11117 including: The Board of Directors of Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation (“CMIC”) and Peet and Cowan Financial Services (“PCFC”), Jonathan Cowan for “CMIC” and “PCFC”, Ronald Bakonyi member Law Society of British Columbia (“LSBC”), BC Minister of Finance, BC Attorney General (Justice Minister), (former) BC Attorney General (Shirley Bond), current BC Attorney General Suzanne Anton, Lauri Anne Fenlon, Justice Fenlon, Christopher Hinkson Q.C. Chief Justice Christopher Hinkson, Robert Bauman, Chief Justice Robert Bauman, Michael Kleisinger lawyer with “LSBC” Board of Governors “LSBC” (circa July August 2013 to present day), BC Court Services, BC Government Employment Services, Deputy Attorney General Richard Fyfe, Elizabeth Lyall lawyer “Fasken Martineau” (FM), Lawyers Insurance Trust, Canadian Judicial Council, Federal Justice Minister, Canadian Press, BC Liberal Cabinet and Caucus, BC New Democrat Loyal Opposition, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Privy Council Canada, Privy Council England. Prime Minister's Office, Premier's Office, Ombudspersons Office, BMO Bank of Montreal, Canadian Federal Minister of Finance, Bank of Canada Competition Bureau Canada, FICOM BC, BC Mortgage Brokers Association, Registrar BC Mortgage Brokers, Mike de Jong, Christy Clark, BC Securities Commissions, Toronto Stock Exchange, Greater Vancouver Real Estate Board, Fraser Valley Real Estate Board, Sutton Realty (British Columbia) & (Canada) Wawanesa Insurance (BC), (Canada), (United States Head Office California).
463. That I verily believe that on numerous 'fronts' involving many 'unlawful occurrences' stretching over a protracted calendar period, including unequivocal evidence of 'wretched, diabolical & reckless' “abuse of power” and “abuse of public office” was and is evident by persons either receiving compensation from government as remuneration or who otherwise are classified as public officials, or are under regulation of statute and was used against myself, my wife and mother in law is prevalent which I further believe in total amalgamation of the facts points directly to criminal (and civil) offences.
464. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals describes malfeasance as “a wrongful act which the actor has no legal right to do, as any wrongful conduct which affects, interrupts or interferes with the performance of official duty as an act for which there is no authority or warrant of law, as an act which a person ought not to do , as an act which is wholly wrongful and unlawful (Daugherty v Ellis, 142 W. Va 340, 357-8, 97 S.E. 2D 33, 42-3.” ).
465. That I verily believe the actions and conduct of Justice Fenlon May 9th, 2013 cannot under any manner of delusion, denial, or other hyperbolic states of misapprehension be excused as anything more than a cynical attempt to deny myself, Ita Robbins & Frana Matich access to the proper administration of justice and to claim the property at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC as ours free and clear of any encumbrance, which would have been the likely outcome save for the criminal actions undertaken by the parties invoked having the superior access and proprietorship of court registry and in these cases at least the constitutional Court as well.
466. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals further described malfeasance as “the doing of an act which an officer had no legal right to do and when that officer through ignorance, inattention, or malice, does that which they have no legal right to do at all, or acts without authority whatsoever, or exceeds, ignores or abuses their powers they are guilty of malfeasance.”
467. Legal consensus asserts malfeasance as “ignoring, inattention, or malice” including “Intent” and “Knowledge”
468. That I verily that no reasonable or honest person possessing a sober and correct state of mind with a view to properly ascertaining the truth, would or could, deny that on May 9th, 2013 commencing at 12 Noon at Vancouver courthouse of BC Supreme Court located at Smithe Street in Judicial Chambers that Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis both “Officers of the Court” & “Attorneys General” operating under oath of those offices or authority as well as Lauri Ann Fenlon under “color of law” also an “Officer of the Court” & “Attorney General” and including capacity through appointment of the Governor General of Canada on advice from members of the “LSBC” and BC Attorney General as “constitutional justice” did jointly and severally commit “malfeasance”, “misfeasance” and/or “nonfeasance” in exercise of their duties of public office or as officers of the court.
469. That the Crown Prosecuting Service, a prosecuting agency for conducting criminal prosecutions in England and Wales asserts the following elements of “misfeasance” : 1. A public office is involved [Both Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis are fee paying members of “LSBC”], are officers of the Court as well as (other) office holders. Lauri Anne Fenlon is a Constitutionally appointed (Governor General of Canada & Privy Council); 2. Willfully neglects to perform her duty and or willfully misconducts herself (sic); 3. The abuse occurs to such degree as to amount to an “abuse of the public trust”.
470. “Similarly named” “malfeasance” in public office has (3) essential elements [House of Lords and Bank of Credit and Commerce International (“BCCI”)] which are referenced in lawyer Erika Chamberlain's academic paper “WHAT IS THE ROLE OF MISFEASANCE IN A PUBLIC OFFICE IN MODERN CANADIAN TORT LAW?:
471. “The House of Lords decision in “Three Rivers” set out the elements of the tort and provided specific guidance on the requirements of malice and duty. The Supreme Court of Canada adopted the Three Rivers framework in its leading case of “Odhavji Estate”, explaining the types of official misconduct that can form the basis of tort. Finally, in “Watkins v Home Office”, the House of Lords stressed the need to prove material damage, and not merely the violation of right...The tort can be made out when a public authority's unlawful action cause material damage to the person (sic) who need not prove the violation of a pre existing right on breach of duty or even have the misfeasance directed toward them personally.”
472. According to Ms. Chamberlain, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario (with assistance of Justice Paul Perell), “misfeasance” “is typically described as a “developing” tort.” Ms. Chamberlain references Allen M. Linden's “Tort Law as Ombudsman” (1973) Can. Bar Rev. 155; & Allen M. Linden, “Reconsidering Tort Law as Ombudsman” in Freda Steel and Sandra Rodgers – Magnet, eds; & “Issues in Tort Law” (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) I; & Allen M Linden, “Torts Tomorrow – Empowering the Injured” in Nicholas J. Mullany and Allen M. Linden; eds.; “Torts Tomorrow: A tribute to John Fleming” (Sydney LBC Information Services, 1998) 321.”
473. “The House of Lords decision set out elements of the tort and provided specific guidance on the requirements of “malice” and “duty”. The Supreme Court of Canada adopted the Three Rivers framework in the leading case of Odhavji Estate explaining the type of official misconduct that (sic) provides the basis of the tort.”
474. “In Watkins v Home Office [2006] UKHL 17 [2006] 2 A.C. 395 [Watkins]” the House of Lords stressed the need for the plaintiff to prove material damage, and not merely the violation of a right. “Lord Steyn, who delivered the leading opinion explained the misfeasance tort in the “BCCI” case where depositors “suffered economic loss due to fraud” and “acted in bad faith” and “failed to take steps to close BCCI” when “the known facts cried out for action” (“Three Rivers”, supra note 3 at 188) established the “ingredient” of the tort: 1. public office, 2. the exercise of power as a public officer, 3. that state of mind of the defendant, 4. duty to the plaintiff, 5. causation, 6 damage and remoteness”.
475. “In Gerald H.L. Fridman's “Malice in the Law of Torts” (1958) 21 Mod L Reve 484 “torts requiring malice” (sic) “there has been some debate about how to define a malicious state of mind.”
476. “The leading historical cases on misfeasance tended to involve some degree of bias or personal ill-will toward the plaintiff, and this has come to be known as “targeted malice”. (Asby v White (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 E.R. 710 (H.L.); Taser v Child (1857), 7 EI. BI. 377 at 379, 119 E.R. 1286; and Cullen v Morris (1816-1819), 2 Stark, 577 and 589, 171 E.R. 741 at 748).
477. Since Roncorelli v Duplessis [1959] S.C.R. 121 [Roncorelli];.... “where the Premier of Quebec” “used his influence for the improper purpose of punishing the plaintiff...” a “second type of malice” or “limb of the tort has evolved”. “Where the public official knowingly acts in excess of power, with the knowledge that the plaintiff will probably be harmed by the ultra vires action.”
478. That I verily believe that on May 9th, 2013 commencing at Noon at Vancouver courthouse BC Supreme Court, that Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis in their respective capacities as “officers of the court” knew that their false statements to the Court in relation to the Grauer J order in Law Society of British Columbia v Glen P. Robbins (BCSC S111171) in relation to section 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act (B.C.), which order was originally caused from petition related to events in Robbins v BMO Bank under (BCSC 106413) were aware that their actions would cause harm and loss of property.
479. That I verily believe that Justice Fenlon's obvious intentional re interpretation of Justice Grauer's order relating to subsection 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act (B.C.) a provincial statute, made by her ill reasoning to be superior to her apparent and evident understanding of her constitutional capacity and requisite discretion in matters of right of audience, her knowledge that her former boss Elizabeth Lyall was opposing counsel to me in the Grauer J. matter, and her refusal to properly consider the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Grauer in conjunction with the final order included in those Reasons and in that Order is evidence of targeted malice, or gross ineptitude and incompetence – pick one.
480. (a) That I verily believe that Mr. Bakonyi, Mr. Ellis took this action with the express consent and direction of the Law Society of British Columbia, and their respective clients as a consequence of their personal animosity toward myself, Ita Robbins & Frana Matich evidence of targeted malice.
481. (b) That I verily believe that Mr. Bakonyi, Mr. Ellis took this action with the express consent of the Law Society of British Columbia, knowing that the actions would bring the justice system into disrepute and could only be undertaken with malice aforethought and with the inclusion of maladministration of justice, and further, would undoubtedly cause extreme financial and economic harm to myself, my wife Ita Robbins & Frana Matich.
482. That Ronald Bakonyi, Robert Ellis did conjunctively and with approval of Michael Kleisinger of Law Society of BC and Lauri Ann Fenlon under 'colour of law' of her appointed capacity as a BC Supreme Court Justice intend to diminish the effect of the Reasons for Judgment of Mister Justice Grauer because they did not reflect the outcome they sought, and further were willing to to any length including purposefully and willfully any miscarriage of justice of required to fulfill their revenge against myself, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich,even if it meant telling Mister Justice Grauer to take his Reasons and shove them.
483. That I verily believe that on May 9th, 2013 commencing at Noon at Vancouver courthouse, BC Supreme Court, that Lauri Anne Fenlon under 'colour of law' and her position as Justice of the BC Supreme Court and Constitutional appointee of the Governor of General and Privy Council knew that her alleged misapprehension of the order of Justice Grauer made October 3, 2011 was in fact a conscious, intentional, and malicious attempt to restate the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Grauer and resulting Order involving section 15 of the Legal Profession Act which any competent person versed in the law and alleged competent to be a Superior Court Justice in a Province in the Dominion of Canada, would understand was provision within Provincial legislation and unrelated to her constitutional discretion pertaining to right of audience.
484. That I further believe in so doing Lauri Ann Fenlon was acting ultra vires the authority of Christopher Grauer J and his Reasons for Judgment and subsequent Orders, all the while pretending to be acting as bound by his Reasons and Order, and knew that by taking the actions she did so as the expense of the credibility of the administration of justice bringing into abject disrepute and cared not if disastrous consequences occurred to innocent parties or not
485. That I verily believe the joint and several efforts of Mr. Bakonyi, Mr. Ellis under the directorship and authority of the Board of Governors of the Law Society of British Columbia, operating in conjunction with Justice Lauri Ann Fenlon, were of such degree of malice that a contributing state of mind was not only to protect the financial interests of Mr. Bakonyi's client “CMIC” and “PCFS”, but also to rightful access and application of due process of law and any economic rights and benefits which might otherwise have accrued to Ita Robbins, Frana Matich and myself as a consequence of a proper hearing that day, but also as a collective act of revenge against each of us “innocent” parties, sufficient to be worthy of consideration of criminal charges and if convicted jail time under mandatory minimum sentences relating to theft over $1,000,000. whether they benefited directly or not.
486. “The second requirement in misfeasance of tort can be satisfied by actual knowledge that the act is unlawful, but also by subjective recklessness. Recklessness involves bad faith in that the officer does not have an honest belief in the lawfulness of her actions.”

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