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Private Public Opinion Pollster Glen P. Robbins Reasons in Google v Equustek Vol 1 (for S.C.C.)
  Sep 13, 2016

Commentary
INTRODUCTION:
Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc is a Canadian legal case originated in the provincial Supreme Court of British Columbia, thereafter appealed to the BC Court of Appeal, where Google's appeal of was then dismissed by Division of that court, and is now headed to Supreme Court of Canada for November 2016 hearing.
The BC Court of Appeal's function is not to re litigate a claim but to ensure facts and law adduced at lower court were appropriately considered and the decision which flowed from that assessment, properly reasoned. The BC Court of Appeal accepted the fact finding from the lower court by way of overall decision, but from my perspective this overall decision was not consistent with its analysis.
We believe our review and analysis of both court decisions will reveal that the BC Court of Appeal either glossed over the less than stellar reasoning from the lower court, altered or contradicted it in its own reasoning, then failed to hold the appeal it as it ought to have, and managed through this confusion to produce a result favourable to either the plaintiff or a combination of the plaintiff, the lower court judge and its own court.
The Court of Appeal made conclusions inconsistent with its own reasoning particular as this relates to process and the administration of justice. This inconsistent reasoning of the appeal court's assessment of the lower court decision on balance appears to be more of an effort in providing opportunity to the lower court decision to find its way to the Supreme Court of Canada over charter arguments pertaining to freedom of speech than to deal properly with the myriad of problems involved in the approach taken at lower court process involving the BC Rules of Court, as well as principle of fairness and equity.
Superior Courts in each province are required to be outfitted with justices. Each justice is essentially a political appointment. The appointment flows from the Canadian Constitution- where incomes earned are provided under the federal Judges Act and judges are alleged to ascribe to a Code of Conduct. This method of producing constitutional justices through political appointment and may no longer be in the public interest as this case well advocates.
This case from the lower court forward smells of political influence and not a focused pursuit of the application of law and the administration of justice as it ought to.
A question of true independence is at hand at this juncture in Canadian jurisprudence. The most conspicuous deficiency we believe exists in the reasons (and rationales) provided in “Google” at both levels of superior court in British Columbia.
I believe neither court did a very good job of judging this litigation which greatly impacts the public interest beyond the interests of one party obtaining relief from another. We will explain why this is so and why these decisions are not only unacceptable, but potentially dangerous.
We believe our analysis and assessment of the Google v Equustek case, with inclusion of other BC Supreme Court litigation involving particularly, main writer of Google reasons, Glen P. Robbins (me), and reveal profound intersection of common (problematic) legal actors in particularly the lower court Justice (Fenlon J.), involving issues relating to myself and others, which I believe will deliver the reader from the intellectual suffering produced by both superior court decisions, to the conclusion that these decisions each displayed wanton disregard for the public interest.
The facts in the case will provoke a review of sections of the BC Civil Rules, which the lower court (and court of appeal) might have better considered to attain the objectives they were seeking without the great dramatic ascent through the court levels off a platform of an unnecessary deployment of those rules to the large stage inherent with charter rights matters and advancement of case law in International comity cases.
This review would specifically include making amendments for clearer provision in the rules for justices to make orders that plaintiffs may amend a statement of claim (notice of claim in British Columbia) to include parties in the style of cause as third parties and not leave it to the defendants to do so with the approval of the presiding justice after hearing evidence.
In Google, the defendants were clearly not operating in good faith (the cause of the claim) and beyond that were disrespectful of the judicial process. The rules as they are currently written actually helped the defendants. They absconded from the oversight of the court process and Google, a non party was left responsible.
The leap the lower court decision takes from processing the litigation of the plaintiff to the injunction of Google a non party (which is “innocent”) is unsavory. It is so because Google appears to be taking the brunt of the plaintiff's claim or at least most of the responsibility for the actions of the defendant.
In a criminal case this would never be tolerated.
The standard of criminal proceedings is not the same as the standard in civil proceedings, but the interest of justice and the public interest apply equally (or ought to).
How Google became the 'proxy defendant' in this case for Equustek and how this case was transformed to revolve around matters of freedom of speech and advancement of issues pertaining to International comity from what appears to be a misapplication of choice within the rules may be something for people smarter than I, however, as an ordinary person armed with the facts, I'm not buying that this case warrants its standing at the highest court based on the events of the lower court.
From Groberman J.A. @ BC Court of Appeal (Google decision):
@ para (1) The “appeal by Google Inc. (“Google”) from an interlocutory injunction that prohibits it from including specific websites in results delivered by its search engines.”
@ para (2) “Google is not a party to the underlying litigation, nor is it alleged to have acted unlawfully or in contravention of an existing order. The injunction granted against it is ancillary relief designed to ensure that orders already granted against the defendants are effected.”
Glen P. Robbins (on behalf of all ordinary citizens):
The Reasons (at both superior court decisions), appears to give only scant information as to the damages awarded to the plaintiff. Little information is provided as to why the plaintiff “isn't satisfied” with the substantial “volunteer actions” provided by Google. This lack of readily available public information appears to rest on the fact that the case we are dealing with relates to an ancillary order sought following application for injunction.
Fuller information relating to damages ought to have been in the public interest and should be addressed given the relationship between damages and injunctions at law, given the peculiarities of the case sufficient to render its course to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The issue of the volunteer actions of Google as non party ought to have been considered under the available provisions of evidence that it had submitted to the court's jurisdiction.
Following submitted to the lower court processes through its volunteer efforts, 'non party' Google responded to service of the injunction application made by the plaintiff making arguments on its behalf thus atoning to the BC jurisdiction through process of the BC Civil Rules.
The volunteer action by Google in behalf of the plaintiff Equustek appears to precede the application by Equustek.
The public is only informed through the Reasons that the plaintiff wants all types of links taken down from Google search engines because these links are situated on the defendant's Websites involving a product the plaintiff's apparently sell, which products are proprietorial to the plaintiffs, and which the defendants, former distributors of this product, were selling it in breach of the plaintiff's “trade secrets” and “Trademarks”.
These breaches originally occurred in British Columbia when the defendants were working as distributors for the plaintiffs. The defendants' later apparently absconded with the plaintiff's product Trademarks and used them for their own economic benefit.
Groberman J. at court of appeal appears to make inconsistent comments as to whether or not the product the defendants are selling is the same product as the one the plaintiff's are selling.
There is no conclusive evidence that the defendants ever left the province, it is suggested by court of appeal justice Groberman JA, writing for the majority, that in fact they probably did.
The defendant(s) were served with notice of claim and filed response to notice of claim (statement of defence), up to a point in time, then ceased to communicate with the plaintiff or the court within the 'structure' of the litigation.
I believe the defendant(s) were outside of Canada and more specifically were situated in Washington State.
I also believe the plaintiff knew this, as did both levels of court, and rather than move to grant B.C. judgment with opportunity for enforcement and foreign jurisdiction comity such as considered later in “Beals”, chose a more dramatic to attract attention to another issue, and away from the bona fides of the case being made by Equustek against the defendants.
I was not able to identify who the directors and executives of Equustek from its own website to see if there is any political correlation with it and the BC Government. This is somewhat unusual. I note that both lawyers for Google are Queens Counsel lawyers a political designation provided by the BC Government after apparent vetting with justices, lawyers etc but no one from the public, (which allows lawyers bestowed with such designation to charge a higher fee than regular).
At best, I believe these judgments to be no more an ill fated public relations campaign embarked upon by both courts where the high profile plaintiff was gleefully permitted to be used 'a pawn' in political case, with the objective of providing the next step in jurisprudence in international comity between Canada and the United States flavoured by the introduction of a case involving “In Personam” and “In Rem” considerations.
I note that one BC Court of Appeal justice has roots in northern BC while another is originally from Alberta. We also note that the lower court justice (Fenlon J) is originally from international law firm Fasken Martineau and that during this time control of management of that firm switched from Vancouver to Calgary.
We note that the most recent appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada is a “Libertarian” also originally from Alberta, educated in British Columbia.
In other B.C. case filings, I have accused the lower court justice Fenlon J. of participating in fraudulent judicial hearings and on behalf of his own and his family interests filed a criminal complaint against her in that matter for her alleged participation in the criminal scheme.
In this case I have asked the Canadian Judicial Council for Lauri Fenlon's removal from the bench on the basis that her credentials for being made justice originally were less than standard, her decision in his family case, where I am involved, as well of the events in this case, are evidence that Fenlon J. is being used as a tool of the economic/legal interests of her former law firm and other lawyers and law firms and government institutions and not in the interests of the Canadian public.
It is fair and reasonable to question the independence of any justice who is politically appointed.
Affirming the decision of the BC Court of Appeal in this matter would in my opinion establish dangerous legal precedent. The first relates to how Google a non party was brought into the case. The second is the manner in which the case achieved status on the basis of international comity within a subsection of a BC Civil Rules.
At the end of the day yanking a non party in the manner employed is of no benefit to the public interest which lies at the heart of Canadian jurisprudence whether that non party is Google or Glen Robbins.
Both levels of court provide reasons suggesting that the plaintiff became aware that the defendant's move 'out of Canada' in order to continue to sell their own version of the plaintiff's product (but with labels and trademarks on their product of the plaintiffs).
It is unclear how the plaintiffs could know what the actions of the defendants were, based on dubious evidence about the Defendant(s) location for operation, save for Groberman J.A.'s belief that it was not in Canada. If the details about the Defendant's location is not known, how do we know what they they are doing?
The lower court justice suggests the defendant's were moving their website around here and there making it difficult to deprive them of the various links they were using to unlawfully sell products.
The lack of available facts regarding the defendants whereabouts, including the specific location of the of a physical plant necessary for production, produces conclusions more about speculation and guess work than an artful effort to employ law as science, necessary to arrive at meaningful conclusions taken in this matter.
Can't locations of Website providers be located? Annual payment must be paid to some person to maintain a Website, not likely the appellant Google. Was the Defendant advertising its use of the Plaintiff's Trademarks illegally?
What does Groberman J.A. mean when he says the Defendant's were selling their own version of the Plaintiff's physical product? How do we know what is being sold exactly, and if the products were being sold by the defendants were sufficiently different from the products the plaintiff sold if we are forced to identify one website after another, chasing the defendant like a fugitive. The websites may be mobile but surely the physical plant cannot be moved about in a similar manner. Are than private investigators offering services?
This case remind me of the Bush administration claim of weapons of mass destruction that apparently did not exist.
How does either BC Superior court arrive at the conclusions they do when they don't even know where the physical plant, necessary for producing the product in the first place, is located?
The facts as to how the plaintiff could not know where the defendants were located (when more than a meager physical plant was required to produce the product) (as opposed to offering and selling proprietorial secrets as in case law asserted as Century 21 v Rogers), but at the same time be substantively aware of the details of the defendant(s) actual abuse of their proprietorial information does not make any sense.
Was there no information available from purchasers through the normal traffic of special market material such as this?
The two levels of the BC Court treat this case in a manner like a restaurant determined to make finalist in a contest by describing a delicious looking meal without any food available for sampling.
The plaintiffs blame their problems on Google's search engine. Not on the myriad of web producers or private search 'optimizers' and not on any other search engine other than Google. Just “innocent” Google, a non party to the action.
The plaintiff asked the BC Court to make order commanding that Google go beyond mere volunteering to take down some 350 links (a lot of links), and were too easily placated in their demands.
In any case, Google is brought to heal by two levels of a provincial superior court in litigation involving the trials and tribulations of an “In Personam” commercial business lawsuit brought by Equustek, where Google is not named as party to the action, and is affectionately claimed by both justices of those courts to be “innocent party”.
The original court decision determines the method by which Google (in its informal capacity as non party) and by virtue of one subsection in the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act of British Columbia is yanked into the action through demand producing volunteer responses to the favour of the plaintiff, and thereafter brought to injunction because these volunteer actions were insufficient.
There is another subsection available to the court under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Act relating to a party's submission to the court. Naturally Google didn't volunteer to take down links based on a letter from the plaintiff. It did so on the basis of the court process which means that the plaintiff could have applied via the easier link to Google, on the basis it had already submitted to the Court.
I do not believe it was necessary to make such a 'hullabaloo' regarding the provision employed to obtain the injunction, specifically, the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act and the substantial connect to B.C. concept, asserting that this entry point is insufficient approach to compel an innocent non party to a injunction order.
There may have been a 'next step' in case law involving judicial comity following “Morguard” and “Beals” (discussed herein) the Google v Equustek case is not that case, yet this case has been in my opinion artificially manufactured to be that case.
It doesn't seem like a natural progression.
Other alternatives under the BC Civil Rules:
In taking the action it did in this proceeding in response to personal service of documents of the application for injunction, I believe that Google may have (more appropriately) made itself available to be included in the “procedure” & “proceedings” by virtue of subsection 3 (b) of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (SBC 2003) Chapter 28 “Proceedings against a person”, which stipulates: “A Court has territorial competence in a proceeding that is brought against a person only if (b) during the course of the proceeding that person submits to the court's jurisdiction.”
Entering the court from this point of “acknowledged submission” under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act would permit the easier more natural evolution to the order granted against Google (if one was to be granted at all).
The public interest so dramatically impacted by the Worldwide Web should never have been bogged down by a case of such small overall consequence to that public interest.
In fact the use of this case would seem to be of greater service to futurist considerations of the Trans Pacific Partnership and behoove the benefits of former law firm of Justice Fenlon (Fasken Martineau) than any possible 'incremental' advancement of case law in International Comity.
If the proprietorial markings of the plaintiff Equustek are valuable enough to drag the world's largest search engine used, utilized and enjoyed by hundreds of millions of people through the judicial system of one Canadian province, then shouldn't evidence have been adduced in claim for default judgment?
If Google, a non party, is ultimately responsible to step up to the plate as the de facto defendant where in the original pleadings of the plaintiff do we get whiff of this possibility?
According to lawyer Theresa Tomchak of professional law firm Farris - “The Supreme Court of British Columbia discussed the importance and purpose of pleadings in Homalco Indian Band v British Columbia 1998 CanLII 6658 where Smith J.” wrote:
“The importance of pleadings cannot be overemphasized. The pleadings define your case. If a claim is not made in the pleadings, it usually cannot be raised at the trial of the matter, nor can evidence be presented if it is not relevant to the pleadings. Further, pleadings define the scope of discovery. This is particularly important if there is an area that your client would be particularly opposed to producing information about. A well crafted pleading can also lead to an early settlement of the action if both parties are able to determine with clarity the real issues in the dispute. Further, pleadings introduce your case to the trial judge. The Supreme Court of British Columbia discussed the importance and purpose of pleadings in Homalco Indian Band v. British Columbia1998 CanLII 6658 where Smith J. stated: The ultimate function of pleadings is to clearly define the issues of fact and law to be determined by the court. The issues must be defined for each cause of action relied upon by the plaintiff. That process is begun by the plaintiff stating, for each cause, the material facts, that is, those facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action: Troup v. McPherson (1965), 53 W.W.R. 37 (B.C.S.C.) at 39. The defendant, upon seeing the case to be met, must then respond to the plaintiff‟s allegations in such a way that the court will understand from the pleadings what issues of fact and law it will be called upon to decide. A useful description of the proper structure of a plea of a cause of action is set out in J.H. Koffler and A. Reppy, “Handbook of Common Law Pleading” (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1969) at p.85: Of course the essential elements of any claim of relief or remedial right will vary from action to action. But, on analysis, the pleader will find that the facts prescribed by the substantive law as necessary to constitute a cause of action in a given case, may be classified under three heads: (1) The plaintiff‟s right or title; (2) The defendant‟s wrongful act violating that right or title; (3) The consequent damage, whether nominal or substantial. And, of course, the facts constituting the cause of action should be stated with certainty and precision, and in their natural order, so as to disclose the three elements essential to every cause of action, to wit, the right, the wrongful act and the damages... in any cause of damage defeats entirely the purpose of the litigative process.”
One can see from this excerpt of the Smith J. decision, the relevance of pleadings to litigation. Making a non party the centre piece of litigation in response to application, leaps well past the essential grounding of the litigation in the first place, and taints the credibility of the process which has formed the cornerstone of civil law for centuries, and is designed to produce judgments based on reasoning of the applicable facts and law of the parties to a case.
This is a case where the axiom keep it simple..your honour may be well served.
Google v Equustek is not making the courts more progressive in capturing the increase capacity of information and communication permitted by the libertarian features of the Worldwide Web, rather it is a giant step backwards in its petty encumbrance and control of a non party, a reality likely obfuscated by virtue of the size of the oppressed person, in this case Google.
This is not a case where Google has overreached and been heavy handed and needs to be reigned in in the public interest, rather it appears that Google has been made the 'victim'.
It is less than inappropriate and without benefit to the Canadian public.
The Superior courts of the country should not be doing the work of the Board of Directors of the plaintiff Equustek (who cannot be identified over the Web).
With the Trans Pacific Partnership and the commercial to commercial tribunals conceived to resolve international trade disputes in the future, does Google v Equustek mark the point in time when nation state courts become the credit and collections and enforcement enterprise for businesses who have failed to protect their strategic economic interests from within the country they operate in?
Why Google's legal counsel did not correctly respond to these two distinguishing provisional entry points from the Court Proceeding and Transfer Act including acceding to the more onerous provisions for purposes of the BC Court of Appeal application is something I can only hope they explain at the Supreme Court of Canada.
The lower court elects to proceed by way of interlocutory application against Google, (a legal entity operating under the laws of the States of California and Deleware but with no standing as party), and to provide subsequent orders on the basis of subsection 3(e) which states: “there is a real substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts on which the proceeding against that person is based.”
As indicated, of the two points of entry from the BC Civil Rules, it is our position that subsection 3(b) is the more appropriate civil procedure in order to have obtained the information it did from Google, a non party to the action.
Google must have submitted for it to have undertaken to volunteer to remove links prior to the application served upon it ultimately leading to the injunction obtained by Equustek. A Google representative is seen to have given evidence at hearing. Submitting to the court action in ones response is not compulsory for non parties, they “may” submit. Google elected to submit to British Columbia's civil rules first as a volunteer and later as a respondent in an application.
However,even if this entry 3 (b) into the interlocutory application were employed, I still don't believe it was in the interests of justice to produce this outcome against a person which has no formal standing the case.
ABOUT GOOGLE:
Google 'appears' to have offices all over the world. It's map of offices (where red balloon figures evidence office location by country on map of the world on Google search) do not clearly locate a Canadian office, however Google does profess to have Canadian offices in Montreal, Quebec, Toronto Canada as well as another location in Ontario. The lower court decision refers to an office in Nova Scotia.
According to the Registry of federal corporate registrations, both “Google” and “Google.ca” does not have a federal registration number. The Province of Nova Scotia does not realize a provincial registration. Canadian registries evidencing particular national registration does not include Quebec though Google represents a 'location' in Montreal, Quebec Canada.
At the heart of the plaintiff's claims are its Canadian Trade-marks obtained presumably under the Trade-mark Act (R.S.C., 1985, C. T-13). Although section 19 would appear to confer the protection of Trade-mark (once obtained) to Canada only, there are provisions within the Act which refer to import and export which would presume cross border activity.
Offences under the Federal Court Act have criminal implications:
When the plaintiffs secure default judgment why aren't they then applying to Washington State (where it appears the physical plant of the defendants is located) or, if Google is really to be implicated, in California or Delaware (where Google is officially located) to enforce the provincial judgment?
The Defendant's require a physical plant, the fact that the Website links involved can be moved quickly and relatively easily is immaterial to the fact that the Defendant's cannot move a physical plant around so easily.
This would appear to make sense given the defendant's knowledge of the product and the business as former distributor. Isn't it possible that the defendants realized the deficiency or what they perceived was deficiency in the Canadian Trade-mark of the plaintiff and subsequently moved to Washington State or elsewhere in the United States to exploit the jurisdictional shortcomings of the Canadian Trade-Mark?
Why is this not discussed in either of the BC Court decisions?
The Federal Act intended primarily for Canadian commercial use, does have opportunity for remedy, far better than that which was achieved.
Offences and Punishment under the Federal Court Rules:
51.01 (1) “Every person commits an offence who sells or offers for sale, or distributes on a commercial scale, any goods in association with a trade-mark, if that sale or distribution is or would be contrary to section 19 or 20 and the person knows that (a) the trade-mark is identical to, or cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from, a trade-mark registered for such goods; and(b)the owner of that registered trade-mark has not consented to the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of the goods in association with the trade-mark. (2) Every person commits an offence who manufactures, causes to be manufactured, possesses, imports, exports or attempts to export any goods, for the purpose of their sale or of their distribution on a commercial scale, if that sale or distribution would be contrary to section 19 or 20 and the person knows that (a) the goods bear a trade-mark that is identical to, or that cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from, a trade-mark registered for such goods; and (b) the owner of that registered trade-mark has not consented to having the goods bear the trade-mark. (3) Every person commits an offence who sells or advertises services in association with a trade-mark, if that sale or advertisement is contrary to section 19 or 20 and the person knows that(a) the trade-mark is identical to, or cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from, a registered trade-mark registered for such services; and(b) the owner of the registered trade-mark has not consented to the sale or advertisement in association with the trade-mark.
(4) Every person commits an offence who manufactures, causes to be manufactured, possesses, imports, exports or attempts to export any label or packaging, in any form, for the purpose of its sale or of its distribution on a commercial scale or for the purpose of the sale, distribution on a commercial scale or advertisement of goods or services in association with it, if that sale, distribution or advertisement would be contrary to section 19 or 20 and the person knows that (a)the label or packaging bears a trade-mark that is identical to, or that cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from, a registered trade-mark; (b) the label or packaging is intended to be associated with goods or services for which that registered trade-mark is registered; and (c) the owner of that registered trade-mark has not consented to having the label or packaging bear the trade-mark. (5) Every person commits an offence who sells or offers for sale, or distributes on a commercial scale, any label or packaging, in any form, if the sale, distribution or advertisement of goods or services in association with the label or packaging would be contrary to section 19 or 20 and the person knows that (a) the label or packaging bears a trade-mark that is identical to, or that cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from, a registered trade-mark; (b) the label or packaging is intended to be associated with goods or services for which that registered trade-mark is registered; (c) the owner of that registered trade-mark has not consented to having the label or packaging bear the trademark. (5.1) In a prosecution for an offence under any of subsections (1) to (5), it is not necessary for the prosecutor to prove that the accused knew that the trade-mark was registered. (6) Every person who commits an offence under any of subsections (1) to (5) is liable (a)on conviction on indictment, to a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years or to both; or (b)on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months or to both. (7) Proceedings by way of summary conviction for an offence under this section may be instituted no later than two years after the day on which the subject-matter of the proceedings arose. (8)The court before which any proceedings for an offence under this section are taken may, on a finding of guilt, order that any goods, labels, or packaging in respect of which the offence was committed, any advertising materials relating to those goods and any equipment used to manufacture those goods, labels or packaging be destroyed or otherwise disposed of. (9) Before making an order for the destruction or other disposition of equipment under subsection (8), the court shall require that notice be given to the owner of the equipment and to any other person who, in the opinion of the court, appears to have a right or interest in the equipment, unless the court is of the opinion that the interests of justice do not require that the notice be given.
Importation and Exportation
Interpretation:
51.02 The following definitions apply in sections 51.03 to 51.12. customs officer has the meaning assigned by the definition officer in subsection 2(1) of the Customs Act. (agent des douanes) Minister means the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. (ministre) relevant registered trade-mark means a trade-mark registered for goods that is identical to, or cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from, a trade-mark on such goods, including their labels or packaging, that are detained by a customs officer. (marque de commerce déposée en cause) working day means a day other than a Saturday or a holiday. (jour ouvrable) 2014, c. 32, s. 43.
Prohibition:
51.04 (1) The owner of a registered trade-mark may file with the Minister, in the form and manner specified by the Minister, a request for assistance in pursuing remedies under this Act with respect to goods imported or exported in contravention of section 51.03. (2) The request for assistance shall include the trade-mark owner’s name and address in Canada and any other information that is required by the Minister, including information about the registered trade-mark and the goods for which it is registered. (3)A request for assistance is valid for a period of two years beginning on the day on which it is accepted by the Minister. The Minister may, at the request of the trade-mark owner, extend the period for two years, and may do so more than once. (4) The Minister may, as a condition of accepting a request for assistance or of extending a request’s period of validity, require that the trade-mark owner furnish security, in an amount and form fixed by the Minister, for the payment of an amount for which the trade-mark owner becomes liable under section 51.09. (5)The trade-mark owner shall inform the Minister in writing, as soon as practicable, of any changes to(a) the validity of the registered trade-mark that is the subject of the request for assistance; (b) the ownership of the trade-mark; or(c) the goods for which the trade-mark is registered.
Request for Assistance:
51.03 (1) Goods shall not be imported or exported if the goods or their labels or packaging bear  —  without the consent of the owner of a registered trade-mark for such goods  —  a trade-mark that is identical to, or that cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from, that registered trade-mark.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if (a) the trade-mark was applied with the consent of the owner of the trade-mark in the country where it was applied; (b) the sale or distribution of the goods or, in the case where the trade-mark is on the goods’ labels or packaging, of the goods in association with the labels or packaging would not be contrary to this Act; (c) the goods are imported or exported by an individual in their possession or baggage and the circumstances, including the number of goods, indicate that the goods are intended only for their personal use; or (d) the goods, while being shipped from one place outside Canada to another, are in customs transit control or customs transshipment control in Canada.(3) The contravention of subsection (1) does not give rise to a remedy under section 53.2

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