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Pollster Glen P. Robbins - Supreme Court of Canada Appeal Submissions - Breaking news Robbins v Law Society of BC accepted by Supreme Court of Canada
Simple Man - Lynyrd Skynyrd- News Update! Glen P. Robbins submission ACCEPTED by Supreme Court of Canada -  Sep 01, 2013

January 17, 2013 Via facsimile And Registered Mail Glen P. Robbins 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC V3E 2N6 Supreme Court of Canada, 301 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1A OJ1 Fax: 613 996 9138
Please find enclosed the Form A NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL Including Application, applicable certificates, Table of Contents number pages A, A1, B and 1-20. This application is provided pursuant to sections 56,57 and 59 of the Supreme Court of Canada Act and Part 5 section 25.(1) of the Supreme Court of Canada Rules. Sincerely, Glen P. Robbins
1.This Appeal is important to all Canadians because it represents a legal case where a state sanctioned monopoly, the Law Society of BC (“Respondent”) is permitted to use its resources and influence to hold an ordinary citizen without those resources and who is self represented, ‘captive’ to the judicial system against that person’s will and in breach of his Charter Rights. The “Respondent” petitioned the “Appellant” into the BC Supreme Court. The “Appellant” consented to every and all order sought by the “Respondent”, yet the “Respondent” refused to permit the “Appellant” to ‘give up’ as evidenced by his consent to orders under the Response to Petition, and forced him to trial where the Respondent obtained far less in orders from the court then they had sought at trial, and certainly less than the “Appellant” had consented to at the beginning of the initiating stage of the document filing. Issue #1- Any State in a fair and democratic society ought never be permitted to unreasonably hold its citizens ‘captive’ to any judicial system or other legal process against their will where that citizen has not been charged with a crime, when that citizen, in this case the “Appellant” had done everything that the State had requested of him within the bounds of the law permitting. The “Appellant” asserts that this conduct of the State constitutes “duress” against him and is a clear breach of his Charter Rights.
2.This case is important to Canadians as it relates to access to justice, high court costs for self litigants, and the right to Canadians to expect an independent and fair hearing from Justices who are State sanctioned political appointments and who themselves are lawyers, and members of or former members of the “Respondent”, the Law Society of British Columbia, and former or current partners with financial interests in law firms whose partners and lawyers are also members of the “Respondent”. The Appellant consented to all orders sought by the “Respondent” in his Response to Petition. The “Appellant actually achieved less than they sought at trial then the “Respondent” was willing to consent to, yet the BC Supreme Court Justice awarded them lump sum costs to the “Respondent” without actually reviewing the entire file (as the fact finder), despite taking 30 days (reserved judgment—close decision) to do so. Had the BC Supreme Court Justice read the entire file as he is expected to do he would have discovered that the “Appellant” surrendered early in the process and awarded costs as he ought to have to the “Appellant”. Alternatively, had the BC Justice simply ordered Costs to the “Respondent” and permitted the administrative process relating to Costs to proceed naturally, the Response to Petition would have been discovered by the Registrar. Issue #2- This case highlights how unusually harsh court costs particularly for self litigants, no matter the unfairness as to how they were allocated, diminishes true and fair access to justice for ordinary Canadians, in contrast to Banks, large corporations and others who can afford to maintain retain the courts at their disposal to referee ‘high level’ and complex cases which might be more attractive to ‘ambitious’ Justices and to bring in large fees to legal offices some of which hold partnerships or financial or other incentives for Justices.
3.This case is important to Canadians as it showcases flaws inherent with the application of judicial discretion in matters of an administrative nature such as costs. This case reflected a clearly defensive position at all levels of the judicial system including the level of BC Court of Appeal, in dealing with what is essentially a relatively simple issue, ‘complicating a stick’ as it were, specifically that an otherwise fair and interesting trial was injured by a simple judicial mistake, a simple error to read the entire file which is part of the judicial job description, and for which there is no application for correction at the BC Supreme Court level (while there is at the Provincial court level and at the BC Court of Appeal), and which the BC Court of Appeal chooses to ignore. This defensive position is further illuminated by the apparent reluctance of the BC Court of Appeal Justice (at leave) to properly and thoroughly consider Judicial discretion relating to costs, despite having clear and unequivocal evidence under his nose that the lower court likely erred on costs, and that the decision at the lower court relating to costs was predicated in an obvious oversight by J. Grauer. Issue #3- Should Canadians be permitted greater latitude in seeking damages against Judges and Justices whose recklessness causes them ‘damage’
4.This case is important to Canadians and to the proper administration of justice in the country because the current outcome strongly suggests that initiation documents are unimportant in the court process, particularly those in response. It would follow that if this outcome is permitted to stand the conclusion must be that offers to settle are not considered at the early stages of litigation only at the later stages as in this legal matter, and if this is the case the entire value of settlement provisions in court documents at early stage are of no force and effect, a fact which theoretically would serve to encourage litigation and not to discourage it, causing a continuance of back logs at court levels and repeated requests by lawyers and others for more tax payer dollars, when it is the practice of the courts and not the structure that is causing money problems at all levels of civil court. Issue #4- Is there no relationship between Consent Orders filed under initiating documents and Costs? If so, does this mean that initiating documents particularly Response to Petitions and Part 1 Consent Orders are therefore meaningless or irrelevant documents, as both levels of the superior courts saw fit to ignore it in this case? If the Response to Petition document is irrelevant and meaningless than it would follow that the Petition itself is irrelevant and meaningless, and other initiating documents such as Notice of Claim (formerly Statement of Claim) and so on are also irrelevant and meaningless documents as they have been proven to have been ignored by 5 Justices of the Superior Courts.
5.The case is important to Canadians because it deals with the independence of Justices relative to the workings of the public service registries. This in turn may well impact on the relative value of legal work, that performed at trial in the capacity of a barrister and that performed as a solicitor, and the capacity of judicial independence. Justice Grauer’s ruling on cost implies that his discretion reaches well beyond the court and into the court registry where his discretion apparently has pre eminence over court filings including the ability to properly defend a claim which capacity is included in the Response to Petition which under Rule 16-1(8) of the BC Supreme Court Rules and the website of the BC Supreme Court which states: If you do not file a Response to Petition “you may no longer have the opportunity to tell the court why you oppose the Petition.” This BC Supreme Court narrative pursuant to Rule 16-1(8) suggests that not filing a Response to Petition may bar a person from a court hearing. The Appellant was heard at trial. Issue #5- Justice Grauer made a landmark decision in this case separating the efforts of lawyers who are barristers and those of other lawyers who are solicitors as the industry was divided years ago. The first activity relates to matters before the Judge or Justice who has supreme independence, a decision not appealed by the Respondent. Does this decision at the BC Supreme Court, supported by or ignored by 4 justices at the BC Court of Appeal extend this judicial independence through judicial discretion outside the courtroom and into the court registry in conflict with the overarching decision of Justice Grauer separating the two activities? Does this give rise to potential litigation in cases such as the Appellant’s where clear offers have?
6.There can be no dispute that Justice Grauer did not read the entire file before him. His words in his Reasons for determining costs as he did proclaim this fact. Issue #6- If Justices are to retain their independence or as implied by this case possibly expand it to include registries for filing, should litigants have the expectation have assurances that the entire file will be read prior to the hearing of the case or after the case is heard in instances where judgment is reserved? Further, should Justices swear out certificates that that they have read and reviewed all documents and particulars in a file to ensure that mistakes such as the one made in this case, are not made again?
1.Should BC Justices be awarding lump sum costs or should they simply make a costs award and permit the administrative process if and when necessary to deal with the specificity of costs amounts.
2.Should cost amounts be so onerous for self litigants and persons who cannot afford a lawyer that in circumstances where there is no mistake that these persons be deterred from defending themselves in court, particularly in matters involving a state sanctioned monopoly such as the “Respondent”, The Law Society of British Columbia?
3.In cases involving provincial unauthorized practice of law cases where persons are self represented, should the provinces attorney general or Ombudsperson be compelled to ‘shadow’ the case to ensure that rights are not abused, or alternatively should lawyers be appointed free of charge to provide the same check and balances?
4.Should the Supreme Court of Canada consider taking action to ensure that judicial discretion and independence is properly documented in the form of Rules or Act, given that Justices to the Superior Courts and thus the Court of Appeal are appointed and not elected?
5.Should certain minimum requirements in terms of explanation and thought process be expected in providing Reasons for Judgment at all levels of court including the BC Court of Appeal?
(1)At the Superior court level, the presiding justice at hearing is the fact finder. The finding of facts pertains to concern submissions made from parties at trial. These submissions relate to and follow the originating position provided by parties at the initiating stage of the file and onward until trial hearing. The Rule of the BC Supreme Court mandate that an initiating Petition be filed, and allow for a Response to be filed.
(2)The Law Society of British Columbia (“Respondent”) filed a Petition and the (“Appellant”) Glen P. Robbins filed a Response to Petition.
(3)The presiding Superior court justice (J. Grauer) heard the one day trial. Most of the Respondent’s submissions dealt with in the morning including seeking an order to declare the Appellant a danger to the public interest (not provided for in the Petition) and other were dismissed out of hand by J. Grauer.
(4)There was not time to deal with the matter of court costs at trial, and when the Respondent asked about costs he indicated that he intended to reserve judgment and would provide his decision into the matter of costs at that time he released his Reasons. Although it is not set in stone, reserved judgments often suggest a close contest based on the finding of facts, a reserved judgment is certainly a distance from an overwhelming victory for one side or another.
(5)J. Grauer did not properly deal with costs in his Reasons. It is clear from his Reasons that he did not read the entire file, lest he would have discovered the error in not considering the Consent Orders provided for by the Appellant in his Response to Petition. To be clear, J. Grauer did not just award costs – he set out why he did, and his Reasons are not based on facts.
(6)Rule 14-1 of BC Supreme Court Rules stipulates that: “the court awards lump sum costs for the proceeding and fixes those costs under subrule (15) in an amount the court considers appropriate.” Subrule states: “The court may award costs (a) of a proceeding and in awarding those costs the court may fix the amount of costs, including the amount of disbursements.”
(9)The Appellant suggests that the basis articulated by J. Grauer for providing the order of costs to the Respondent after hearing, is flawed simply because his foundation is not based on facts. The Appellant could not have been more cooperative. He gave up’ right away.
(10)Grauer provides a lump sum for costs to the Respondent based on the presumed lack of cooperation of the Appellant, which the Appellant asserts can be proven to be a wrong conclusion. In so doing, J. Grauer connects the costs as lump sum to his overall Reasons all assumed to be based on fact, and does not allow for the costs ordinarily designated as to scale to be assessed, which process would have certainly caught the error as the process for assessing each unit of work from the commencement process through to trial would have come under scrutiny through taxation.
(11)The Appellant asserts that had the learned Justice permitted the natural consideration of the Bill of Costs through the lower administrative process and outside his role as fact finder of evidence and argument, the Consent Orders under the Response to Petition would have been discovered relative to subrule (3). After all, these are two clearly different functions. The primary role of the Justice as fact finder, with the more administrative role of ‘taxer’ of costs a more bureaucratic consideration based on a review of assessment of each portion or element of work relating to the file.
(12)J. Grauer’s were quite masterful and eloquent in terms of determining the outcome of the trial in his primary capacity as fact finder, but in obvious haste in terms of the costs considerations as it is clear that the file’s commencement proceedings were not read during the period he reserved judgment, a mistake easy enough to make which would not hear on the matter at the level of court where he had custody of the matter, but less so at the point of the registry where the documents are filed.
(13)On page 14 of J. Grauer’s Reasons he cites Rule 9-1 “Offers to Settle” specifically subrule (6) which state under heading “Consideration of the Court”: “In making an order under subrule (5), the court may consider the following: (a) whether the offer to settle was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted, either on the date that the offer to settle was delivered or served or on any later date.”
(14)The Appellant notes that Rule 9-1 generally is distinguished from his Response to Petition in that it does not consider offers to settle on the way to trial as most offers to settle emerge closer to trial date where the bulk of expense and court time is created. This pattern of litigation behavior ought not to neglect the fact that the forms used at the court level are specifically designed to be equivalent to common documents of settlement, namely the Consent Order a document which signifies the end of litigation with parties agreeing to a settlement of the disagreement or issues.
(15)The Respondent sought its relief by way of Petition which differs from a Notice of Claim, the latter where damages are normally sought. The Respondent wanted particularly relief from the Appellant citing the Legal Professions Act which it has custody to oversee in the Province of British Columbia. The Petition was filed and served on the Appellant. The Petition sets out specifically what orders the Respondents is seeking to satisfy the relief it demands from the other party(s). The actual Petition document provided is specifically designed as registry and court friendly. ‘The Petitioner seeks the following orders’
(16)The Appellant’s Response to Petition is similarly set out to reflect the responses to the Petition including Consent Orders. The Appellant’s Response included a pledge under Orders Consented to – consenting to ALL orders sought by the Respondent.
(17)Had the state sponsored monopoly on the practice of law – the Respondent accepted the surrender of the Appellant at that time the Response to Petition was delivered to the Respondent about six months before the hearing at trial there would be no issue right now.
(18)It is important to note that the Law Society of British Columbia believes a Formal Offer to be made as follows: “The mechanism that brings the costs implications of a Formal Offer into ‘effect’ (proactive noun-a thing) is relatively straightforward – did the offering party “beat” the Offer it made.”
(19)In case law involving the question of Liability versus Quantum it states: “When considering a Formal Offer, the court will look not only at a party’s damages but also the determination regarding liability. In some cases, the final number may have been reduced to take into consideration the contributory negligence of the offeree.”
(20)In this matter, we may not be dealing with monetary damages as one might expect in a tort action, we are dealing with rights – an entirely different kettle of fish, and one which at all times and places has implications for consideration of the Appellant’s Charter Rights. The Respondent wanted to curtail the Appellant’s rights in keeping with provincial legislation, namely The Legal Professions Act, and the Appellant consented and consented quickly to have these rights curtailed.
(21)This apparently simple solution to a contentious matter did not satisfy the Respondent. It wasn’t enough that the Appellant was willing to consent to all orders the Respondent sought. Instead, the Respondent opted to drag the Appellant through the BC Supreme Court process and to trial where it sought all types of orders within the secrecy of the court and the protection of the onerous fees required for court transcripts, and far outside the orders sought under Petition, including seeking more coercive orders for contempt and other orders declaring the Appellant as a danger to the public, conduct which the Appellant believes any reasonable Canadian for whom Human Rights and the Rule of Law are important – would consider grotesque.
(22)J. Grauer’s Reasons effectively reduced the power of the provincial statute of The Legal Professions Act to historical rubble and returned the definition of job tasks to 1952. J. Grauer declared the existing language of the statute difficult to understand. In his Reasons he revisited the historical separation between the two acts of a lawyer, that of solicitor and that of barrister. He permitted that it was the jurisdiction of the court to determine who and when it heard at bar, thus entrenching the independence of the judiciary in the courtroom. The case before J. Grauer had been provoked by the Appellant inadvertently declaring himself the ‘lawyer’ of his wife and mother in law over a family property matter and a subsequent lawsuit against BMO Bank of Montreal and others – so with J. Grauer determining that each Justice and not the Respondent should ultimately decide what transpires at each hearing, then who really won the case? Since the Reasons were published the Appellant has appeared on behalf of himself and others – for no benefit – on over 25 occasions. Who really won the case?
(23)Further, the Government of British Columbia soon after the J. Grauer decision elected to amend the Legal Professions Act to replace the use of the word “lawyer” with the word “professional”. Who really won the case?
(24)The Appellant sought Leave to Appeal before Justice Lowry at the BC Court of Appeal. All of the evidence provided in the arguments was laid before him, including most particularly, the Response to Petition and consent orders submitted by the Appellant. Justice Lowry appeared distracted and refused to deal with the evidence contained in the Response to Petition, trying through the course of the hearing to deflect away from its glaring existence, and it’s obvious and stark relationship to the improper basis upon which J. Grauer at the lower court awarded Costs, and more specifically to the Application for Leave to Appeal in front of him.
(25)To say that early on in the hearing before J. Lowry I was concerned that I would not get a fair hearing was an understatement. On page 2 of his decision J. Lowry concluded at paragraph {5}: “On what Mr. Robbins has said today with respect to his having leave to appeal, I find there to be little or no merit in what he says with respect to an appeal succeeding. The judge was exercising a discretion that is well recognized in respect of the awarding of costs and having listened to what Mr. Robbins has said, I see nothing by way of any error in principle that could be attributed to the judge.”
(26)Justice Lowry may well ‘find little merit in what {the Appellant} (sic) says’, right or wrong that is his opinion…upon ‘listening to what Mr. Robbins has said’ but does not provide any determination with respect to the documents and evidence before him. Apparently Freud (or Sergeant Shultz) has subconsciously played a role in the decision of J. Lowry as he follows his assessment of my viva voce submissions with “I see nothing...”
(27)The Appellant believes that J. Lowry by limiting his Reasons to include only comments regarding the Appellant’s viva voce submission, has done precisely what J. Grauer did at the lower court, based his Reasons on only part of the evidence. There was a hearing, the parties attended, submissions were made but there is no evidence that the hearing was indeed “fair”, as there is no mention of the document submissions including the ‘elephant in the room’ the Appellant’s Response to Petition.
(28)J. Lowry then proceeds to link ‘what the Appellant has said’ in viva voce submission to “any error in principle that could be attributed to the judge.” The Appellant is not certain precisely what principles can be attributable to not reading the entire file, and certainly the Appellant’s informal conversation with nephew Ryan Dalziel, constitutional lawyer and former clerk at the Supreme Court of Canada – that there is an expectation that all Judges and Justices read the file – there would seem to be some element of lack of principle in not considering all of the facts and evidence before making a decision that could cost someone potentially thousands of dollars who unlike the Justices does not earn hundreds of thousands of dollars per year with an entire federal statute Judges Act dedicated from section 1 to 60 on how money and benefits they will be getting.
(29)Clearly the principles like the document evidence provided to J. Lowry were directly under his nose when we consider Giles v Westminster Savings and Credit Union who identified four guiding principles that guide the discretion the courts have when considering awards of costs:
(30)A senior justice Justice at the BC Court of Appeal (Mr. Justice Frankel), in a unanimous 3 member sitting identified the four guiding principles that guide the discretion the court have when considering awards of costs:
(31)“Deterring frivolous actions or defences”; 2. “Encouraging conduct that reduces the duration and expense of litigation and to encourage conduct that has the opposite effect”; “Encouraging litigants to settle whenever possible, thus freeing up judicial resources for other cases”; 4. “To have a winnowing function in the litigation process” by “requiring litigants to make a careful assessment of the strength or lack thereof of their cases at the commencement and throughout the course of the litigation,” and by “discouraging the continuance of doubtful cases or defences.”
(32)Beyond the more obvious principles with which a reasonable person would expect Justices to be familiar with, are those principles relating to Natural Justice and Fairness.
(33)Rules of Natural Justice require minimum standards of fair decision making by the judicial decision maker. Where a person in a judicial capacity’s decision will have a direct impact on the right of the legitimate expectations of persons involved in the process – there is an implied obligation to observe the principles of natural justice.
(34)Where a hearing takes place or a decision is reached which breaches the principle of natural justice a review of the decision should be made. The elements of Natural Justice pertaining to hearings and trials in court require the right to a fair hearing, and the rule against bias.
(35)The right to a fair hearing is relevant as it encompasses matters such as proper notice and a fair hearing. The Respondent provided notice of petition this document was served by the Respondent on the Appellant. After receiving the petition the respondents within the prescribed time filed a Response to the Petition providing the Petitioner, the Respondent with a ‘blanket’ consent order.
(36)Under Part 1: Order Sought in the Claim of the Petitioner dated February 24, 2011, the Respondent in its capacity as the Petitioner seeks the following order:
(37)“The Respondent, Glen P. Robbins, until such time as he becomes a member in good standing of the Law Society of British Columbia, be permanently prohibited and enjoined from representing himself as a lawyer.”
(38)Notwithstanding the rather dubious effort at advancing neither a clear position at law nor a proficient use of the English language, the Law Society of BC neglects to properly consider the Legal Professions Act, which subsection 15(1) provides the Appellant with the capacity to represent himself as a lawyer, specifically be his own legal counsel.
(39)Notwithstanding this, the Appellant provides his Response to Petition filed March 21, 2011 under Part One – Orders Consented To:
(40)“The Respondent agrees henceforth to comply in all instances and at all times with Section 15(4), 85(1) and any and all applicable sections of the Legal Professions Act.”
(41)Yet, despite this – the order of J. Grauer at the Superior court following trial and a reserved decision dated October 5, 2011 provides the following order:
(42)“The Respondent, Glen P. Robbins except as permitted by section 15(1) of the Legal Professions Act, S.B.C. 1998, c.9 be permanently prohibited and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding in any court, in his own name or in the name of another person.”
(43)Let’s review the Petitioner’s order sought: “The Respondent, Glen P. Robbins, until such time as he becomes a member in good standing of the Law Society of British Columbia, be permanently prohibited and enjoined from representing himself as a lawyer.”
(44)What the Respondent sought under the Petition and what they achieved from J. Grauer are not the same things, they aren’t remotely close. Certainly what the Appellant offered in the Response to Petition was more than the Respondent achieved after trial.
(45)The order sought by the Respondent under Petition demanded custody of the non lawyer by the Law Society of British Columbia and any members in good standing by way of the Legal Professions Act – while the order granted by J. Grauer usurped custody of any legal proceeding at the courtroom door.
(46)In the Petition of the Respondent under Part 3: Legal Basis, number 1. The Petitioner provides the following Legal Basis for its petition:
(47)“Section 15(4) of the Legal Professions Act, SBC 1998, c.9 prohibits a person from falsely representing himself as being a lawyer”; number 2: “Sections 85(1)(a) of the Legal Professions Act, supra, makes it an offence for any person to contravene section 15”; number 3 “Section 85(5) of the Legal Professions Act, supra provides that the Law Society of British Columbia may apply to the Supreme Court for an injunction restraining a person from contravening the Legal Professions Act, supra”; number 4: “Section 85(6) of the Legal Professions Act, supra provides that the Court may grant an injunction if satisfied that there is reason to believe that there has been or will be a contravention of the Legal Professions Act.”
(48)In the Response to Petition of the Appellant under Legal Basis the Appellant writes:
(49)“The Respondent asserts that he will not…’contravene the Legal Professions Act’ at any time in the future and provides his Order of Consent evidencing the same under part one of this Response to Petition.”
(50)From the reality of these court filings at registry we can now consider page 14 and paragraph (51) of the Order of Justice Grauer:
(51)“Turning to the costs considerations set out in Rule 9-1(6), I note that the terms offered by Mr. Robbins would not in fact have given the Law Society what it has obtained through this judgment. Those terms maintained the confusion between acting as counsel or advocate for free, and commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding, which confusion I have endeavoured to clarify. Accordingly, it is not an offer that I consider ought reasonably have been accepted. The Law Society on the other hand, gave Mr. Robbins every opportunity to give undertakings or consent to the orders it has now obtained and thereby avoid costs. He chose not to do so.”
(52)How is that J. Grauer had he read the entire file arrived at this conclusion when we consider the Consent Order provided by the Appellant seven months previously that:
(53)“The Respondent (Robbins) agrees henceforth to comply in all instances and at all times with Section 15(4), 85(1) and any and all other applicable Sections of the Legal Professions Act.”
(54)There can be no doubt that J. Grauer did not read the entire file as he ought to have. Do Justices have others who read the files for them and provide notes who neglected to so in this case in order to preserve some dignity for the Respondent the Law Society of BC who had seriously underperformed and did not attain its objectives at trial.
(55)The Appellant asserts that for both courts to ignore the submissions filed by him at court registry as “orders consented to” under Part 1 of his Response to Petition under the general dictate of judicial discretion is a complete denial of due process and a fair hearing of the case in its entirety. It is a part hearing of the fact. The clear proof of this is the award of costs to the Respondent based on erroneous facts, and not on the reality of the case.
(57)Justice Lowry at Court of Appeal ignored the Consent Order submission in the Response to Petition and held that Justice Grauer’s discretion was pre-eminent over facts and law, and the Court of Appeal did not vary the order from J. Lowry.
(58)The Appellant seeks a reversal of the order of order(s) of Justices Grauer (BC Supreme Court), Justice Lowry (Leave to Appeal) and Justices Chiasson, Low and Bennett (Court of Appeal).
1.The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the BC Court of Appeal and Justices Chiasson, Low and Bennett, to vary the Order the Order of Justice Lowry at Leave to Appeal upheld Justice Grauer’s decision to award costs to the Respondent for a new order that:
2. The Supreme Court of Canada orders that the decision not to vary the order of Justice Lowry at the BC Court of Appeal be overturned and further that the order of Justice Grauer to award costs to the Respondent, the Law Society of British Columbia be overturned and the matter of costs under BCSC Action No. be directed back to Justice Grauer to properly and fully consider the offer of the Appellant as it is constituted within the Response to Petition and orders consented to within the context of that filed document, and to thereafter re issue his order as to costs, or alternatively for Justice Grauer to direct that a Special Master and Registrar of that court deal with the matter of costs.
PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (paragraph from SCC Appeal)
1.Aujla v Kaila, 2011 BCSC 466 at para. 9 to 13 (J. Harris) (para. 19); 2.Bailey v Jang, 2008 BCSC 1372 at para. 24 (para. 19); 3.Bedwell v McGill, 2008 BCCA 526, 86 B.C. L.R. (4th) 343 at para. 33 (para. 29); 4.Catalyst Paper Corporation v Companion de Navegaceo Norsul, 2009 BCCA 16, 18 B.C.L.R. (4th), 17 at para 16. 2010 BCCA 282 @ para. 74 (para. 29); 5.BC Court of Appeal, Law Society of British Columbia v Glen P. Robbins; J. Lowry (BCCA CAO 39446) para. 24 (paras. 25, 26, 27,28); 6.BC Supreme Court, J. Grauer Reasons: Law Society of British Columbia v Glen P. Robbins page 14 para 52 (paras. 37, 41, 51, 45, 43, 50, 51, 53); 7.Federal Judges Act {Canada} (para. 28); 8.Giles v Westminster Savings Credit Union (BCCA), Mr. Justice Frankel (para. 29); 9.Howelling Nurseries Ltd. v Fisons Western Group (1998), 37 B.C.L.R. (2d) 2 at 25 (C.A.), leave ref’d, {1988} 1 S.C.R. ix, (para. 29); 10.Law Society of British Columbia v Glen P. Robbins, (J. Lowry), BCCA CAO 39446 (paras. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28); 11.Lumanlan v Sadler, 2009 BCSC 142 at para. 35 (para. 16) (Madame J. Humphries); 12.Robbins and Matich v BMO Bank of Montreal and others (para. 22); 13.Sartori v Giles, 2011 BCSC 419 at paras 66 to 68 (J. Wilson (R.D.)) (para. 29);
1.Legal Professions Act (B.C.) (para. 20,22,40,47); 2.Rule 14-1 BC Supreme Court Rules, 14-1(15) (para. 6); 3.Rule 9-1 BC Supreme Court Rules “Offers to Settle” 5(a), 6 (para. 13); 4.Rule 16-1(8) BC Supreme Court Rules “Response to Petition” (paras. 36,39,40, 48, 49, 53); 5.Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule B, Part 1, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms sections 7, 8, 9, 12;,,,,

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