Robbins SCE Research
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Vol IV Glen Robbins criminal complaint (aff sworn by BC Notary) to Justice Wilson Raybould Re: Bakonyi (Cambridge mortg), Robert Ellis (BMO Bank (insider)), M Kleisinger (Law Society of BC), {lawyers}, Lauri Fenlon, Chris Hinkson (BC Justices)
  May 30, 2016

288. That even if Fenlon J. were to seek refuge in arguments relating to recusal under judicial independence, I would say that this position has soft ground based on her inability to decipher the different foundations of authority found in Grauer J's order of October 11, 2013 pursuant to provisions of the provincial Legal Profession Act and the Constitutional authority of discretion to hear or not hear someone.
289. That at the point in time at page 15 of transcript (page 170 of submissions) I add on the record this comment commencing at line 34 page 15: “ had hoped – I had hoped that because there's so many triable issues here I wouldn't be blocked at the administrative part until I noticed that the document they filed is improper” (the notice of hearing document containing false statement by Ronald Bakonyi).
290. That at this juncture the court transcript clearly reveals that the notice of hearing filed April 15, 2013 and Fenlon J. chooses to nothing about it, even though it is only one page.
291. That I verily believe that this point in time in the hearing reveals an inconsistently of representations made by BC Court Services who ALL assert that although they do not question documents filed (even when they notice errors) the Justices or Master are intended to pick up on the mistakes and take necessary steps to correct them.
292. That at line 38 page 15 of transcript (page 17 submissions) Fenlon J. (now clearly aware of the mention of her former boss's name (Lyall), and the obvious potential for conflict of her own participation and with full knowledge of Mr. Robbins right of audience reference provides this: “All right. But let me bring you back to the issue. I agree it's normally up to the judge hearing the matter to decide whether to permit somebody to speak on behalf of others and as I said to you, that happens very often in my courtroom, but first I have to be satisfied that the person is speaking truly on their behalf. So is there anything in the materials that – signed by Ita Robbins or Frana Matich, under oath or otherwise, that says we are asking Mr. Robbins to speak for us in this matter, that's one issue. Without that, without that, no matter how well intentioned you are, I wouldn't hear from you. The other issue is this order which seems to say even if I had that information, Mr. Justice Grauer says no, Mr. Robbins is not to be speaking on behalf of anyone else. So that's the framework I have to consider.”
293. At Page 16 of the transcript (page 171 of submissions) commencing line 30 Justice Fenlon as The Court asserts (speaking about the Grauer J. order) “Well, the order is what's here and unless you have another order, this is the order that is in the court, and it's binding.”
294. That a more benevolent person might say at this juncture of the hearing Fenlon J. has misapprehended the evidence of the Order provided by Ron Bakonyi after retrieving it from online, however her words are I believe actually beneficial to my (our) case in that she stipulates that the order of Grauer J “is binding”..meaning its binding upon her as well.
295. That I am not that benevolent person, and believe that Fenlon J. knew what she was doing the entire time first framing her consideration as to right of audience to two elements (1) – evidence that Ita Robbins and Frana Matich want me to attend (I don't rise to the bait with general affidavits) & (2) the Grauer J order. This original framework first occurs on Page 15 of Transcript, and then at Page 16 she moves away from element ((1) of her requirements, referring to the Grauer J order as “binding”. The Grauer J. order is obviously not binding on her or any other justice for that matter in terms of right audience.
296. That BC Supreme Court Justice Fisher had this to say in The Law Society of British Columbia v Parsons 2015 BCSC 742 at Page 3 paragraph [6] quoting the Grauer Reasons for Judgment in Law Society of BC v Robbins: “This subsection (15(5)) has been interpreted to prohibit non-lawyers from conducting the overall prosecution or defence of a proceeding in court on behalf of others whether or not a fee is charged. In Law Society of British Columbia v Robbins, 2011 BCSC 1310, Grauer J consider this provision in light of its legislative history. After noting that the distinction between the practice of a barrister and a solicitor disappeared in 1955, he stated @ {37} “In my view, that historical distinction is important to interpretation of these provisions and helps clarify the confusion to which the inelegance of the drafting has given rise. It provides the key to understanding the difference between “appearing as counselor advocate, and other actions included in the definition of “practice of law” if done for a fee, on the one hand, and the reference in section 15(5) to commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding, on the other. The former, particularly including the barrister's work of appearing at a a hearing as advocate for a party, do not constitute the practice of law if done for free. The latter, incorporating the litigation solicitor's practice of commencing, prosecuting and defending a proceeding, does, whether done for a fee or not. This distinction survives today in the use of the terms “solicitor” or “solicitor of record” to designate the lawyer or firm responsible for the conduct of litigation on behalf of the party in question and the term “counsel” to designate the lawyer who will actually appear in court on behalf of that party. The two may but need not be the same individual.” (@ {38} “It follows that if a person in the position of Mr. Robbins does nothing more than assist a party by appearing to speak on his or her behalf at a hearing for free, then he is not practicing law and the Law Society is in no position to intervene. That person will be subject only to the court's overriding discretion, in the case of persons who are neither litigants nor lawyers, to grant or without a right of audience. Where, however, a person takes in hand not only advocacy or assisting in the drawing of a document, but also the overall prosecution or defence of a proceeding, as a solicitor was wont' to do, then he is practicing law, or at least contravening section 15(5) and the Law Society may intervene.”
297. That I verily believe that at this juncture of the hearing on May 9th, 2013 Fenlon J. has expressly outlined her recognition of her and any other justices inherent right of discretion in matters pertaining to right of audience, has explained her many experiences with it as justice, as well as her apparent libertarian attitude toward it, and now further recognizes the 'binding' effect of Grauer J.'s order, BUT only after she has helped herself to a willful reinterpretation of it more favourable to the Law Society of British Columbia, its members and clients and to her former boss Elizabeth Lyall senior partner at Fasken Martineau.
298. At Page 3 (page 142 of submissions) and paragraph (6) (carried over from Page 2) Mr. Justice Grauer writes: “Apart from his misrepresenting himself as a lawyer, which he (Glen Robbins) now regrets, he has not been practicing law because he has not been charging a fee, and simply stands in the shoes of his family members. Accordingly, the Law Society should leave him alone. It is for the court to decide in its discretion whether it will grant him an audience.”
299. At paragraph (7) (Page 3) Mister Justice Grauer asserts on the subject of judicial discretion to grant a right of audience: “That the court has such discretion, quite apart from anything in the Legal Profession Act, is not in doubt.”
300. That I verily believe that on May 9th, 2013 when hearing submissions under H130330 Madame Justice Fenlon knew or ought to have known that the Grauer J. order provided by Ronald Bakonyi as “evidence” was not formally submitted to the Court through proper procedure and document procession, and that Fenlon J. also knew full well that the Order of Justice Grauer did not prohibit me from speaking on behalf of other persons, and that she was intentionally misapprehending the Order of Grauer J. to circumvent her obligation as a constitutional justice to hear the evidence of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich filed with the court in response to petition signed in their own names evidence of their desire to context the integrity and validity of the so called mortgage of “CMIC”.
301. I do not believe it is possible for any reasonable person, particularly one who is trained in law, and who has been determined fit to hold the office of a constitutional justice to have misapprehended the Reasons of Justice Grauer, or for a person in this position of authority to not desire to further investigate the content of those Reasons in conjunction to the Order, or alternatively, is it possible for a person, competent in law, to confuse an Order in relation to a subsection of the Legal Professions Act, the statute of a provincial public body, with the inherent rights of audience of a constitutional justice, and that, further, the only explanation and conclusion that any reasonable person would arrive at, is that Justice Fenlon on that day knew what she was doing, and what she was doing was unprofessional and unbecoming a person in her position as a constitutionally appointed justice of the Superior Courts of British Columbia.
302. That, quite clearly Fenlon J. not only revealed her awareness of the distinction in her authority of the constitutional right of audience versus the provincial legal professions act (bc) in Transcript Evidence from May 9, 2013, but also in her Reasons in the matter of Google versus Equustek now heading to the Supreme Court of Canada. This goes to point to the accusation that Fenlon J knew what she was doing and engaged with Mr. Bakonyi and Mr. Ellis as part of a scheme to abuse her office and position to aid and abet Bakonyi, Ellis and their clients, even if it meant removing my rights, and the rights of my wife Ita and mother in law Frana, and even if it meant ignoring the Reasons of a fellow justice.
303. A BC Superior Court justice like Fenlon J. who is not able to respect and support the findings and Reasons of a fellow justice within her jurisdiction, is in my opinion certainly not fit to make 'historic' findings on judicial comity such as exists in the Google v Equustek matter.
304. That I also note in the Fisher J. Reasons for Judgment in LSBC v Parsons in relation to Mr. Parsons May 2000 “27 count information against the Ministry of Attorney General, the Law Society and various lawyer and judges, alleging that they had engaged in conspiracy and contravened an Act of Parliament. What is most interesting is what Fisher J stipulates at Page 5 para [12] quoted text from Reasons of Edward J. on Mr. Parson criminal allegations at {15} “The action of a judge in declining to make an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Code, whether right or wrong as a matter of law in a particular case, could not conceivably constitute an offence under s. 126 of the Criminal Code in the absence of evidence the judicial power has exercised for a corrupt purpose.”.
305. That I verily believe the evidence points to Justice Fenlon's actions on May 9, 2014 (and thereafter) being done for corrupt purpose.
306. That it is significant to note that in the “Parsons” matter Fisher J. (Michael Kleisinger for the Law Society of BC) at Page 2 para [1] states: “The petitioner, the Law Society of British Columbia, seeks an order under s 85(6) of the Legal Profession Act, SBC 1998, c 9 (the Act), to prohibit the respondents, David Parsons, from commencing, prosecuting, or defending a proceeding in any court, other than representing himself as an individual party to a proceeding.”
307. That the Law Society of BC in my original case before Grauer J. (BCSC S11171) also sought these orders under 85(6) present and future claims of prohibition and these orders were not granted by Grauer J. who determined that I only breached section 15(5) on one occasion, the legal inference from Grauer J. holding me my promise (in relation to section 15(4) order – arising from the one and same 'offense') that he believed I would not make the same mistake again, while Mr. Kleisinger for Law Society of BC, knew or ought to have known that this was the limit of the Grauer J prohibitions against me, while Fisher J. made order under the broader (future) prohibitions, thus – as between the two cases involving two different justices of the BC Supreme Court generally in alignment, I was not considered a threat to 're offend' and was held on my word (“promise”) one that I have never broken, and remains bound with Justice Grauer and disregarded by LSBC members Ronald Bakonyi, Robert Ellis, & Michael Kleisinger, as well as by former members now justices Lauri Anne Fenlon and Chris Hinkson.
308. That this legal tie to the Grauer J. decision is tied to amendments made in the BC Legislature by both the government (BC Liberal Party) and Opposition BC NDP, which amendments to the provisions of the Legal Professions Act including section 15 (1) and 15 (5), as well as the amending 'out' of the existing provisions of the word “lawyer”, or subsection 15 (1) (h), which permitted the practice of law for no fee (and should have set me free from what I did under subsection 15 (5) given that I was released on promise by Grauer J. under 15 (4)) –, also ties me the BC Legislature amendments made by Royal Assent, and given that the BC Attorney General/Justice Ministry is member at Cabinet, and is party to the Memorandum of Understanding involving all three (3) chief justices, and is Bencher in historical perpetuity – and is ALSO partner to the vetting process for all BC Superior Court justices, the actions of Mr. Bakonyi, Mr. Ellis, & Lauri Ann Fenlon as officers of the court, & the actions of Michael Kleisinger and Chris Hinkson, the relationship between the head of Cabinet Christy Clark who as premier is also an employee of the BC Liberal Party earning 20% of her annual salary—it is fair to say that the Government of British Columbia is an active player in the malice with which these actions have occurred, particularly when each of the elements is fully aware of all of the information.
309. That I further edify the reader of the actual nature of subsection 15 (5) of the Legal Profession Act, at the time of hearing the matter, and with respect to the Order(s) of Mister Justice Grauer. At Page 5 Grauer J stipulates at para. (19) “Although Mr. Robbins also represented his wife and mother-in-law in other proceedings connected with the foreclosure of their property, including a petition brought by MIC Investments, Action No. S-106413 is the only one he commenced on their behalf.” (from “commence”, “defend and prosecute” 'language' under subsection 15 (5)).
310. That in his Reasons for Judgment Grauer J. stipulates at Page 5 (144 of submissions) under Part 2. “The Legislation” at para (20): “The Law Society brings this application pursuant to sections 15 and 85 of the Act, relying in particular on subsections 15 (1) and (5). It maintains that Mr. Robbins is guilty of commencing, prosecuting or defending proceedings in the name of another person, contrary to those subsections.” (Again, on the basis of signing my name Glen Robbins in the place of my wife Ita Robbins in the Notice of Claim # 106413). “Section 85 (5) permits the Law Society to apply for an injunction to restrain a person from contravening the Act, while section 85 (6) authorizes the granting of such an injunction where there is reason to believe that there has been or will be a contravention of the Act.”
311. That the final order of Justice Grauer under S111171 relates only to subsection 15 (5) of the Legal Profession Act and not to Section 85 (5) or 85 (6).
312. That at Page 6 and paragraph (21) Justice Grauer stipulates: “Just how these provisions apply to a person like Mr. Robbins, a non-lawyer who is acting for free as the representative of litigants to whom he is related in matter in which he has an interest, is not entirely clear. Previous decisions of this Court are not consistent, and the Court of Appeal has yet to resolve the inconsistency. The problem arises from what I consider to be rather clumsy legislative drafting. Given that the legislation in question is the Legal Profession Act, this observation is not without irony.”
313. That at Page 6 (page 145) and (22) Justice Grauer stipulates: “Section 1 of the Act defines the “practice of law.” The definition is non exhaustive. It includes such matters as “appearing as counsel or advocate”, “drawing, revising or settling....a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial”, and “doing an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages.” “It specifically does not include, however “any of those acts if not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed”. “So by definition, the “practice of law” does not include, for instance, appearing as counsel or advocate if one does not charge a fee for doing so.”
314. At Page 6 para (24) Grauer J writes: “Section 15 specifically deals with the authority to practice law....”, and I verily believe that when the Order of Justice Grauer in relation to subsection 15 (5) was procured from “online” as confessed to by Mr. Bakonyi in transcript submissions, that both he, Mr. Ellis and Justice Fenlon all knew during the hearing May 9, 2013 that it had nothing to do with a “right of audience”, and further believe and assert that this hearing and outcome was orchestrated and gamed out by persons trained in law sufficiently so that they are able to cover their plan through the purposeful impropriety of their respective duties to the Court.
315. That the matter of speaking on someone else's behalf when you are not party to an action if you are not receiving a fee or benefit has no linkage to section 15 at any time.
316. At Page 10 paragraph (38) Grauer J. writes: “It follows that if a person in the position of Mr. Robbins does nothing more than assist a party by appearing to speak on his or her behalf at a hearing for free, then he is not practicing law and the Law Society is in no position to intervene. That person will be subject ONLY to the court's overriding discretion, in the case of person who are neither litigants nor lawyers, to grant or withhold a right of audience. Where, however, a person takes in hand not only advocacy or assisting in the drawing of a document, but also the overall prosecution or defence of a proceeding as a solicitor was wont to do, then he is practicing law, or at least contravening section 15 (5) and the Law Society may intervene.”
317. At Page 11 under section 3 “Application” and paragraph (40) Grauer J writes: “Given the history of the litigation involving the Bank of Montreal and Ms. Robbins and Ms. Matich, in particular B.C. Supreme Court Action No. 106413 commenced by Mr. Robbins in the name of Ms. Robbins and Ms. Matich, I have no difficulty in concluding that Mr. Robbins has 'commenced and prosecuted a proceeding in the name of another person, contrary to section 15 (5) of the Act.” (The Commencement of a Civil proceeding as ably discussed in the September 2015 submissions to the S.C.C. - can only occur by way of Notice of Claim, Petition, or in some circumstances a Requisition filing. I commenced the Notice of Claim under 106413 by signing his name in the document where his wife and mother in law ought to have each signed their name. Again, this has no relation to right of audience matters).
318. That I verily believe the actions of Mr. Bakonyi on behalf of his clients and at the direction of his clients, Mr. Ellis on behalf of his client, Lauri Fenlon on behalf of her former law firm and boss Elizabeth Lyall, on behalf of the Law Society of BC,Michael Kleisinger on behalf of the LSBC and for her own personal self aggrandizement, and Chris Hinkson on behalf of the BC Attorney General and Law Society of BC, and for his own self aggrandizement intended to render the Grauer J Reasons for Judgment as meaningless and re litigate the Grauer J. matter in the 'basement of their house' as it were.
319. That I verily believe that BC Chief Justice for British Columbia Robert “Bob” Bauman, former BC Supreme Court chief justice knew what was happening, knew it was wrong, but did not possess the personal fortitude that a person in his position should to take proper action, and abdicated responsibility to Chris Hinkson the proverbial court 'hammer', who it appears had plenty of skin in the game including (a) his original relationship to my former John Motiuk as his attorney (circa 1998-2000 @ BC Human Rights Tribunal) and Mr. Motiuk's failure to take instruction including failing to defending against joinder as instructed.
320. That when Mr. Motiuk finally disclosed his problems with Law Society of BC discipline, his failure to adhere to direct instructions to fight joinder at BCHRT, his failure to disclose his mental illness of bi polar depression, he blamed it on his lawyer telling him not to (as it would go better for him at LSBC). Ultimately this resulted in my not being in position to defend myself in quasi criminal proceedings and then defamed by BCHRT Tribunal Member Tom Patch as a pedophile on Google for a 3 years period.
321. That I am aware of 8 boxes of investigative material from Law Society of BC in relation to Mr. Motiuk has been identified, that his lawyer of record through this period running concurrent with Mr. Motiuk's acting as my legal counsel is Chris Hinkson. I am working to having these documents made available to the Freedom of Information Commissioner and Ombudsperson BC to see what Chris Hinkson and the Law Society of BC knew and when.
322. That I am pursuing a line of investigation between my September 2013 letter of notice to litigate against the Law Society of BC acknowledged in letter from Michael Kleisinger to me (provided in submissions), and my notice to seek default judgment in the multi million litigation against the Government of British Columbia for the pedophile defamation and ruin of my multiple million publishing business, in litigation that was not defended, and Christopher Hinkson's order provided to Michael Kleisinger in a rush to judgment obtained outside proper procedure under the rules and breach of administration of justice (giving order to seek leave before filing).
323. In further support of the decision to undertake a corrupt process under BCSC S111171 (the Grauer J. matter final and conclusive from S.C.C.) in conjunction with the operating theory as this relates to John Motiuk, his lawyer Chris Hinkson (long time LSBC go to guy), Law Society of BC, and this matter under S111171 involving vexatious procedure) I assert that Michael Kleisinger was also made aware by the BC Mortgage Brokers Association of my intention to file a class action lawsuit against them. Mr. Kleisinger led evidence at the hearing March 21, 2014 submission to Chris Hinkson using this letter (obviously unrelated to section 18 BC Supreme Court Act on vexatious proceedings).
324. That I verily believe that it is impossible for any right thinking justice of any Superior Court in Canada to make any order in relation to the order of another fellow justice which they might have misapprehended and in particular where that order related to right of audience, the constitutional domain of all justices, and Madame Justice Fenlon knew and understood this which I verily believe reflects ultimately in her first part of the criminal conspiracy against Glen & Ita Robbins, and Frana Matich.
325. That I verily believe where more conventional criminals or unscrupulous business persons produce more conventional schemes of conspiracy it is not as necessary to do so in the field of law where language is particularly abstract but better known among those trained in law., who are able to understand what is intended whether or not it is planned and that in this case both lawyers, law society and justices were winking and nodding to each other throughout.
326. That I further believe what I allege to be criminal conspiracy at point in time of May 9th, 2013 (BCSC H130330) involved the petitioner Cambridge Mortgage (“CMIC”) and legal counsel Ronald Bakonyi & Robert Ellis (“BMO Bank”) demonstrated a litany of intentions to conspire and to defraud us, which later morphed into full blown criminal conspiracy.
327. Justice Fenlon acknowledged her awareness of a 30 page response to petition filed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich, it is thus impossible for any reasonable person armed with the facts to believe that she could not see that this matter should have been directed to trial, and that if nothing else, after taking this appropriate step, then used her authority to demand that a lawyer represent the both of them and seize herself of the matter. Fenlon J did not take these actions because she intended to assist both fellow lawyers Bakonyi and Ellis in their fraud.
328. That I verily believe that Fenlon J went to some lengths to disguise her participation in the 'unlawful conduct conspiracy' though in the cool breeze of hindsight can be seen to be shallow and for a justice, rather pathetic.
329. That I verily believe that Fenlon J.'s reluctance to deal with my exhortations to read the Grauer J. Reasons for Judgment and her further reluctance to exhibit any concern for the defence filed and signed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich (in compliance with section 15(5) of the LPA, are sufficient to form ground that she was a willing participant in a corrupt hearing.
330. That I verily believe that Fenlon J. Ronald Bakonyi, Robert Ellis & Michael Kleisinger were concerned of my advocacy in speaking on behalf of others at court and being proficient at it, were causing them discontent and in conjuction with their knowledge of the mortgage fraud, unconscionable loan, fraudulent mortgage filing at BC Land Title and Survey, they took matters into their own hands to disregard the truth relating to the Grauer J. Reasons and Order, in an effort to bring our “defences” and “prosecutions” to an end, including particularly those efforts by myself, my wife and her mother, to prove fraudulent and criminal mortgage filing, which they knew if made public by someone who was not a member of their society (the hidden nature of extensive case law put under Fenlon J's nose relating to unconscionable mortgages clearly available in the Response to Petition of Ita Robbins & Frana Matich), could form the basis for class actions lawsuits as proposed by me as against the BC Mortgage Brokers Association and others.
331. In May 9, 2013 Transcript Robert Ellis refers to me as a “prodigious bully” in court matters. This would infer his impression that I am an immense or remarkable legal bully, more a compliment than a reason to not grant right of audience, considering I am not legally trained, and in context of the realities of the circumstances would make my response to this that he, Mr. Bakonyi, Lauri Fenlon, Michael Kleisinger & Chris Hinkson are 'evil criminals'.
332. That on December 4th, 2014 Madame Justice Fenlon heard application of Ronald Bakonyi in relation to the sale of property at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC under file No. H130330, and on that day, upon reviewing the file which justices are expected to do, would have realized that the ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION of May 31, 2013 made in her name, never took place, did not occur, and is a legal fiction and fraud &, that she would know never occurred and upon seeing this, ought to have investigated, but failed to do so, which I further allege is further evidence that Justice Fenlon was complicit in the 'theft' of the property at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC along with Ronald Bakonyi and his client “CMIC”, or alternatively, along with Robert Ellis for BMO Bank of Montreal aided and abetted this 'theft', and abused her power as a Superior Court Justice to permit it.
333. That along with granting ex parte order for sale of property Fenlon J. also ordered vacant possession order under H130330 (a second vacant possession order), which would presume a deficiency with either the first vacant possession (made under stay order April 24, 2014), or this second one, and that something is very wrong with the fact that Fenlon J. made these orders in custody of a file which featured the Order Made After Application dated May 31, 2013, which she knew never occurred, yet signed many months later (her honour's signing of this order months (a year) later is evidenced in submissions to BC Court of Appeal where Fenlon J. now plies this trade.
334. That I make this statement as against Fenlon J. on the basis of her also recognizing her constitutional authority in right of audience, and her ultimate reasoning to deny leave to speak on the basis of the Grauer J. order. I further contend that the Fisher J. order in support of these submissions pertaining to right of audience declared at Page 3 (top) by Grauer J. (included in the extensive submissions initially provided to the Supreme Court of Canada) affirms the Grauer J. and by inference rejects the Fenlon J. basis for rejecting leave of right of audience on the basis of the Grauer J. order under BCSC S111171.
335. That Chris Hinkson clearly contributed to, & aided & abetted the conspiracy by ensuring the adding on of the vexatious litigant (procedure) branding to me, which served to suffocate the affect of the Grauer J. decision through his collusion with Michael Kleisinger, under case file No.: BCSC S111171, after rejecting my written request to him in January 2014 to clarify the Grauer J. matters in light of the Fenlon J. decisions as “inappropriate”.
336. That the purchase of our family home at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, approved by Madame Justice Fenlon in December 2014, hundreds of thousands of dollar below market value was made to a person whose mortgage included no money down, contrary to the policy of the federal government in relation to home purchases.
337. That as recent as January 2016, 1355 Honeysuckle was sold for $500,000 more than Fenlon J sold it for, to a third party by the person awarded the property who paid no money down, affirming I believe, my accusations that Justice Fenlon knowingly and with malice aforethought participated, or otherwise used her office to aid and abet the theft of property over $1,000,000 including theft of other personal property valued at over $300,000 along with Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis for clients “CMIC” and BMO Bank
338. That at the time of this writing 1355 Honeysuckle Lane is worth $1,400,000 with a house situated 'kitty corner' with slightly higher appraisal value selling for over $1,500,000.
339. That Fenlon J. nearly one year after the filing of the Order Made After Application of May 31, 2013 under H130330 then signed this order for Ronald Bakonyi to use in his fraudulent efforts at BC Court of Appeal. She knowingly endorsed an order of an application that was never filed, that she never heard, and that she never made order to.
340. That I believe the action of signing this Order Made After Application of May 31, 2013, and her participation in the sale of the home is indicative of my claims that Fenlon J. was 'in on' the fraud from the beginning.
341. That I verily believe no reasonable person in this country or any other democratic nation armed with the facts would arrive at any other conclusion then that what occurred under BCSC H130330 & BCSC S11117 (as well as BCSC 149328 & other) was part of a criminal conspiracy of persons who abused their office and authority and did so with disgraceful ease.
342. That at Page 11 under Part 3 Application of the Reasons of Justice Grauer dated October 3, 2011 at paragraph (41) His Honour writes: “While it would be open for Ms. Robbins and Ms Matich to apply for leave for Mr. Robbins to speak on their behalf in court without contravening section 15 (5). Mr. Robbins has clearly been the originator and driving force of the litigation.”
343. That this stipulation in Justice Grauer's Reasons clearly depicts the separation of the provincial statute from the constitutional discretion with regard to leave to appeal.
344. That Justice Grauer had condemned the inelegance of the provisions of the Legal Profession Act before him under BCSC S111171 including section 15 (5) making the following negative remarks about these. At Page 6 para [21] of his Reasons he writes: “The problem arises from what I consider to be rather clumsy legislative drafting. Given that the legislation in question is the Legal Profession Act, this observation is not without irony.” At Page 7 para [25] he writes: “It is not immediately obvious why subsection 15(1)(a) permits a person who is an “individual party” (whatever that means). At para [26] “It is also why subsection 15 (5) includes the redundant words “in the persons' own name”. Given the provisions of subsection 15(1), and the definition of the “practice of law”, those words would appear to be superfluous, and detract from the clarity of the subsection.”
345. That section 15 including 15(1)(h) and 15 (5) were amended by Royal Assent of the BC Legislature May 12, 2012 (referenced in pages 130-157 in May 7, 2015 submissions to S.C.C.).
346. That the textual language of the provisions in section 15(5) had been amended from the date of Royal Assent of the British Columbia Legislature of May 2012 up to present date including the date of hearing of the petition (May 9th, 2013). That the Order handed up to the bench from Mr. Bakonyi evidencing the Grauer J order (notwithstanding the realities pertaining to right of audience) were no longer valid evidence as the new amended 15(5) legislation ought to have been offered to the court.
347. That I verily believe this fact relating to the amended legislation and to other facts provided in this affidavit evidence, there can be no doubt that Fenlon J. 'had in in' for Justice Grauer, likely to avenge the embarrassment suffered by her former boss Elizabeth Lyall at the hands of a non lawyer.
348. That I verily believe Michael Kleisinger, who sat 2nd chair to Elizabeth Lyall during the Grauer J. hearing was directed by official with the Law Society of BC to seek a course of revenge against me following the Grauer J. orders, but lacked the courage to realize this through proper challenges of the court, and undertook to participate in the criminal acts of deception and abuse of court filings.
349. That for purposes of edification the characterization of “originator” and “driving force” is predicated on the breach of subsection 15 (5) in signing of the Notice of Claim 106413 where my wife Ita ought to have signed her name, and where my mother in law Frana Matich ought to have signed her name but where I had signed my own name in their place on the new notice of claim forms, a breach of the Legal Profession Act.
350. That at no time since the Reasons of Justice of Grauer were published have I ever breached subsection 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act, nor has any Order been made by His Honour Christopher Grauer or any other Superior court justice suggesting that I have, or alternatively, any Order been made denying me opportunity to speak on behalf of my wife Ita, mother in law Frana, or any other person “with the overriding discretion of the Court.”
351. That the overall contempt shown for Mister Justice Grauer's order of October 3, 2011, to my rights, and to the right of my wife and mother in law by Bankonyi, Ellis, Kleisinger, Fenlon, Hinkson, & (Bauman) reveal without a sliver of doubt that the court administration is rank with corruption.
352. That the Law Society of BC proceeded with its petition (BCSC S111171 (in materials) February 2011) including Section 85(5) and 85 (6) which provisions deem its desire to have the prohibitions applied to future acts not yet done, yet Grauer J. did not see fit to apply these provisions in any way in any order.
353. That in BC Supreme Court Citation: The Law Society of British Columbia v Parsons, 2015 BCSC 742, Date: 20150506, Docket: S151214, Vancouver Registry, Before: The Honourable Justice Fisher, Reasons for Judgment, Counsel for the petitioner – M.J. Kleisinger, Self-Represented Litigant, Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. April 22, 2015, Place and Date of Judgment Vancouver B.C. - May 6, 2015 a similar set of circumstances in some respects to the Law Society of BC v Robbins (BCSC S111171) arises as described at Page 2 para (1) “The petitioner, the Law Society of British Columbia, seeks an order under s. 85(6) of the Legal Profession Act, SBC 1998, c. 9 (the Act), to prohibit the respondent, David Parsons, from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding in any court, other than representing himself as an individual party to a proceeding.”
354. Paragraph 55 reflects that Mr. Kleisinger, seeking the same order (subsection 15 (5)) (which had been amended by Royal Assent of the BC Legislature in May 2012 because of the clumsy wording cited by Grauer J. in “Robbins”), decides to pursue his prosecution of the matter by way of the prohibitions under 85(6) which have the forward thinking consideration which Grauer J. elected not to apply to “Robbins”.
355. That one can see that Fisher J. first references the 'new & improved' version of 15(5) at Page 2 para (5) {continuing on to Page 3} and then on Page 3 para (6) references the “Robbins” case before Grauer J., involving opposing counsel, Glen P. Robbins (acting for himself) and Elizabeth Lyall for Fasken Martineau (Michael Kleisinger was 2nd chair). Again the application of subsection 15(5) can be seen by both Grauer J. and Fisher J. to be applied only to the traditional actions of the Solicitor in filing of documents, and not to the actions of the Barrister.
356. Fisher J. introduces Bruce J. at Page 3 (2012), paragraph (7) stating: “This interpretation was followed by Bruce J in Law Society of British Columbia v Bryfogle, 2012 BCSC 59”. I agree with her honour's comments (at para 54) that Grauer J.'s interpretation of s. 15 properly explains the interplay between s. 15(1), which prohibits acts that constitute the practice of law when rendered for a fee, and s. 15(5), which prohibits the conduct of a solicitor's practice by a layperson whether or not a fee is charged.
357. At Page 12 para (42) of Fisher J.'s Reasons under heading “Conclusion” Her Honour asserts at para (42) “The Law Society is entitled to the order it seeks. Mr. Parsons is permanently prohibited and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding in any court in the name of another person.” At para (43) she asserts “This order does not prevent Mr. Parsons from (a) appearing in court with leave of the court or assisting others to prepare documents for court.....providing that any such assistance is done without the expectation of any fee or reward, or (b) representing himself in any legal proceeding.”
358. That it is abundantly clear from decisions made in Law Society of BC v Robbins (S111171), Law Society of BC v Parsons S151214 and Law Society of BC v Bryfogle (2012 BCSC 59) that subsection 15 (5), as it existed in the LSBC v Robbins case (when the legislative drafting was confusing to Justice Grauer), or thereafter post Royal Assent by the BC Legislature when it was applied in Law Society of BC v Parsons that subsection 15 (5) has nothing to do with appearing before a justice to speak on someone's behalf.
359. That I assert the fact that at all times in these cases cited Michael Kleisinger is involved as legal counsel for Law Society of B.C. He is the most poison apple in the barrel.
360. That I verily believe that when Ronald Bakonyi provided a copy of the order of Justice Grauer at foreclosure proceedings under H130330 which he asserted in transcript evidence, that he obtained this 'evidence' “online”, however this 'evidence' was not featured in his originating petition for foreclosure or in the accompanying affidavit, or in binder thereafter, and was unrelated to the foreclosure matter involving Ita Robbins and Frana Matich (respondents) who had filed their response to petition and had a right to be heard.
361. I further believe that as an officer of the court, Mr. Bakonyi had a duty to the court to understand the proper interpretation of the order he provided to the justice to that day, and further believe that when he saw Glen Robbins arrive to court on that morning he telephoned Robert Ellis counsel for BMO Bank, and a strategy was devised as between them to make the Grauer J. order an obstruction to the leave application when the Grauer J. Order and Reasons were unrelateded to the matter of leave.
362. That I believe that Mr. Bakonyi and Mr. Ellis planned and schemed to effect the intended misinterpretation of subsection 15(5) in order to obtain the order nisi (foreclosure order), knowing that in obtaining this order at any cost, including if it means a serious misadventure in terms of the proper administration of justice, it would gain them leverage and advantage over a case involving clearly criminal, unconscionable financial arrangements made on the property at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane with sister company Peet and Cowan Financial Services), and subsequent fraudulent mortgage filings (Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corp) {with both companies owned by the same two people.
363. That at Page 14 (page 169) and line 20 Justice Fenlon described as “The Court”: asserts “Mr. Robbins, I'm going to interrupt you for just a moment - - (and then at line 23) “because part of my task is to make sure that this case gets heard today and all the other cases get heard, so I have to bring you back to the issue. The only issue that I have to deal with today, and I realize you have a case.”
364. That it is difficult to know for certain whether Fenlon J. means that Ita Robbins & Frana Matich have a case to hear their triable issues given her acknowledgment on the court transcript of the response to petition of Ita and Frana, or whether it is in reference to my appeal of the Grauer J. order to the S.C.C. In either case what Fenlon J. failed to recognize was that her first obligation was in fact to the interests of justice, and this is clear, were not served at this hearing in any regard of expectations of those by right minded reasonable Canadians armed with the facts.
365. That I believe with absolute certainty that Fenlon J. knew full well what was going on before and faked her misapprehension as part of her contribution to the conspiracy to defraud myself, my wife and mother in law.
366. That at page 1 (page 156 of submissions) line 26 Fenlon J. acknowledges Mr. Robbins is not a member of the Law Society of BC... “Now Mr. Robbins, you say you are appearing as agent for Ms. Matich?” - to which Glen Robbins responds at line 29 “I'm not appearing as agent, I'm appearing for my wife and mother in law, which I have done, pursuant to the order of Justice Grauer of October 3, 2011 which order is the subject, main subject of a Supreme Court of Canada appeal.”
367. That I verily believe any reasonable person (including particularly a sitting constitutional justice) would have wanted to have a meaningful consult of the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Grauer given the information before her in Transcript evidence, and that a purposeful constitutional justice would presume that an order of a justice might have Reasons attached to it, and might have thought checking out the relevant judicial Reasons of a brother justice of a case that had traveled to the Supreme Court of Canada and been given a file number, during the recess period might have been a judicial thing to do.
368. That at page 2 (page 157 of submissions) at line (22) Fenlon J. asserts to Mr. Bakonyi “Just a moment though. It would helpful if Mr. Robbins had a copy of the notice of hearing. Madam Registrar, do you have another copy there?”
369. That at this juncture Fenlon J. is affirming that I do not possess a notice of hearing document. The notice of hearing document on its face a false statement by Ronald Bakonyi was also not served.
370. At page 2 (page 157 of submissions) line 33 Justice Fenlon representing The Court “And I'm going to set some rules here on this application, Mr. Robbins, that apply to everyone, and I'm, going to ask you to hold your fire, so to speak, and not interrupt Mr. Bakonyi and then I will permit you to speak and I will ask Mr. Bakonyi not to interrupt you, so those are the rules of engagement here.”
371. That at this juncture early in the proceedings Mr. Bakonyi has provided the Court with the nature of the application which he describes at Page 2 line 2 “My Lady, this is usually a usual sort of application in foreclosure materials.”--and again at Page 8 (page 163 of submissions) line 47 occurring at bottom of page and continuing over onto Page 9 line 1 from Fenlon J. “All right. So you are saying on behalf of your client that this is a standard application for an order for foreclosure?”
372. That this statement from Fenlon J. describes her mindset as to the substantive mater before her 'standard application for an order for foreclosure', acknowledging that there is no other application including one seeking an order that 'Glen Robbins has no standing and is not permitted to speak on behalf of Ita this matter.'
373. Prior to the point in time occurring at Page 2 line 40 Mr. Bakonyi, Mr. Ellis and I have introduced each other to the Court, Justice Fenlon is aware that I am not a member of the Law Society of BC and is clearly getting ready to hear from both sides.
374. It is not until that Mr. Bakonyi initiates his segue into the false statements regarding the Grauer J. order followed by Mr. Ellis's 'perjured' rendition he knows to be false statements to a Court that Fenlon J is 'conveniently distracted' to pursue submissions regarding right of audience.
375. That I believe that all that occurred following line 39 on page 2 involved compromised re-visitation and purposeful misinterpretation of the Grauer J. order is unrelated to the opportunity for Ita Robbins and Frana Matich to have a fair hearing of their “defence” of the foreclosure petition.
376. That I verily believe that Justice Fenlon knew or ought to have known that her former boss Elizabeth Lyall senior partner of Fasken Martineau, was lead counsel in the matter before Justice Grauer involving myself, and, again, ought to have recused herself in order to ensure that Ita Robbins and Frana Matich received a fair hearing.
377. That in fact commencing at line 3 Mr. Bakonyi begins submissions in relation to his petition and evidence: “In fact, Mr. Ellis has filed a response on behalf of Bank of Montreal basically agreeing to the relief sought as long as there was a six month redemption period. That's at tab 4” and then following Justice Fenlon's acknowledgment “Yes” at line 7 page 3, continues at line 8 in submissions relating to the foreclosure application “Okay. At tab 3 Mr. Robbins, it looks like, has prepared – its an unfiled response.” “I believe it was prepared by Mr. -- and..,” and then Mr. Robbins interjects (in reference to the response petition) “It was filed” to which Justice Fenlon speaks at line 18 page 3 asserting: “Now, just a moment now, there are some basic rules. If anyone has a question or a comment to make its directed to the court, not to each other, so let's proceed now. So we're at tab 3, the response.”
378. That at this juncture Fenlon J. has the response to petition before her as well as the Order and Reasons of Grauer J. Had section 15 (5) of the LPA been breached, Fenlon J. has opportunity to check the signatures at the end of the response to petition which clearly established the signatures of Ita Robbins & Frana Matich and not me.
379. That this statement by Fenlon J. affirms her clear awareness of a 30 page response to petition a very clear message from the respondents Ita Robbins & Frana Matich that there are triable issues. Very little is required to send a matter to trial ('de minimum'), and it is important in the interest of justice that this is so, particularly in matters relating to foreclosure given how difficult it is to overturn an order nisi on appeal.
380. At Page 6 line 39 Mr. Bakonyi is acknowledging service of the response to petition and letter from Glen Robbins in furtherance of service of documents signed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich and filed with the Vancouver Registry of BC Supreme Court within the time limit prescribed by the BC Civil Rules. He acknowledges that the letter seeks an adjournment stating “It included a request for an adjournment”.
381. That Justice Fenlon has every opportunity to grant an adjournment as neither Ita Robbins nor Frana Matich were made properly aware of the hearing date, the date itself was obtained by way of false statements made on Government of British Columbia Forms by two officers of the court, accepted for filing by court staff that could easily see it did not truly comply with the rules and was a false and misleading statement to the court.
382. That filing the false statements on the notice of hearing filed April 15, 2013 at Vancouver courthouse, British Columbia Supreme Court, 800 Smith Street, Vancouver, BC and signed by Mr. Bakonyi on behalf of his clients, and Robert Ellis on behalf of his clients, and not properly served, the matter of petition filed by myself, Ita Robbins & Frana Matich, at New Westminster courthouse, BC Supreme Court (the appropriate court for hearing the petition) an adjournment of the petition hearing on May 9, 2013 would have been an appropriate determination by the constitutional court and specifically Justice Fenlon, in the interests of justice, given the rules provide for an abridgment of extension of the redemption period anyhow (no real prejudice to either party).
383. At page 7 line 4 Mr. Bakonyi tells the Court: “It's an unfiled response. The rules require the respondent to file a response and provide to me a file response within 21 days.”
384. That I verily believe that Mr. Bakonyi is acknowledging his awareness that a response to petition (defence) exists. Later at line 18 page 7 (submission pg 162) Mr. Bakonyi states “We filed our notice of application on April 15, 2013.” and just as important is also acknowledging that his notice of hearing document filed April 15, 2013 contains statements that both he and Robert Ellis know to be false including that the hearing date was obtained following a response to petition being filed and served (when it had not), and providing that both parties tried to determine an agreeable hearing date, but adding that the hearing would take five minutes.
385. That I ask: Would a reasonable person armed with these facts believe that the fraudulent April 15, 2013 notice of hearing document was an accident?
386. That at this 'point in time, specifically April 15, 2013, 'Mr. Bakonyi is admitting his liability for the notice of hearing document made April 15, 2013 (unserved) by claiming the response to petition is not served upon him. The aforementioned statement made on court transcript by Ron Bakonyi would appear to contradict the statement made on the notice of hearing form that in fact a response to petition had been filed April 15, 2013 when the response to petition was filed April 19, 2013, further proof of the allegation that Mr. Bakonyi and Mr. Ellis both conspired to file a document in a court registry bearing false statements with intent to corrupt court process, as described in by Edward J. contained within Fisher J.'s Reasons in Law Society of British Columbia v Parsons alluded to in this affidavit evidence.

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