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Glen P. Robbins gives Reasons in Google v Equustek Vol V (with ref to UBC Book - and Fenlon J. & Hinkson CJ)
  Sep 09, 2016

Continued from Vol IV
Groberman J.A.'s assessment of the defendant as “clandestine” presumes he believes it is hiding its actions. The inference from this is that the defendant's actions may be of a criminal nature, like fraud or intentional breach of Canadian Trademark law as we have discussed.
If criminal fraud is suspected, why aren't the police involved? Were punitive damages assessed? Under Canadian (and American) law, punitive damages are available to plaintiffs. Punitive damages are intended to punish more than reward.
Why didn't Fenlon J. use the opportunity to properly exercise her authority and apply punitive damages?
When we contract different language used in both superior court judgments like “virtual” ("In Rem"), and physical property ("In Personam"), in context of the main argument at hand “jurisdictional competence” we begin to see more clearly. I believe the Google decision falls off the rails, and the outcomes are in aggregate incompetent not only to arguments of jurisdiction but also to reasons produced.
Justice Fenlon sees Google as a virtual company (“In Rem”), a dissimilar situation to a company “In Personam”. She is aware of the difference in this case as it relates to territorial competence cases in “Morgaurd” and “Beals” and the interprovincial consideration of foreign and international territorial competence.
In this case the unique circumstance presenting itself is not that Google's offices are in California and Delaware states “In Personam” but in Google's operational capacity “In Rem
The plaintiffs could not have included Google as a defendant as there was no cause of action against them. This is the core reason why the injunction against Google must no succeed. The court should not interfere in any matter where a cause of action does not exist.
If and when it does as it has in the Google case, the court transitions its legal responsibility to adjudicate among traditional adversaries “In Personam” to adjudicating by way of rule 8 application between a valid party seeking court relief in an In Personam dispute to gathering up an Innocent party In Rem without proper grounds for so doing, taking up the challenge against Google on behalf of a BC business,outside the appropriate scope of its jurisdiction.
The results of decisions at both courts defy any reasonable connection to a cause of action and thus any reasonable connection to the provision used in obtaining access to Google for purposes of injunction.
Given the courts admission that Google was willing to volunteer actions, why not produce a less onerous injunction seeking Google's participation in further assistance?
This appears to us more disconcerting when we realize that Google's legal counsel has come to certain agreements prior (or during) the Court of Appeal hearing with respect to the Court Proceedings and Transfer Act and the more onerous subsection achieved through 3 (b) (e).
If this was done with a strategic long view to its client Google (and to the public interest) than perhaps it makes sense, but it doesn't make sense to us in terms of the public interest, which could not have been more offended by the lower court decision, an offense which might have been mitigated had 3 (b) (c) (Googles' submission to the BC Court) been employed.
Rule 10-4 “Injunction” (1) “An application for a pre-trial injunction may be made by a party whether or not a claim for an injunction is included in the relief claimed”; (5) “Unless the court otherwise orders, an order for a pre-trial injunction must contain the applicants undertaking to abide by any court order that the court may make as to damages”; (6) “In a proceeding in which an injunction has been or might have been claimed, a party may apply by petition after judgment to restrain another party from the repetition or continuance of the wrongful act or breach of contract established by the judgment or from the commission by of any act or breach of a like kind.”
We believe these provisions of the BC Civil Rules relating to injunctions reflect the nominal investigation and inquiry made by Justice Fenlon prior to making her decision in relation to the injunction ordered against Google.
The responses to notice of claim (statement of defence) had been struck, the judgment available either directly or by default. The injunction against Google should have been brought by way of petition and not by Rule 8 application, naming Google as a respondent.
There is case precedence reflecting that the BC Supreme Court has a habit of ignoring the Rules or not fully understanding jurisdiction, and where we repeat ourselves here we apologize.
In BC Supreme Court foreclosure action BCSC H130330, Glen Robbins attended to court on behalf of his wife title holder on land in Coquitlam, B.C. with another. He seeks leave of the court to ensure that the response to petition filed (defence) by his wife moves to trial. The response of 30 pages clearly outlines why the Vancouver courthouse does not have jurisdiction, how the trial hearing was obtained by fraud, and how the centerpiece of the defence, an unconscionable and unscrupulous loan should be rescinded entirely.
Fenlon J is also the justice in this matter and during hearing admits to her awareness of the response to petition on the record. The petitioner's legal counsel objects to Glen Robbins being granted audience, under the constitutional discretion of the presiding justice.
Leave to a right of audience is a one off consideration by each independent decision maker in the court and no justice may make a blanket order over other justices in any regard of this matter owing to judicial independence. No justice could make an injunction against someone speaking on behalf of another save for the leave sought to that particular justice. Constitutional discretion on leave to right of audience is of superior force and affect than an injunction based on any provincial legislation.
In the Robbins matter, the petitioner's legal counsel occupies court time making submissions unrelated to his petition and for which no originating application is brought and are not within his authority to do in matters of right of audience.
Furthermore they cannot be made with regard to final and conclusive Reasons of the court, in this instance those of Justice Christopher Grauer made October 3, 2011 in Law Society of BC v Glen P. Robbins (BCSC S111171) who makes injunction against Glen Robbins under section 15 (5) of the Legal Profession Act and includes in his reasons Glen P. Robbins right to seek leave of any court to speak on another person's behalf.
Again, Grauer J.'s decision is later affirmed in Law Society of BC v Parsons (2015).
Justice Fenlon appears to purposefully ignore the fact that her former employer Elizabeth Lyall was opposing counsel for LSBC in the matter before Grauer J. (and should have recused herself). She then denies Glen Robbins a fair right of audience based on her constitutional right to grant it, and instead sets the bar on the basis of the Grauer J order, one which she knows relates to provincial legislation involving the Legal Profession Act (B.C.).
Fenlon J. is either dishonest as Glen Robbins alleges in criminal complaint or she fails to properly understand different levels of jurisdictional limit, including her own. In context, unless she is being assisted by her friends in the court at higher levels, the Robbins case reflects why she is likely the last justice which should be advancing the concept of judicial concept in precisely the wrong case.
If one B.C. justice treats the work of a fellow B.C. justice as Fenlon J (and Hinkson C.J.) did Mr. Justice Christopher Grauer's reasons after full trial, why should any court outside the province take any decision they make with any credibility?
In doing so Fenlon J. has permitted a provision of a provincial legislation to have more power and authority than her own constitutional discretion despite in Transcript clearly recognizing her powers. She stipulates on the record that section 15 (5) of the Legal Profession Act stipulated in the Order (abstract) by Grauer J. is a denunciation of rights to speak on Mrs. Robbins' behalf.
It is not possible for Grauer J. to have made a 'global' order for injunction relating to leave to right of audience as it would be outside his authority to do so. To do so would impede on Fenlon J.'s or any other decision maker in the court's own constitutional authority no less and no more than Grauer J.
Fenlon J. knew all of this on May 9, 2013, but 'pretended' she did not, hoping, along with Bakonyi J and Robert Ellis for the petitioner and nominal respondent to abuse the court processes for their own benefit.
A joint effort to defraud Glen Robbins of his right to leave, and his wife's right to challenge the fraudulent mortgage agreements in breach of the Company Act (BC) and laws ranging from the criminal code were undertaken between the parties including Justice Fenlon.
There is nor rule or law (or legal mind) that can honestly explain it otherwise.
Some 10 months later in an effort to assist in Fenlon J's actions in assistance of the fraud of Glen Robbins and Ita Robbins, B.C. Chief Justice Chris Hinkson permits Law Society of BC lawyer Michael Kleisinger (2nd chair with Elizabeth Lyall in the Grauer J matter, counsel in the appeal of the LSBC v Glen P. Robbins matter at BC Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada (costs)) to file a Rule 8 interlocutory application for final order under BCSC claim number S111171 (already concluded at Supreme Court of Canada) when a petition ought to have been commenced under a new court file number.
Hinkson C.J. is aware that the process is improper and in serious breach of the administration of justice but permits it for reasons which cannot be explained or properly justified, other than dishonest collusion with one of the justices under his charge and his close association and history with the Law Society of BC.
Following the Fenlon J. simple order for foreclosure with Costs at Schedule “A” (meaning order is obtained without defence), the petition Cambridge Mortgage's legal counsel Ronald Bakonyi and nominal respondent Robert Ellis of “insider” law firm Ellis Roadburg for BMO Bank of Montreal file an Order made Application claiming an Order was formally made following said application by Justice Fenlon directing that Glen P. Robbins “had no standing (in the foreclosure matter – a fact) and was prohibited from speaking (right of audience) on behalf of his wife.”
This fraudulent order forged in a justices' name was filed May 31, 2013 for May 9, 2013. The event never took place. This forged order is later used to obtain a conduct of sale before a court master (who may or may not know the difference).
At or about the time Hinkson C.J. injects himself into 'the fraud' and expresses, like Fenlon J. a willingness to abuse office along with Michael Kleisinger of LSBC, lawyer Bakonyi obtains an ex parte vacant possession order (April 24, 2014) during a period where a stay order is in place (Justice Kloegmann) on the appeal of the conduct of sale until April 30, 2014.
A more diabolical set of actions could not have been effected by the most devious minds.
Hinkson CJ later cites RJR Tabacco (as we have) in relation to a detailed matter involving court injunctions, their relationship to damages, and how they should be brought. He is aware of the right way and the wrong way to conduct his business, but chooses the wrong way in the Robbins matter as Fenlon J. does, simply because both Fenlon J. and Hinkson CJ. believe more in their own personal authority to use the court as they please.
This indictment of the Chief Justice responsible for the proper administration of the court and often for directing which justices will hear which claims is intended to claim distress as to the qualities of both of these justices and impugn them of their ability to conduct themselves properly in the interest of the justice.
It is also intended to reveal previous cases which touch eerily upon the Google case, almost as if the Google case were being used to create new law after the fact of the fraud like covering up a murder with a fire.
Fenlon J. produces an injunction against Glen Robbins claiming by logic a constitutional injunction upon a provincial legal provision. The two lawyers before her Bakonyi and Ellis file an Order Made After Application, an event which never took place. One year later Fenlon J. signs an Order from an application which never occurred and which on its face presumes to deny Glen Robbins the opportunity to speak on behalf of his wife at court....ever again..overriding thereafter the constitutional jurisdiction of every BC Justice before her, working with her, and into the future.
The word “insanity” rather than sobriety is evoked by the events.
This phony order now including her signature was utilized to obtain conduct of sale and fool a court master. Later under stay order made April 7, 2014 Bakonyi uses this phony order now resplendent with Fenlon J's endorsement of the fraud to obtain ex parte orders including one for vacant possession.
The point to recognize here in the Robbins matter similar to the- Google matter, is that Fenlon J did not respect judicial comity of a decision of her fellow justice and her devious and purposeful misinterpretation of it exists as a blanket disregard and disrespect of the administration of justice. If she is incapable of understanding this or doing as she pleases how can any reasonable person expect her to be on the 'cutting edge' of an original order involving international comity?
Fenlon J.'s efforts in Google appear more like a dramatic cover up of her own malfeasance and abuse of power than of anything to do with new wave international law.
Her direct supervisor Hinkson CJ is no better. He clearly understands the nature of injunctions yet ignores these to assist with judicial and legal fraud of property.
Chris Hinkson as unethical lawyer, unethical justice:
From “In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: stores from the Canadian Legal Profession – Edited by Adam Dudek and Alice Wooley described as follows: {This is a preview. The total pages displayed will be limited. UBC Press 2016} (UBC gratefully acknowledges the financial support of our publishing program of the Government of Canada (through the Canada Book Fund), the Canadian Council of the Arts, and the British Columbia Arts Council. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada}.
In the opening chapter of the Book Adam Dodek's “Keeping Secrets or Saving Lives: What is a Lawyer to do?” “illustrates” how “loyalty can lead lawyers astray”, past the point of “protecting a client” (sic), and “ensuring that state power is only exercised...”
The Dodek book involves the “Supreme Court's decisions in Smith v Jones.”
The issue in the Smith v Jones related to the Court's decision to disclose “privileged information when there is threat of serious bodily harm or death to an identifiable group or person.”
In Smith v Jones (not the parties actual names in connection to media blackout) an accused's lawyer was compelled to disclose “violent criminal intentions an accused had disclosed to a psychiatrist.”
The lawyer for the accused did not believe it was his position to subvert solicitor client privilege and disclose information about his client's violent intentions. The psychiatrist a Dr. O'Shaughnessy, contacted the accused's lawyer to inform him of the violent criminal intentions of his client.
The lawyer Mackoff believe that “if he revealed information about his client's wishes, he would place his client in jeopardy, which according to one of Canada's better known criminal lawyers Eddie Greenspan “ the very opposite of a lawyer's function.”
The BC Supreme Court held that the public safety exception overrides the intentions of the accused. In the circumstances, lawyer Mackoff sought a plea deal for his client and got one. However, under the terms of the plea agreement Crown Counsel would be released from the deal “if something surprising” was “revealed in a pre-sentence report on psychiatrist assessment.”
The accused plead guilty under the terms of the agreement but without Crown counsel aware of the O'Shaughnessy assessment. “Mackoff informed Dr. O'Shaughnessy that he did not intend to communicate his medical report revealing the inherent danger to the sentencing judge. Dr. O'Shaughnessy informed Mackoff that he would seek legal advice.”
Dr, O'Shaughnessy retained lawyer Chris Hinkson, now the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Hinkson “initiated an application in the Supreme Court of British Columbia seeking a declaration “as to whether or not {O'Shaughnessy} is required to make disclosure to the responsible authorities”. Lawyer Hinkson and Mackoff filed a style of cause where the actual parties names were changed to Smith and Jones. A publication ban was imposed.
The BC Supreme Court justice held that the same principles existed with regard to a lawyers professional responsibility. The BC Supreme Court justice ordered Dr. O'Shaughnessy to “disclose portions of his affidavit to the public” "Mackoff appealed this order, and it (the order) was stayed or frozen, pending the appeal."
The BC Court of Appeal focused their attention on the solicitor client privilege. “It held that the client's communication with Dr. O'Shaughnessy as well as his opinion could not be revealed.”
“It agreed with the trial court that the privilege was overridden by the public safety exception but (also) held that the disclosure was not mandatory, only permissible.”
Mackoff headed off to the Supreme Court of Canada. Lawyers Mackoff and Hinkson (for O'Shaughnessy) travelled to the Supreme Court of Canada “at the end of May 1988”.
The Court made the private decision to hear the leave application to private hearing disallowing the public – and directed that all 9 judges of the Supreme Court of Canada rather than the customary Division of 3 would hear the matter before it.
At hearing “the judges seemed...surprised that Hinkson did not contest that the issue was a matter of national importance and granted Mackoff's motion for leave.”
Dr. O'Shaughnessy would not have been aware that his lawyer Chris Hinkson was not properly arguing his interests. Did Chris Hinkson feel he was entitled to neglect his client because his father was a judge? What was Chris Hinkson's privilege in this case?
“The court denied the motion to lift the publication ban but allowed publication of the decision that leave to appeal was granted and that the issue” related to expert opinion as an “exception to solicitor client privilege”.
“In R v Neil (2002), the Supreme Court of Canada quoted the following statement made by Henry Brougham, late Lord Chancellor, in his defence of Queen Caroline in 1820 against the charge of adultery brought against him by her husband, King George IV, Lord Brougham proclaimed before the House of Lords during that trial.....and advocate, in discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty, and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequence, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in the confusion.”
“Lord Brougham's statement has become part of the dominant model of the role of the lawyers – especially the defence lawyer – in the adversarial system. This duty of loyalty is essential to the independence of the legal profession in a free and democratic society.”
Lawyer Mackoff fought like hell for his client despite being aware of the risks that were involved including the danger to the public. According to the authors top criminal defence lawyer Eddie Greenspan said of Madoff's predicament:
'If Madoff had revealed any information against his client's wishes, at the least he would have been in a conflict of interest and could not have continued as lawyer to his client because he would have been in a conflict of interest'
“It was Madoff's job and his duty to take his client's side”.
At the hearing before the Supreme Court of Canada there was a third lawyer, a Mr. Schabas, acting on behalf of Southam News. Only Schabas and Hinkson had experience before the Supreme Court of Canada.
Again, lawyer Chris Hinkson despite being retained by Dr. O'Shaughnessy whose position was directly related to the public interest question at the heart of the matter, did not bother to advance his client's position at Supreme Court of Canada, opting instead to permit his opponent Mr. Madoff's arguments to stand. This left legal counsel representing Southam News to advance the cause of the public interest. Why did Hinkson abdicate his responsibility to his client opting instead to surrender his client's voice to that of the lawyer representing the accused?
In context of consideration of access to justice and the right to speak – the basis of freedom of speech that so many had fought for, been jailed for, and which in the matter of Smith and Jones could not have been advanced in person did Hinkson roll over to protect lawyers interests?
In the end, “The Supreme Court unanimously confirmed the existence of a public safety exception to solicitor-client privilege.” “Writing for the majority, Justice Peter Cory stated that there are certain circumstances when the safety of the public is at risk (and) the solicitor-client privilege may be set aside.”
“First, there has to be a clear risk to an identifiable person or group of persons. Second the risk has to be of serious bodily harm (including serious psychological harm) or death. And third the damage has to be imminent.
Letter of complaint from Glen P. Robbins to the Law Society of British Columbia involving BC Human Rights matter – conduct of his (“bi-polar” as determined by 2 psychiatrists) lawyer John Motiuk (now deceased), and John Motiuk's lawyer Chris Hinkson).
February 10, 2016
Glen P. Robbins
Law Society of B.C. 845 Cambie Street, Vancouver, B.C. V6B 4Z9 Fax: 604 669 5232
Attention: Complaints department, Executive Director, Board of Governors
Re: Complaint against John Motiuk, Christopher Hinkson QC (as lawyer), Law Society of British Columbia Board of Governors, Benchers, Attorney General BC (circa 1999 & 2000), BC Human Rights Tribunal Members Tom Patch, Judy Parrack, Heather McNaughton, Lyndsey Lyster, Tonie Beharell).
Please find enclosed a complaint against John Motiuk and other parties of conspicuous note. Heather McNaughton currently a BC Supreme Court Master is linked to the extent that she refused to deal with the matter of my being defamed as pedophile on BCHRT website while she was working at BCHRT. It was Geoff Plant who eventually placed Meta Tags on the defamation.
A lawsuit was filed and served appropriately at BC Supreme Court. No defence was ever filed. In written letter sent to me Geoff Plant, than AG wrote to me with regard to the Meta Tags and wrongly insisted that the Government of British Columbia had settled the defamation matter.
The John Motiuk complaint examines the misconduct of Mr. Motiuk who represented me while he was mentally incompetent to do so, did not inform me of this until long after he had sabotaged my case at BC Human Rights Tribunal. Two psychiatrists evaluated Mr. Motiuk. It was determined that he was bi-polar and off his medication.
Mr. Motiuk's bi polar mental disorder (mania) was determined by LSBC to be the cause of his unprofessional conduct. His lawyer Chris Hinkson QC and the Law Society of BC would have known this relatively early on in the investigation in sufficient time to obtain medical appointments with two (2) different psychiatrists. Why was this information not communicated by Chris Hinkson QC and Law Society of B.C. to Glen Robbins when it was first known? Why did John Motiuk wait over a year to inform Glen Robbins, and at the time he finally informed Glen Robbins and was asked why he sabotaged his BCHRT case, why did John Motiuk tell Glen Robbins his lawyer told him to do it.
The information provided by the Preliminary of BCHRT Tribunal Member Judy Parrack provides us with a chronology of Mr. Motiuk's behaviour and of the events which ran concurrent at BCHRT (affecting Glen Robbins) and to Mr. Motiuk's troubles with LSBC.
Tribunal Members are members of the Law Society of B.C.
It is my position that Law Society of BC (“LSBC”), Attorney General (Government of BC) in its Cabinet role and as constant Bencher at “LSBC”, Christopher Hinkson QC colluded and conspired with lawyers Tonie Beharell, Lyndsey Lyster, Tribunal and Law Society members Judy Parrack and Tom Patch to use Mr. Motiuk and knowledge of his mental incapacity to ensure that I did not receive fair process nor fair hearing, and for that they are ultimately all responsible for causation of damages.
I further believe that there is linkage between these events, my 2013 notice to BC Attorney General's office of intention to seek Default Judgment in my BC Supreme Court defamation lawsuit, the appointment of Christopher Hinkson to Chief Justice for BC Supreme Court and his abuse of office in providing your Michael Kleisinger with ex parte order for Trial and subsequent Trial order April 10th, 2014 on the basis of an application under a docket number (BCSC S111171) leave application dismissed by (5) five S.C.C. Justices September 2013 with that lower court file ultimately closed at S.C.C in August 2015.
I have written out the complaints by hand and provide them now in typographical form.
Beginning at page 2 of Complaint Form at top denoted as “Background”:
“I hired (BC Lawyer) John Motiuk in 1998 to represent me and my company Calvary Publishing Corporation (intended as “Cavalry”) in our capacity as respondents in BCHRT 2000 26 matter.”
“The complaints were made by five female respondents. Original complaint at BC Human Rights Commission was for staring. The 'ringleader' of the Complainants and original complaint was Jennifer Tannis. Ms. Tannis's father Mitchell Tannis was petitioned into bankruptcy by Peter Lee of Davis and Company circa 1996 (November hearing) and ordered into bankruptcy by Justice Linda Loo in January 1997.” [during the period claimed by the complainants Mitchell Tannis and his company Tannis Group of Companies is the bona fide respondent as Calvary Publishing (respondent) is not incorporated as a company until September 1996 – all acknowledged in Reasons of Tribunal Member Tom Patch].
“In September 1996 Calvary Publishing Corp was incorporated by Glen Robbins and Jennifer Tannis were original shareholder and Directors. Some months later, following the bankruptcy matter Jennifer Tannis sold her 50% interest in Calvary for $30,000.” [Glen Robbins also paid Mitchell Tannis's legal bill of $10,000]. Jennifer Tannis sold her interest in Calvary Publishing when Glen Robbins indicated that Mitchell Tannis could not be at the business. Mitchell Tannis left attending to the business following the January 1997 order of Linda Loo J. Mitchell Tannis was employer to all respondents from the complaint period of January 1996 until September 1996 (when Calvary was incorporated). (Mitchell Tannis continued to work within 10-15 feet of all Complainants including his daughter from September 1996 until February 1997. Basically, for 13 of 15 months of the common Complaint period Mitchell Tannis was either the legal employer or among the Complainants while Glen Robbins worked in another building altogether – see Tom Patch Reasons inexplicably contradictory).
In Preliminary Decision of Tribunal Member Judy Parrack we discover a rendition of the events at BC Human Rights Tribunal which support Glen Robbins Complaint.
At pg 1 para (5) “The Tribunal advised the parties that is was considering joining the complaints filed by Ms. Lee, Ms. Clemente, Ms. Dato and Ms. Corbette (sic).” (Ed: Ms. Corbette (sic) was dropped when it was discovered that she was a prostitute hired by Mitchell and Nadine Tannis to entrap Glen Robbins. Ms. Clemente never testified. Ms. Dato was a part time worker who attended high school, and Ms. Data filed a Employment Standards complaint at the same time she filed the BCHRT complaint claiming and entirely different reason for leaving employment than suggested in her complaints. The person at BC Employment Standards Helene Beauschene (now a WCAT Vice Chair) was a fellow employee in Burnaby office with a Mrs. Dauo, the wife of the only witness attending to court to support the women's Complaints. Mr. Dauo was determined to not be credible.
A year following the ex parte Decision of Tom Patch, Glen Robbins obtained filed material that Chris Hinkson QC had failed to provide to him prior to the hearing at John Motiuk's (former) law office from Privacy Office. The documents detailed how the complainants had changed their testimony from original complaint at (then) BC Human Rights Commission to BC Human Rights Tribunal.
One example is when Complainant Laura Dato had indicated at point of original complaint that Mitchell Tannis was working around the Complainants the entire period of the alleged contraventions, and later in laundered testimony at BC Human Rights Tribunal changed her testimony to suggest that Mitchell Tannis was working elsewhere. Given that this evidence was under affidavit from Tonie Beharell of Heenan Blaikie, it is fair to suggest that Tonie Beharell induced Laura Dato to commit perjury. (Laura Dato's mother was the sister of Angela Abbate's mother).
Glenda Lee was hired by Jennifer Tannis in her capacity as co-owner of Calvary Publishing Corporation and only worked at Calvary a few times. She was hired at or about the time that Kimberly Corbette the prostitute was hired (and later fired).
No actual application was ever made for joinder. It is on the basis of the BC Human Rights Tribunal that joinder was suggested. The submissions requested were not based on formal application. From page 1 para (5) of Parrack's 'evidence' on the subject matter of joinder. “The parties were to provide their position by August 1998.”
Details of your complaint (continued) from page 4.
As a consequence of Christopher Hinkson QC only providing Glen Robbins with a small box of material in early 2000 and not the numerous large boxes of material Chris Hinkson was ensuring that Glen Robbins could not defend himself properly. Obviously, Glen Robbins would have ripped the Complainant's testimony to shreds and made a laughing stock of the entire process.

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