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Glen P. Robbins gives Reasons in Google v Equustek Vol VII (case heading to S.C.C.)
  Sep 07, 2016

Continued from Volume VI
This name and link to pedophile was placed on a full page link following link defamation following defamation for a period of 3 years. There is an abundance of news relating to the hunting of pedophiles which suffocated my ability to travel extensively. Whether the threat to me was real or lay in my mind at all times.
Lastly, in the midst of the matters involving (predominantly) my wife in Robbins v Cambridge and Cambridge v Robbins (BCSC H130330), Chris Hinkson just installed as Chief Justice of the BC Supreme Court knew that Michael Kleisinger of LSBC has not filed proper documents to get a hearing for a vexatious litigant order, rather Chris Hinkson knew that Justice Kloegmann had provided order for stay of execution of Conduct of Sale order and Order Nisi, and knew that if proper petition documents were filed and served that a trial date would not be heard for months to come, allowing me time to defend my wife and our family home in BC, and to challenge the unconscionable and illegal loan of Cambridge Mortgage Investment including the fraudulent filing of phony mortgage registration at Land Title and Survey office in New Westminster and the court applications associated with them.
The criminal complaints alleged of Chris Hinkson under my affidavit reveal that he had indicated his 'cooked up' hearing without filing of originating petition that he would be reserving for 60-90 days and instead once he discovered the stay of execution made a quicky order to the Law Society of BC.
This criminally produced order conjured up between Hinkson and Kleisinger is now serving as further defamation against me. (The first attempt to kill me at BCHRT failed so Hinkson was sent in again to finish the job), revealed below. A clear abuse of power and of office by Chris Hinkson in his capacity as Chief Justice.
Here than are the links to the affidavit pertaining to criminal complaint submitted by me a number of weeks ago where communication has occurred between myself and the federal justice minister directing me to the provincial authority, and to which I have responded by informing the federal justice ministry they are responsible for the judicial appointments under the Judges Act.
A history of improper judicial conduct at BC Supreme Court:
This is not the first time a BC Court has seen fit to support the malfeasance of another justice. In 2009 Kari Simpson identified a circumstance where a BC Supreme Court Justice Koenigsberg assisted her husband, a person convicted in California civil court of Nazi like hate crimes.
When a BC lawyer attempted to attach the $250,000 California judgment against the jointly owned Koenigsberg – convicted husband property, the Nazi husband had signed off title to his wife, textbook fraudulent conveyance, and the lawyer enforcing the California confronted former BC Supreme Court justice Donald Brenner who dismissed the claim without good cause.
When Glen P. Robbins posted this story at – the Vancouver Foundation Charity (actually an investment organization) was on his site reading this posting for two weeks straight which followed with the Chief Justice resigning.
(Glen P. Robbins is currently advocating to have both Chief Justice Hinkson and Justice Fenlon fired from their positions).
It would in light of these facts seem like the actions of both Hinkson CJ and Fenlon were using the courts to exact revenge on Glen P. Robbins and his family. (Justice in BC are vetted and appointed in secret with no transparency to the public whatsoever). The Google case would appear to be mere racket in distraction.
Indirect political influence on the judiciary:
If this case was made at the provincial superior courts for political reasons given that the justices participating are all former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper appointments with decisions made while he was still in that position.
Given Mr. Harper's Conservative government's ardent position with respect to Bill C 51, his close personal association and ties to the state of Israel, his conspicuous, his dislike of many Muslim customs evidenced by his- securing a poll at tax payer expense (for use during the Canadian federal election) relating to the Niqab garment that some Muslim women wear over their faces, and its relationship to Canadian law for defending persecuted persons – and his appointment of both the chief justice and his underling Fenlon J. suggest a connection between the Google decision and Bill C 51.
Glen P. Robbins intends to determine if current Prime Minister Trudeau is willing to permit such despicable abuse of office of (at least) two justices in order to protect his own Liberal parties own interest represented by support of Bill C 51.
Will the Supreme Court of Canada treat the Google v Equustek matter without considering the conduct of the lower court justices in other matters involving similar subject matter, court standing, causes of action, parties to actions, injunctions etc.
Afterall, the fraudlent/forged order is and grotesque breach of stay of execution order at the heart of criminal submissions made against Fenlon J., Hinkson CJ., as well as members of the Law Society of B.C. including officers employed at the law society.
If these allegations have merit, and I believe beyond pure denial they are without defence, then the justices in the midst of permitting them to occur should not be permitted to be heard in other matters at the highest court because it brings not only the S.C.C into potential disrepute, but could bring Canada's judiciary into international disrepute.
My right to free speech in court cannot be denied by provisions of provincial legislation. To do so would make the provincial legislation of the Legal Profession Act equal in authority to the Constitution of Canada.
When we consider the lack of strength of the judicial decisions at both levels of court in the Google matter, and the focus of attention being given to it we must also wonder ALOUD if this political influence could have impacted on what we consider to be very questionable outcomes at both levels of court.
The Canadian public as well as the public in other countries has been decidedly against government intrusion into the Internet, save for matters obviously offensive to the public, like child pornography. Judicial proceeding always ignore political influences on courts and court judgments inclined to belief they are made completely independent of these influences. It is not reasonable in a country where the Prime Minister's Office makes so many appointments to accept these beliefs any longer. This does not mean that judicial decisions should seek out politics as a factor in decision making, however in Google v Equustek it merits mention.
The Google case was decided at a time when it appeared Stephen Harper might win another government. In his role of Prime Minister Mr. Harper was a multiple loser at the Supreme Court of Canada over a number of issues politically important to him. Supporters believed they might yet have the last laugh owing to the Prime Minister's capacity to appoint dozens of justices to various provincial courts and to the Federal Courts and Supreme Court of Canada.
I believe that both the lower court justice (a Harper appointment) and the BC Court of Appeal majority (also Harper appointments) may have had Bill C 51 (Anti-terrorism Act) in mind when they decided Google. A loss for Google is a win for political and police authority who would not be easily barred by charter arguments when rationalizing directives to remove links on websites.
I note that the lower court decision was made by Fenlon J. in spring of 2014, and that the BC Court of Appeal Division heard the matter October 27th & 28th, 2014 at Vancouver courthouse B.C. Supreme Court as well. Judgment was made by BC Court of Appeal June 11, 2015 and Fenlon J. was then appointed to the BC Court of Appeal 4 days later, June 15, 2015.
This would suggest that Fenlon J. was being considered (vetted) for the court of appeal appointment prior to the decision being made at BC Court of Appeal. On its face this is not itself a very attractive series of events, given the look of potential conflict.
Courts are public domains and the public interest should be paramount when decisions are made, particularly when powerful interests affecting that public are at hand. Justices come and go, some are better than others, but the public interest remains.
The greater public interest to be considered in this matter is not the defendant's or even Google's rights alone, but the actual users of the 'virtual' communications networks made available with control or custody of the government.
A search engine algorithm is proprietorial and is itself an object of freedom of expression. It is a creation which foster further creation.
There is no doubt that the freedom of speech of many thousands or millions of Internet actors participating in the creation, construction of Web sites for personal expression or for commercial enterprise which could be adversely affected by a dismissal of Google's appeal such as the loss of web page promotion experienced by ROBBINS Sce Research and similar sites seeking a cost effective method to promote their sites.
That Google's invention promotes freedom of speech is not in serious doubt, but the freedom of speech doesn't occur just by Google's algorithm alone. The freedom of speech expression cannot however occur if no algorithm exists. Thus freedom of speech is created as a consequence of the algorithm. Everyone who uses Google to search on the Internet is viewing expression the moment when pages of links occur, and further when the links are clicked and more evidence of freedom of expression occurs.
The website producers who made the defendants carrying on of business (virtual or clandestine) are engaged in freedom of speech, the “optimizers” who push Websites up the page links are also actively engaged.
The audience gained by placement of links and optimization of those links is essential to the speech of the defendant being maximized for commercial benefit. Did Google construct or alter the website? Did Google engage in the optimization of the website? Of course not, Google is “innocent”. Why weren't other “innocent” persons involved in this matter. Was their exclusion that they did not sell advertising space on the Internet?
The two BC Superior Court decisions in Google are imposing their judicial authority over Google's algorithm by compelling Google to use its influence gained through the propriety of its algorithm to take down links that it is not specifically responsible for.
No injunction can be made against any person particularly one which is admitted to have no standing without an application and without notice. My involvement in Cambridge v Mortgage Investment Corporation, no lawful injunction should have been made without an application, the adducing of evidence by independent justice through legal process. No lawful injunction could be made based on any provincial legislation as this relates to right of audience.
In fact be made even without a proper application (petition) an injunction could not be lawfully achieved against me by a party before any justice, because no justice has the right to make a blanket order against any person seeking a right of audience.
The only application is leave sought by the person seeking the right of audience. The right is obtained through the leave sought by the person wishing the right and only the court can grant or refuse it. We have said it here three times and is cannot be any clearer, a first year law student would understand it the first time, Fenlon J never got it.
Again, when we consider the Google case in light of the Robbins case are we dealing with incompetence or dishonesty? Incompetence is the inability of someone to do something successfully, while dishonesty reflects deceitfulness in someone's character. In Robbins I believe it is dishonesty which motivates Fenlon J. In Google I believe it is incompetence.
The example of the Glen Robbins and Law Society of BC case S111171 showcased the unique event of one BC Supreme Court justice (Fenlon J.) going to some length to avoid judicial comity of a fellow justice. Such disrespect must clearly be seen as contempt.
Should any superior court so obviously contemptuous of a fellow justice's reasons be permitted to have another case of their heard at Supreme Court of Canada, particularly one as important as Google resplendent with errors, poor conclusions and generally bad decision making.
The Google matter illuminated by the events one year earlier in the Robbins matter suggests investigation of the Judicial operator's state of mind. I don't believe that all of these errors by Fenlon J. were accidental.
We don't buy the incompetence, no justice can be this incompetent over such a period of time with so many nefarious actions involved. Lack of respect for parties, inability to distinguish the scope and authority of constitutional discretion over provincial statute, and complete lack of respect for the lawful Reasons of a fellow justice.
If a justice cannot properly adhere to the reasons of a justice in her own court involving basic legal concepts, how can she possibly be taken seriously in a matter involving a worldwide search engine affecting the day to day communications of millions of businesses and other communication when a person like Robbins & Google are not parties to the action?
Grauer's Reasons (and Glen Robbins position on the matter) were later followed (and affirmed) by Fisher J. in “Law Society of B.C. v Parsons” in reasons published in spring 2015 on this very issue differentiating speaking at court from subsection 15(5) of the Legal Profession and affirming Grauer's position on the matter.
If a BC Justice like Lauri Fenlon is willing to sign what is a counterfeit order made by two lawyers nearly a year after they had breached the Criminal Code and take the other action she did, suggests criminal collusion on her part. Did a guilty mind serve as the catalyst for this poor decision in Google aided by some latitude by her friends at the BC Court of Appeal.
We would strongly suggest the Google decision was more about Fenlon J.'s self interest, perhaps the self interest of her former law firm, the self interest of both levels of superior court, and possibly, about self interest between the BC Attorney General and the Attorney General for Canada, as he was then a Conservative who made Bill C 51, given the close financial and political relationship between both Attorneys General politically.
I believe the forthcoming analysis will provide sufficient cause to determine that the decisions by both the lower court and court of appeal in this Google matter, in sum total equal more a decision about the advancement and promotion of some policy choice of the government, not government in general, but more specifically a federal government (at the time) when the decisions were being made by these courts in the midst of legislation related to Bill C 51, Canada's anti-terrorism legislation “designed to grant greater powers to police authorities to target activities that could undermine the security of Canada” as well as “activities that are detrimental to Canada's interests.”
Within this anti terror legislation, CSIS's ability to collect intelligence would be greatly enhanced, allowing the spy agency “to do things above and beyond mere observation.”
If Google could be controlled by a small provincial authority in aid of execution of enforcement in this manner, what be the consequences from security and courts involving in camera hearings involving security allegations?
A reasonable person would see both these decisions as no better basis for framing a trial balloon for public policy, and certainly not grounds for extraordinary case law.
If in other cases similar judicial decisions could be made as it was in Google v Equustek, than later on government might be in the position to seek injunctions against persons it felt were broadcasting information considered dangerous to the public good.
Is isn't a stretch of one's imagination to foresee that if the decision from the BC Court of Appeal were upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, that an expansion into areas “to do things above and beyond mere observation” in the interests of national security would be just around the corner, that national interests of security could find their way into intersection with the interests of the business and commercial endeavours into the overall nexus of 'political and economic security' where Bill C 51 could be seen to enable the Trans Pacific Partnership and vice versa.
The Trans Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) (found at Google search “Global Affairs Canada”) and Chapter “Trade Remedies” states the following: “Trade remedies are measures taken by governments to protect their domestic industries.” “It is described as “Reinforcing (sic) certain international best practices....while (sic) protecting domestic producers from unfair trade practices.”
The Temporary Entry for Business Persons Chapter “enables the establishment of a committee to consider undertaking mutually agreed-upon cooperative activities.” It also includes: “substantive obligations that are similar to those undertaken by Canada in several of its existing free trade agreements”, which include: “obligations relating (sic) to transparency, future collaboration, and the processing of work authorization.”
This history of judicial comity outlined in these Reasons include province to province comity of the Supreme Court of Canada, reference to state to state (United States) comity, reference to international comity of in Rem business (Google) and Spain absent proper consideration of trademark law in Canada, the United States and or reference to Madrid Protocol in Spain in which Canada has is absent.
One could theorize (a condition which is likely not worse than the judicial decisions arrived at) that in upholding the decision by the court of appeal, a company like Equustek, devoid of the requisite trademark protections of its product in the United States, (which demands a more onerous and expensive process of trademark protection), could, realize transport of its existing Canadian trademark de facto into the US federal government territory with the aid of a sufficiently motivated provincial judiciary.
The presiding justice Fenlon J. at lower court was a former associate legal counsel with “International” professional law firm Fasken Martineau self described, “as (sic) a leading international business law and litigation firm, with more than 700 lawyers, the firm has offices in Canada, the United Kingdom and South Africa. Fasken Martineau has offices in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, London and Johannesburg”.
Canada's Financial Post and writer Julius Melinitzer writes in article published October 29, 2014 that Peter Feldberg, “an energy lawyer from Calgary (Alberta) is (sic) “to take over as managing partner of the firm....” “He replaces David Corbett on February 1, 2015.” “Mr. Feldberg appears to have been the “establishment” candidate closely allied with Mr. Corbett and his continuing vision of aggressive international expansion for the firm.”
At the time these two court decisions were being made, in the run up to the federal election in October 2015, (which many believed Stephen Harper would win), one can see that the internal power struggle at Fasken Martineau. Fenlon J.'s former law firm produced a managing partner in Stephen Harper's hometown of Calgary, sympathetic to both their mutual interests in obtaining pipeline approval through British Columbia operating in conjunction with their financial and political partners the BC Liberal Party.
There is absolute evidence of electoral funding from interests in Calgary Alberta to the BC Liberal Party and to its leader Christy Clark personally. The BC Attorney General is a constant 'Bencher' with Law Society of BC described by Elizabeth Lyall in BCSC S111171 petition against Glen Robbins as a “Corporation”.
Fasken Martineau was contracted by the BC Attorney General to provide a paper of judicial reform which did not serve the public interest particularly the needs of self litigants. Fasken Martineau recieves an inordinate amount of money for its contract work with The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia nearing $1,000,000 per year.
B.C. Freedom of Information is negotiating with BC Finance Ministry through the Attorney General release of government payments to B.C. lawyers and law firms going back 6 years. We have no doubt that Fenlon J.'s former law firm will be on that list.
It is not a stretch of one's imagination to suggest that if a provincial superior court justice cannot be held to the responsibility of properly assessing her scope of authority as a federally appointed independent constitutional justice of a country, and properly assess the application of limited powers of provincial statutes, particularly provisions within a stature that offer less onerous options to facilitate process as in the Google matter, and is incapable of recognizing simple judicial comity between herself and another colleague within the provincial superior courts, than, she certainly has no business or credible authority making decision and new law regarding comity between a company registered within a province of that country “In Personam” and equip it with worldwide powers over a worldwide conglomerate that she herself describes as “virtual”.
The decision at the lower court is possessed of conclusions that amount to no more than conjecture piled upon by a decision from the court of appeal which also serves to at best excuse this very decision from the court below. It is uncertain what the objectives either court were attempting to fulfill. It is certain in our opinion that the collective outcome is not in the public's interest.
The litigation involving Google could have been dealt with with much greater ease and focus of utility involving the existing statutory structure within the Province of British Columbia including the BC Civil Rules. This will be examined through the reasons taken by from both court decisions and further examination of other choices available as described.
In totality I would make the decision in the public interest to uphold the appeal by Google.
Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia, October 27 and 28, 2014 Additional Submissions Received: December 4, 22, and 23, 2014 Place and Date of Judgment:Vancouver, British Columbia June 11, 2015 Written Reasons by:The Honourable Mr. Justice Groberman Concurred in by:The Honourable Mr. Justice Frankel,The Honourable Mr. Justice Harris
“The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants designed and sold counterfeit versions of their product. They sued for trademark infringement and unlawful appropriation of trade secrets, and obtained injunctions prohibiting the defendants from carrying on their business. The defendants continued to carry on business, but did so in a clandestine manner using a variety of websites, and relying on web search engines to direct customers to those sites. The plaintiffs successfully applied to the court for an injunction prohibiting Google, which operates the world’s most popular search engine,from delivering search results pointing to the defendants’ websites. Google appealed, arguing that the injunction was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, that it improperly operated against an innocent non-party to the litigation and that it had an impermissible extraterritorial reach. Held:Appeal dismissed. Under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, territorial competence over the action between the plaintiffs and defendants was sufficient to establish territorial competence over the injunction application. Google does not have resident employees,business offices, or servers in the Province, but its activities in gathering data through web crawling software, in distributing targeted advertising to users in British Columbia, and in selling advertising to British Columbia businesses are sufficient to uphold the chambers judge’s finding that it does business in the Province. The court, therefore, had In Personam jurisdiction over Google. In the circumstances, it was permissible to seek relief against Google, even though it was not a party to the litigation. The injunction did not violate principles of comity.”
The principle of comity:
In the premier historical case on comity before the Supreme Court of Canada: Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, Case Number: 21116, Date: 1990-12-20, “on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia” “Conflict of laws” - “Civil Procedure” -- Judgments and order—“Recognition and enforcement of extraprovincial judgments – Respondents obtaining judgments in Alberta court against British Columbia resident for foreclosure and for deficiency between value of property and amounts owing on mortgages – whether or not Alberta judgment should be enforced by British Columbia court .”
From preamble assessment described as paragraph 1 (and thereafter): (LaForest J.) - ......“The appellant took no steps to appear or to defend the actions. There was no clause in the mortgages by which he agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Alberta court and he did not attorn to its jurisdiction.”
“The respondents obtained judgments nisi in the foreclosure actions. At the expiry of the redemption period, they obtained orders for a judicial sale of the mortgaged properties to themselves and judgments were entered against the appellant for the deficiencies between the value of the property and the amount owing on the mortgages. The respondents then each commenced a separate action in the British Columbia Supreme Court to enforce the Alberta judgments for the deficiencies. Judgment was granted to the respondents by the Supreme Court in a decision which was upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeal. At issue here was the recognition to be given by the courts in one province to a judgment of the courts in another province in a personal action brought in the latter province at a time when the defendant did not live there.”
“Held: The appeal should be dismissed.”
“The common law regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is anchored in the principle of territoriality as interpreted and applied by the English courts in the 19th century. This principle reflects one of the basic tenets of international law, that sovereign states have exclusive jurisdiction in their own territory. As a concomitant to this, states are hesitant to exercise jurisdiction over matters that may take place in the territory of other states. Because jurisdiction is territorial, a state's law has no binding effect outside its jurisdiction.”
“Modern states cannot live in splendid isolation and do give effect to judgments given in other countries in certain circumstances, such as judgments in rem and personal judgments. This was thought to be in conformity with the requirements of comity, which has been stated to be the deference and respect due by other states to the actions of a state legitimately taken within its territory. But comity is based not simply on respect for a foreign sovereign, but on convenience and even necessity. Modern times require that the flow of wealth, skills and people across boundaries be facilitated in a fair and orderly manner. Principles of order and fairness which ensure security of transactions with justice must underlie a modern system of private international law. The content of comity therefore must be adjusted in the light of a changing world order.”
“No real comparison exists between the interprovincial relationships of today and those obtaining between foreign countries in the 19th century. The courts made a serious error in transposing the rules developed for the enforcement of foreign judgments to the enforcement of judgments from sister-provinces. The considerations underlying the rules of comity apply with much greater force between the units of a federal state.”
“The 19th century English rules fly in the face of the obvious intention of the Constitution to create a single country with a common market and a common citizenship. The constitutional arrangements made to effect this goal, such as the removal of barriers to interprovincial trade and mobility guarantees, speak to the strong need for the enforcement throughout the country of judgments given in one province.”
“The Canadian judicial structure is so arranged that any concerns about differential quality of justice among the provinces can have no real foundation. All superior court judges -- who also have superintending control over other provincial courts and tribunals -- are appointed and paid by the federal authorities. All are subject to final review by the Supreme Court of Canada, which can determine when the courts of one province have appropriately exercised jurisdiction in an action and the circumstances under which the courts of another province should recognize such judgments. Further, Canadian counsel are all subject to the same code of ethics.”
“The courts in one province should give "full faith and credit" to the judgments given by a court in another province or a territory, so long as that court has properly, or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction in the action. Both order and justice militate in favour of the security of transactions. It is anarchic and unfair that a person should be able to avoid legal obligations arising in one province simply by moving to another province.”
“These concerns, however, must be weighed against fairness to the defendant. The taking of jurisdiction by a court in one province and its recognition in another must be viewed as correlatives and recognition in other provinces should be dependent on the fact that the court giving judgment "properly" or "appropriately" exercised jurisdiction. It may meet the demands of order and fairness to recognize a judgment given in a jurisdiction that had the greatest or at least significant contacts with the subject matter of the action. But it hardly accords with principles of order and fairness to permit a person to sue another in any jurisdiction, without regard to the contacts that jurisdiction may have to the defendant or the subject matter of the suit. If the courts of one province are to be expected to give effect to judgments given in another province, there must be some limit to the exercise of jurisdiction against persons outside the province. If it is reasonable to support the exercise of jurisdiction in one province, it is reasonable that the judgment be recognized in other provinces.”
“The approach of permitting suit where there is a real and substantial connection with the action provides a reasonable balance between the rights of the parties. It affords some protection against being pursued in jurisdictions having little or no connection with the transaction or the parties. Here, the actions for the deficiencies properly took place in Alberta. The properties are situate there, and the contracts were entered into there by parties then resident in the province. Moreover, deficiency actions follow upon foreclosure proceedings, which should obviously take place in Alberta, and the action for the deficiencies cries out for consolidation with the foreclosure proceedings. There was a real and substantial connection between the damages suffered and the jurisdiction. Thus, the Alberta court properly had jurisdiction, and its judgment should be recognized and be enforceable in British Columbia.”
“The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Acts in the various provinces were never intended to alter the rules of private international law. They simply provided for the registration of judgments as a more convenient procedure than by bringing an action to enforce a judgment given in another province. There is nothing to prevent a plaintiff from bringing such an action and thereby taking advantage of the rules of private international law as they may evolve over time.”
Morguard occurs in 1990 when the Internet was not yet flourishing. In context, ROBBINS Sce Research was established as public opinion policy – in 1998 it had yet to make a website. A website was established in 2002. The amount of news derived from the Internet in 2002 was estimated at 17%, that number is now closer to 80%. With the inclusion of social media in Twitter and Facebook the entire nature of what news and information services has dramatically changed since “Morguard”.
In the Morguard case we have a party to the “action on appeal” (De Savoye), “who” (sic) “does not take (sic) step to appear or to defend the actions.”
“There was no clause in the mortgages by which he agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Alberta court and he did not attorn to its jurisdiction.” “The respondents then each commence a separate action in the British Columbia Court to enforce the Alberta judgments.”
The Morguard case establishes the territory of British Columbia for enforcement of deficiency orders related to mortgage foreclosure from Alberta. “The common law regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (B.C. and Alberta being contemplated as “foreign” circa 1990) is anchored in the territoriality as interpreted and applied by the English courts in the 19th century”
“This principle reflects one of the basic tenets of international law, that sovereign states have exclusive jurisdiction over matters that may take place in the territory of other states. Because jurisdiction is territorial is territorial a state's law has no binding affect outside its jurisdiction.”
“Modern states cannot live in splendid isolation and do give effect to judgment in other countries such as judgments in rem and personal judgments.”
“But comity is based not simply on respect for a foreign sovereign, but on convenience and even necessity. Principles or order and fairness must underlie a modern system of private international law.”
“The consideration underlying the rules of comity apply with much greater force between the units of a federal state.”
Although the Morguard case may be somewhat dated as it relates to the events of the Google case, it provides invaluable standards in consideration of territorial competence and comity. The decision to grant BC comity relative to Alberta is consistent with the court's intention at that time to ensure that provinces within the state of Canada kept up to date in terms of adhering to the elements of “convenience” (even) “necessity” and to “principles of order and fairness”.
The decision was anchored in sober reflection of the evolution of individual provincial court powers, but with the necessity to ensure that relationships existed between provincial court authorities to facilitate the criteria established “of (a) convenience; (b) necessity, (c) order and (d) fairness.”
It was easy for De Savoye to move from one province to another to live to evade the deficiencies he left behind at mortgage in Alberta. It would not be so easy for De Savoye to move to another country to live, owing to requirements for status, citizenship etc. to accomplish the same objective.
The reasons in Morguard are most important given the courts position of asserting that its decision to permit comity between provinces (Alberta and British Columbia) does not require the same “greater force” as an order between a Canadian province and a state (United States for example), which if permitted would undermine the the territorial competence of the state to permit an order from a province in Canada to have unilateral force in the considered state in the other country, in this case the United States.

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