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July 2020 No.: 11 -IRobbins v Cambridge, Glen P. Robbins v LSocietyBC - Sea to Sea Supreme Court Perfidy - Demand to Can Judicial Council for Inquiry v Hinkson CJ, Fenlon J (primary) (2nd) (Davies, Smith, Grauer JJ, Bauman CJ) (3rd) SCC Wagner --Abella,
  Jul 06, 2020

continued from No.: 10
Law Society public links declare for years now that Glen P. Robbins falsely declared himself to be a lawyer. It shamefully sounds as if GPR wants to be of their designation, when he was clearly trying not to be or do that.
It is an unfair depiction of Glen P. Robbins. He believes it lends itself to a claim of libel in context, particularly with concern for his own safety that people might think he wants to be seen as a lawyer at all, unquestionably he understands, (an unloved class of (so called) professionals if there ever were one).
(Moreover these injunctions are intended to be short lived and not exist in perpetuity, it isn’t fair or reasonable. It’s oppressive and clearly unconscionable conduct by the State).
The allegation of breach of subsection 15 (4) of the LPA made by Webster QC against Glen P. Robbins, then later taken up by Elizabeth Lyall of law firm Fasken Martineau and 2nd Chair back up lawyer -- Michael Kleisinger for Law Society of BC in the subsequent petition filed against GPR (S111171), is that Glen P. Robbins is holding himself to be a lawyer, when it is perfectly legal for GPR to hold himself out to be his wife’s (or anyone else’s) unpaid and unbenefitted lawyer.
Ita Robbins filed an affidavit with the Court, BC Law Society, and BC Attorney General that under the BMO matter she engaged subsection 15 (5) - meaning then Glen P. Robbins could not also have engaged 15 (5) as well as he was never made a party to the action.
In January 2014 Ita Robbins filed an affidavit under Requisition with Vancouver courthouse file No.: H130330 indicating that at all times and all places, including under the BMO matter, she had commenced, prosecuted and defended claims on her own behalf (readers this is the 15 (5) coronavirus legal provisions at the heart of this).
Ita Robbins believes it is sexist and a breach of her gender rights to assume that it is her husband who is the one commencing because somehow she could not.
Glen P. Robbins is the better Barrister than his wife Ita on the basis of his superior knowledge of law and extraordinary memory (GPR wrote this without any handnotes lol), helpful to the actions taken in the role of the profession, which Grauer J. simply explains in his Reasons for Judgment, and which Fenlon J. refuses to read during an hour and one half court recess, covering up the impropriety of her hearing the matter in the process.
These Reasons are a mere 14 pages double spaced.
In context, with historical evidence in support, Glen P. Robbins considers the application of subsection 15(4) against him to be a breach of his rights under 15(1), which he believes permits him to be a lawyer, so long as he does not receive a benefit or payment.
The 15 (4) defence was settled by Ellis Roadburg in January 2011 with Ita Robbins.
Ita Robbins must ultimately be reasonably presumed to have initiated the BMO case and engaged subsection 15 (5) “commence, defend, prosecute…” Both Legal Professions complaints under 15 (4) & 15 (5) occur because of the one action of Glen P. Robbins signing his name as “Lawyer for Plaintiffs”.
But, Ita Robbins insists in an Affidavit that she was the 15 (5) actor on her own file. This would leave retrospectively (and uniquely) Glen P. Robbins was responsible only for the 15 (4) issue which he settled early with BMO’s lawyer, a settlement entered into by a half score or less of other defendants.
Ita Robbins was served with the Statement of Defence of all parties, and later signed off on multiple documents during the settlement period including the settlement with Robert Ellis lawyer and legal insider with BMO Bank including for matters pertaining to her husband Glen P. Robbins.
Ita Robbins was served with the Statement of Defence of all parties, and later signed off on multiple documents during the settlement period including the settlement with Robert Ellis lawyer and legal insider with BMO Bank including for matters pertaining to her husband Glen P. Robbins.
The Law Society of BC goes after Glen P. Robbins without a reason for doing so while the corona style legal virus of subsection 15 (5) infests the BC Superior Courts.
The Law Society of BC files petition against Glen P. Robbins with the Vancouver courthouse BC Supreme Court on February 24, 2011, the same day that the BMO matter is dismissed, asserting the breach of 15(4), of the Legal Professions Act (BC), already settled with BMO lawyer Robert Ellis and every other defendant. (One cannot settle the entirety of the defence of their claim, and then elect to omit certain defences in that overall defence inconvenient to its friends at the Law Society of BC).
Under the Bank Act of Canada the lawyer of the chartered Bank, in this case Bank of Montreal “BMO” is a legal insider to the Bank. The word insider is a powerful one, historically a negative connotation particularly as this relates to stock information received by persons like Directors and Executives who have inside information.
It’s very illegal. In this case Ellis Roadburg for BMO settles a lawsuit against it like every other party (other than BMO itself) in his capacity as the lawyer for BMO and then as the newly unencumbered lawyer for BMO refuses to settle. As an insider of the Bank of Montreal methinks this stinks a little of Conflict of Interest. Don’t you? Does this sound legal? Does it sound ethical?
It’s very illegal. In this case Ellis Roadburg for BMO settles a lawsuit against it like every other party (other than BMO itself) in his capacity as the lawyer for BMO and then as the newly unencumbered lawyer for BMO refuses to settle. As an insider of the Bank of Montreal methinks this stinks a little of Conflict of Interest. Don’t you? Does this sound legal? Does it sound ethical?
The Law Societies Officer Michael Kleisinger was in attendance in the Court in the BMO matter, on two occasions. Why didn’t Michael Kleisinger direct Ellis to step aside as BMO’s lawyer owing to his participation in the settlement?
Remember all along, the crux of this original case was that lawyer Ellis Roadburg the Insider to BMO, failed to provide Ita Robbins with any Notice of overdue mortgage amounting to $1,000 - $2,000, which they paid to the mortgage account to extinguish any overdue amount in any event. Ita Robbins in her desperation to stave off foreclosure from State Actors BMO Bank and Law Society of BC offered another $750,000 (2009) to the near half million in existing equity. That little amount against all that equity. BMO would have had net security of $1,150,000 to $1,200,000.
This is an act of cruel and unusual punishment planned and implemented by State and sub State Actors. I/We are referring to BMO first when I/We say this. Imagine the depravity of what has occurred here, and I/We have published these assertions broadly and made certain parties more than aware of the publishing. It isn’t a secret, but it's not well known. On one hand Ellis Roadburg settles it all in the name Robert Ellis, yet Ellis continues on as BMO’s lawyer. BMO should have hired new counsel to hear their defence.
Glen P. Robbins informed Robert Ellis at the courthouse that he believed he ought to have recused himself as lawyer for BMO, there are many lawyers perfectly capable of handling the matter. Ellis said his client (BMO) refused to do it. (z)Ellis Roadburg put it on the Bank - a good client - and not upon himself. Robert Ellis has run in many Law Society Elections for one thing or another. He is part of the legal banking foreclosure community. His firm Ellis Roadburg has tremendous ties to the Jewish community (Jca), Roadburg himself being acknowledged as such in Dicta in another provincial court matter before Dyer J. BMO screwed up bad against Ita Robbins on the original foreclosure which set the dominos of all of the damages that followed.
A Credit Bureau for foreclosure kills homeowners when seeking mortgage money thereafter, even if they have hundreds of thousands of dollars of equity in the home. The equity remaining in the home (all values being equal) at that time would have paid the existing monthly mortgage with BMO every month for 35 years or less (because of paydown of principal monies).
Glen P. Robbins Consents to Everything the Law Society demands in its Petition. Glen P. Robbins agrees to everything the Law Society of BC demands in its petition including promising not breach 15 (4).
Glen P. Robbins Consents to Everything the Law Society demands in its Petition. Glen P. Robbins agrees to everything the Law Society of BC demands in its petition including promising not breach 15 (4).
Rather than relent with all of it’s heavy handed nonsense, LSBC takes the unusual step of amending its petition removing subsection 15(4) demands. This ex 15 (4) amended petition is subsequently served upon GPR, with a new inclusion of the “unclear” “redundant” subsection 15(5) of the LPA (which no one to this day clearly understands).
So - -the original petition of the Law Society of BC advances 15(4) the subsection about ‘referring to yourself as a lawyer’ when technically, at least the way 15 (1) is written, every person is a lawyer only actual lawyers can receive a fee or benefit. Glen P. Robbins agrees to everything the Law Society demands including its 15 (4) prohibitions in his response to petition (and in fact) to many other demands under the section of response petition where Consent to Orders are provided for.
The Law Society of BC’s amended petition is filed and served upon Glen P. Robbins but seeks no orders pertaining to subsection 15 (4) of the LPA - ‘referring to himself as lawyer’. No reasonable person in the position of Glen P. Robbins would not have come to the conclusion that once the Law Society did not continue to seek orders relating to 15 (4) in its amended petition, and after already having settle with BMO Bank lawyer and Insider Robert Ellis Roadburg over 15 (4) in the referenced matter, and signing the Settlement Order along with his wife -that before the Hearing before Grauer J., 15 (4) has been dispensed with entirely.
This assertion is subsequently reflected in Grauer J. 's Reasons for Judgment of October 3, 2011 where he directs from the Bench that the 15 (4) charge against him be dismissed on Glen P. Robbins ‘promise’.
REMEMBER the action GPR takes, signing his name to the Notice of Claim, the subject of Law Society complaints under 15(4) and 15 (5) is this one singular same action. Glen P. Robbins signs the Claim against BMO as “Lawyer for Plaintiff” - his wife. This action is primary to 15 (4) and less so to 15 (5), but they are both born of the same single (one) (une) action.
If 15 (4) is ‘flushed’ then 15 (5) should swirl the bowl simultaneously.
Grauer J. makes this order on 15 (4) at Trial Hearing (and not following the reserve to judgment (where (theoretically at least, anything could happen)). 15 (4) is described by Grauer J. as the ‘primary’ Reason for the Law Society Hearing in the first place, thus highlighting 15 (4) from as more important than 15 (5).
GPR had already settled the primary 15 (4) case twice before Grauer J. 15 (5) will be shown to be unworthy of any of the Court’s time if we properly evaluate Grauer J. 's Reasons in Law Society of BC v Glen P. Robbins (S111171), S.C.C. (35302) and certainly be proven to be unworthy of any more of the court’s time in Cambridge Mortgage v Ita Robbins (H130330), S.C.C. (35772).
The “primary” matter of 15 (4) is off the agenda at the front end of the hearing. Only the reserve judgement relating to the secondary residual matter 15 (5) “commence, defend, prosecute” is left to deal with.
Big deal.
Based on any textual reading of Grauer J. 's Reasons for Judgment “The Trial” should have ended the day with a final order - the (“W”) to the winner Glen P. Robbins, the loss and Double Costs against the Law Society of BC. (It seems to GPR that even in any hypothetical situation in BC or Canada where Law Society lawyers were arrested at hearing by bailiffs - for fraud, they would likely still be awarded the costs). (Sarcasm with Emphasis).
Why would the (apparently) less (un)important matter of 15 (5), where it is clear that no one from the top of the court to the street - has any idea what it means, be given so much, (let alone) any weight in LSBC v GPR? Only the Trial in the public courtroom is most authentic (although the foreclosure before Fenlon J. is obviously staged authentic fraud), given what we now know from these case complaints - if such a fraud can take place with the court recorder on, anything can happen once any of the decisions is made outside of the Court.
It suggests to me, that in the future in cases involving non lawyers as counsel, and one day or less hearings, should never be reserved and Costs should never be assessed against non lawyers. Costs are an onerous bar to access to justice. Reserving Judgment suggests the case was close, and where self litigants are involved no order should be granted to their detriment.
So Grauer J. reserves judgment about a Legal Profession Act Section he proclaims to badly written law (15 (5)), as Grauer J. alludes to numerous times, which badly written law is residual in importance to primary 15 (4), and where both 15 (5) and 15 (4) are causally related to the same singular action. Afterall, that Grauer J. is forced to reserve his judgment on 15 (5) following his deciding the primary decision on 15 (4) at the Hearing, makes it fair to say that we have a tie on the (very) minority question of 15 (5).
To make the point of proper Reasoning of Grauer J. 's Reasons for Judgment, 15 (4) is the primary case The Law Society of BC is making against Glen P. Robbins. ‘Primary’ means 51%-99% importance or 75% average, leaving a residual 25% leftover for 15 (5) and 15 (1) or 12.5% importance to each of 15 (1) and 15 (5).
However, 15 (5)’s value of 12.5% must be reduced because of its “unclear”, “redundant” language, and the fact that its provisions are amended in May 2012 subtracting language from 15 (5) redundant to the same or similar language already possessed by 15 (1) as Grauer J. clearly establishes in his Reasons for Judgment 15 (5)’s value should again be reduced.
By our own sensible discretionary deductions (mockery intended with emphasis) I/We reduce the value of 15 (5) to 6.5%. From this point we then assess the value between the Primary case before Grauer J. relating to 15 (4) settled 3 times by Glen P. Robbins (lol) throughout the LSBC/BC Supreme Court insanity as 12 times the primary value as 15 (5).
Both 15 (4) and 15 (5) are complained about - they encompass one action, yet neither of the provisions can possibly be construed as similar. 15 (4) is Primarily reasoned to be baseline 75% of the entire Law Society of BC case. Dispensing with 15 (4) drags 15 (5) along with it (see earlier ‘flushing’).
Under this method of mathematical deduction 15 (5) attracts a big zero, nil value for 15 (5).
Averaging 15 (5)’s value pursuant to Grauer J. produces an average for these provisions of 6.5% and zero percent or 3.25% legal value ascribed to 15 (5). Assessing costs against Glen P. Robbins on the face of the early portion of Grauer J. 's Reasons are light years beyond unfair, it is intellectually offensive. It’s intellectually unreasonable.
It’s suspicious given the result didn’t occur naturally at trial, where GPR believes he easily “Thumped and Trumped” ® the Law Society of BC lawyers including Elizabeth Lyall and Michael Kleisinger. Applying the defence of discretion is mentally lazy, and in context and insufficient excuse to parlay it into the conspiracy narrative of criminality.
What is the process of dealing with reserved judgments following hearing? Does any other person not at trial (including court clerk) make contact or connection with the case, have input into the judgment?
BC Justices under the Judges Act of Canada make $300,000 per year, many benefits, pension etc. Their offices cost the taxpayer one million dollars per year or more. Did the Law Society of BC and/or BC Attorney General interfere with or influence Grauer J.’s final decision?
Obviously, among the $1,000,000 annual cost for each judge made per year, other people are working with justices. What made Christoper Grauer, BC Supreme Court Justice want to provide Reasons which excoriates the Law Society’s unclear language under 15 (5) and flatters Glen P. Robbins calling him “ingenious” - but gives costs to the Law Society?
No ordinary person with the capacity to Reasons and armed with the facts would support a decision against GPR by simple deductive reasoning of reading Grauer J. 's Reasons for Judgment of October 3, 2011. BC Justice Lauri Anne Fenlon presiding over the foreclosure application of May 9, 2013 uses the flimsy - weak and no longer in existence provisions of 15 (5) from Grauer J. to commence the property theft against Ita Robbins.
Justice Lauri Anne Fenlon, who presided at Bakonyi/Cambridge’s foreclosure petition (absent affidavit of full disclosure of triable issues (clearly known to Bakonyi/Cambridge given they had been sued over the case at New Westminster courthouse 149328)), was implored by Glen P. Robbins at Hearing to read Grauer J.’s Reasons by Glen P. Robbins. Twice on Court Transcript of Hearing that day, GPR begged her to read Grauer’s Reasons for Judgment during the long afternoon recess court workers and judges enjoy every day.
Fenlon didn’t read the Reasons for Judgment she had in her possession because she knew doing so would inform her that Elizabeth Lyall of Vancouver Fasken Martineau, her former boss was lead lawyer for LSBC at the hearing before Grauer J., and also knew the Reasons would identify that the order made by Grauer in relation to the weak and unclear provisions of 15 (5) had no relation to the right of audience ‘procedural’ (not substantive) consideration before her.
This outcome should never have occurred - it simply wasn’t right. It was simply the continuation of BC lawyer, Constitutional justice perfidy against Ita Robbins & Glen P. Robbins.
On Grauer J., and Legal Professions Act 15 (4) and 15 (5).
In process of arriving at the same ‘spot’ in the reasoning of these submissions, the reader, be it State actor (elected person), or public jury, will come to understand that any reasonable interpretation of Grauer J.’s Reasons, demands 15 (5) be given not even residual weight, lower than de minimis and the Grauer J. order relating to 15 (5) be struck from the record as at October 3, 2011, the date of that judgment.
Subsection 15(5) is a different animal than subsection 15(4). The latter relates to referring to oneself as a lawyer when the law asserts that every person is a lawyer under 15(1) so long as they don’t receive a fee or benefit. (Imagine the Law Society of BC acting under BC Attorney General having to ascertain what type of benefits are ongoing in a marriage).
15(5) is in reference to “any person in his own name commencing prosecuting and defending a claim”. Would the reader know just how to interpret what 15 (5) means to the public who are included in the provisions of Section 15 Authority to Practice law?
Does this language make any sense to you?
In his Reasons for Judgment, Grauer J. attached 15 (5) to the work of the solicitor, the ‘paper pusher’, the ‘document filer’ at the court registry. The Barrister is according to Grauer J in his Reasons a different person than the solicitor. The Barrister attends to the Court to Speak to the Judge or Justice or other decision maker in relation to the documents filed for both/all parties in the action.
In his Reasons for Judgment, Grauer J. unequivocally separates the provisions of the Legal Profession Act, 15 (5) for instance, from having anything to do with matters pertaining to rights of audience (speaking as a barrister would do) before presiding justice a constitutional right.
Glen P. Robbins clearly wins the battle with the Law Society, compelling Justice Grauer to determine that the Law Society has NO right to intervene in matters of right of audience with any of the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (BC).
It's none of their ‘communist’ business.
It's only the presiding Justices business based on constitutional discretion who can make that decision, but they do not have the latitude within that discretion to misinterpret an order, particularly an order from 15 (5) so unclear it was like the authors of it in 1996 might have been impaired when they drafted the provisions.
In any event, there is ‘case law a plenty’ across courts everywhere within this great land featuring many non lawyers acting in a court process with multiple vexatious orders and other contaminants on their record, to at least be permitted an opportunity to make proper arguments and adduce evidence in a substantive application as to why they ought to be heard.
On May 9, 2013 under BCSC foreclosure H130330 presiding Justice Fenlon knew of no vexatious order against Glen P. Robbins (LSBC Kleisinger & former law partner Chris Hinkson back fill that nearly a year later), nor any other blemish against his record as a non lawyer other than perhaps the attributes of ‘genius’, ‘heroic’, and ‘should be treated as a lawyer at all times’, hardly discrediting attributes.
She appears misinformed (lied to) with legal explanations of the Grauer J. Reasons most particularly related to subsection 15 (5) possessing significantly less elegance then the legal provisions themselves in 15 (5), asserting before Fenlon J. that the order made by Grauer J. relating to confusing, “unclear”, “redundant” subsection 15 (5) automatically denied Glen P. Robbins a right of audience. Appears like an insider set up job among the lawyers and the judge doesn’t it?
Judicial discretion is not unfettered. Grauer J. for instance does not have the discretion to award costs in a case where his own Reasons would contradict such an offhand and ‘uninvestigated’ (or alternatively hometown call for lawyers decision), in a matter where any fair minded person would contradict Grauer J.’s assertion relating to costs that GPR didn’t try hard enough to comply with the Law Society’s demands.
Grauer J. certainly did not have the discretion to assess costs based on the 15 (5) breach, the same provisions he refers to as a residual matter, not the primary case as presented in the Law Societies original petition,the language in it, where the Judge makes mockery of the Legal Profession Act (BC) in his Reasons for Judgments compelling the amendments to those exact provisions just months later in the BC Legislature.
In 2010 when the original BMO action was filed, Glen P. Robbins had no idea what subsection 15(5) means, just as Fenlon J. in May 2013 had no idea what 15 (1) means, but somehow purports/pretends to understand what 15 (5) means sufficient to grant it constitutional authority. (GPR says How depressing to be that blocked).
Fenlon J. mistakenly then fuses Grauer’s version of 15 (5) to the right of audience. Is this what taxpayers should be paying for in a Constitutionally appointed (anointed) Judge?
As Grauer J. indicates in his Reasons For Judgment there has been no conclusive judgment on 15 (5) or even effort from both levels of Superior Court in the Province of British Columbia to determine what 15(5) means prior to the Glen P. Robbins case with the Law Society of BC.
What's equally important, is how many regular people would understand what subsection 15 (5) means? Don’t the courts want access to the courts and justice to be transparent? Maybe they don’t.
I/We would estimate that if I gathered 100 regular people - all with IQ of 115 (half way between average and genius) or higher, and provided them with an opportunity to express how they might interpret 15 (5) of the BC LPA first under Grauer J., then after amendments to 15 (5) because of Grauer J. in May 2012, and further asked them to compare and contrast the language in 15 (5) to 15 (4), none would have a clue.
Fenlon J. didn’t have a clue on May 9, 2013, why should people at 115 or similar to her not trained in law be expected to do better? If I undertook a similar experiment of 100 articled students with no background information and no prospect of researching the case law, 2 might plausibly be able to explain the provisions.
I would again emphasize that the breach under 15 (5), at least according to Grauer J. does not invalidate the document that contains the germ of the breach, rather Grauer refers to it as a contempt of court.
This contempt of court ‘lite’ occurs at the filing of the document as a ‘solicitor is wont to do’ (Grauer J. in Reasons for Judgment, October 3, 2011 LSBC v GPR), at the ‘commencement’ stage of the filing, and by extension of those Reasons has nothing whatsoever to do with a right of audience.
Does that understanding of contempt of court assessed by Grauer J. in October 3, 2011, going on nine years now hold any water to the Contempt of Court revealed of these contemptible court characters?
The BC Legislature circa 1996, at least according to Grauer J. did not put any sense into 15 (5) when they put it into law. Most justices, including Fenlon J., don’t understand it, but she found it useful for her use that day for reasons still unexplained.
The BC New Democrats were in power in the province when this very very stupid law 15 (5) first reared its ugly head under the Legal Profession Act (BC). Grauer J.’s Reasons for Judgement forced the amendment (by any measure of legal inference) of 15 (5). Language was removed, it is not readily understandable which it ought to since it engages. It’s a loser. A secondary minority de minimis legal case caused all of the mess.
It invigorated two dirty cops, Michael Kleisinger Enforcement Officer with Law Society of BC and Chris Hinkson Chief Justice - a former Law Society of BC to fuck with the entire legal system, the courts, the registries, and the public, with a level of deviance only surpassed by the level of the denial of other people who might do something about it.
The May 2012 BC Legislature amendment to 15 (5) subtracts language and leaves or adds those subtracted words to 15 (1) the main subsection of the Authority to Practice law and Fenlon J. doesn’t know what 15 (1) means, yet permits 15 (5) to prevail at hearing. As Jed Clampett says: “Pitiful”.
Here is what Grauer J. had to say in his Reasons for Judgment involving 15(1), 15(5) & 15(4) Dated October 3, 2011.
First, for context at paragraph (2) Page 2 Grauer writes: “Ms. Robbins is the wife, and Ms. Matich the mother-in-law of the respondent in the proceeding, Glen P. Robbins, Honeysuckle Lane (the subject home) was his residence too.”
At paragraph (2) Page 2 Grauer J. writes: “The Law Society then brought this petition seeking, first, an order permanently prohibiting and enjoining Mr. Robbins from representing himself as a lawyer until such time as he becomes a member in good standing of the Law Society, and second, an order permanently prohibiting and enjoining Mr. Robbins from commencing, prosecuting, or defending in any court in his own name or in the name of another person except as permitted by section 15 (1) of the Legal Profession Act S.B.C. 1998, c.9 (the Act).”
At paragraph (5) Page 2 Grauer J. writes: “At the hearing before me, Mr. Robbins did not seriously contest the Law Societies entitlement to the first order it sought (15 (4)).” “He promised that he would not so describe himself again. I pronounce the order on the terms requested, but reserve my judgment on the second order (sic) which the Law Society applied for 15 (5).”
At paragraph (14) Page 4 Grauer J. writes: “Mr. Robbins signed the Notice of Claim as “Lawyer for Plaintiffs” (there is an invitation on the Form for the 15 (1) stipulation). “It was filed in the Vancouver Registry of the Supreme Court as Action No.: S-106413. It is this action that is primarily responsible for the Law Societies intervention” (subsection 15 (4)).
AND, for salt in the new wounds At Section 2 “The Legislation” at paragraph (20) Grauer J. writes: “The Law Society brings this application pursuant to sections 15 and 85 of the Act, relying in particular subsection 15 (1) and 15 (5).”
We can see Grauer J.’s Reasoning has already gone off the rails. Paragraph (14) Page 4 declares subsection 15 (4) (referring to oneself as lawyer as a non lawyer) is the (P)rimary responsibility for the Law Societies intervention in the amended petition application, but he later contradicts this conclusion by insisting the Law Society brings this application pursuant to sections 15 and 85 of the Act, relying in particular subsection 15 (1) and 15 (5).
What weight then to we give to 15 (5) as a consequence of Grauer J.’s own words? The ‘Appeal’ should be granted on this inconsistency alone.
But wait there’s more:

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